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Abstract: Sjaastad (1962) viewed migration in the same way as education: as an investment 
in the human agent. Migration and education are decisions that are indeed intertwined in 
many dimensions. Education and skill acquisition play an important role at many stages of an 
individual’s migration. Differential returns to skills in origin- and destination country are a 
main driver of migration. The economic success of the immigrant in the destination country 
is to a large extent determined by her educational background, how transferable these skills 
are to the host country labour market, and how much she invests into further skills after 
arrival. The desire to acquire skills in the host country that have a high return in the country 
of origin may also be an important reason for a migration. From an intertemporal point of 
view, the possibility of a later migration may also affect educational decisions in the home 
country long before a migration is realised. In addition, the decisions of migrants regarding 
their own educational investment, and their expectations about future migration plans may 
also affect the educational attainment of their children. But migration and education are not 
only related for those who migrate or their descendants. Migrations of some individuals may 
have consequences for educational decisions of those who do not migrate, both in the home- 
and in the host country. By easing credit constraints through remittances, migration of some 
may help others to go to school. By changing the skill base of the receiving country, 
migration may change incentives to invest in certain types of human capital. Migrants and 
their children may create externalities that influence educational outcomes of non-migrants in 
the destination country. This chapter will discuss some of the key areas that connect 
migration and education. 
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Starting with homo erectus about 2 million years ago, the first humans were organised 
in groups of hunters and gatherers. These groups were nomadic, and the economic foundation 
of their existence was making migrations a necessity, forcing them to move continuously 
according to food supplies. Constant migration was the normality. Today, populations that 
pursue a nomadic lifestyle are the exception. The abandonment of the hunting and gathering 
lifestyle by humans about 10,000 years ago, when this lifestyle was replaced by agriculture, 
changed the technology of subsistence production. It led to social and political structures that 
built on non-nomadic forms of economising. If migrations took place nevertheless, then for 
two main reasons: either because people were forced to move by natural disasters or man-
made circumstances (such as persecution due to distinct political or religious views), or 
because economic prospects seemed more favorable in other regions. Immigrant-receiving 
countries today draw distinctions between these two different motives for movement. The 
Geneva Convention of 1951 defines a refugee as any person “who owing to a well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country – or return 
to it”. Its signatories committed to not sending an individual back into a situation of possible 
persecution. According to United Nations figures, 7.1 percent of all international migrants in 
2005 are refugees from their countries of origin.
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2 Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. International 
Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision, 2009.  
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In this chapter, we will deal mainly with migrations due to the second motive: 
movements that are due to individual decisions based on some optimising considerations. We 
will focus our discussion on international migrations, although much of what we discuss also 
holds for migrations within national borders.
3 Deliberate migrations are driven by economic 
motives and considerations, and can therefore be subjected to economic analysis and 
investigation. Hicks noted in his Theory of Wages in 1932 (p. 76) that it is differences in net 
economic advantages, chiefly differences in wages, [that] are the main causes of migration.  
Education, in turn, is a main determinant of wages, both in the country of origin and 
the potential destination country.
4 Although the decisions about how much education to 
obtain and whether to migrate are often sequential, individuals may in many cases make these 
choices simultaneously, choosing education at home with a view to migrating later. Once 
migrated, choices about skill acquisition in the host country are crucial for the economic pay-
off of the migration decision. These investment decisions are, in turn, related to future 
migration plans and therefore the forms that migrations take over the individuals’ life cycles. 
Furthermore, acquisition of education may be the sole reason for a migration – student 
migrations are an example. Some countries, such as the U.S., the UK and Australia, are 
established “learning centres”, offering educational products to an international market. The 
acquisition of skills abroad that are more productive at home may also take place on the job – 
for instance through the acquisition of language skills or learning of particular production 
technologies. Thus, individual migration decisions and decisions about educational 
                                                 
3 We follow the convention in most of the literature in economics, and define an “immigrant” as an individual 
that resides and works in a country other than the country where he/she was born. This is the standard definition 
of immigrants in the Anglo-Saxon countries; however some countries (like Germany) define immigrants based 
on nationality rather than country of birth. 
4 We will use the terms country of destination and host country, and the terms country of origin and home 
country interchangeably throughout this chapter.  
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attainment are strongly intertwined, and we will shed light on this relationship in the third 
section of the chapter.  
But migrations may also affect educational attainments of those who do not choose to 
move, both in the destination and the origin countries. Migrations may lead to a change in the 
skill base of both sets of countries, affecting average levels of education and possibly 
generating educational externalities and new incentives for human capital investments. For 
instance, if immigration is selective in the sense that only better able individuals move, then 
this may enhance the skill base in the destination country, while it may deplete the skill base 
in the country of origin, with consequences for the populations of those who have chosen not 
to move. However, there may be situations where migration enhances the skill base of both 
countries. Immigration may lead to a specialisation of non-migrant workers in the destination 
country in areas where they have a competitive advantage. It may also lead to an 
improvement of the economic situation of migrants’ families, for instance through 
remittances, thus enabling children to attend school instead of working. Remittances may also 
help to create educational infrastructures that foster educational attainment of those who do 
not have family members who migrate. We will discuss immigrant selection and the 
interrelation between migration and education of those who do not move in the fourth section 
of this chapter. 
Finally, migration is a long-term process, with many immigrants bringing their 
children with them or founding families in their host countries. In this context, it is important 
to understand how the children of immigrants are accommodated by the host country’s 
education system and how they perform in it relative to native children? What is the role 
intergenerational transmission of human capital plays for the longer run integration process 
and how does it affect the immigrants’ long-term convergence to the native population? 
These are key questions in the current debate about immigration, in particular in those  
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countries that only recently received large immigrant populations. We will discuss the 
educational achievement of the children of immigrants and their intergenerational mobility in 
the fifth section of this chapter. 
 There are therefore three related cornerstones to this chapter. These cover the key 
economic aspects of the individual migration decision, their connection to education and skill 
selection of immigrants, and the nature of intergenerational spillovers. The analysis of these 
three cornerstones provides a comprehensive overview of the economic connections between 
migration and education. 
Before considering these three inter-related areas in detail, we begin in Section 2 by 
setting the scene with the presentation of some empirical evidence about immigrant 
populations in OECD countries, their educational attainment, their labor market performance, 
and how they compare to natives and to those in their home countries who decided not to 
move. We will demonstrate the large diversity of immigrant populations in different 
countries, which is often due to historical reasons, such as colonial pasts, historical trade 
links, or particular recruitment policies at earlier points in time. At the same time, the 
descriptive evidence we present shows many common features across populations of 
immigrants in different destination countries. Some of these features we will return to later in 
the individual sections that deal with the migrant, the non-migrants, and the children of 
immigrants where we will embed them into a more structural framework. In order to ensure 
comparability, we focus on OECD countries for which detailed and standardised data are 
available. 
2. Empirical Evidence 




When thinking about the educational attainment of migrants, two points of reference 
naturally come to mind, the educational attainment of the migrants relative to the native 
population in the destination country, and the educational attainment of the migrants relative 
to their compatriots who remained in their country of origin. To provide an overview, Table 
1a shows the educational attainment of the foreign-born (FB) population in the 10 most 
important immigrant receiving OECD countries around the year 2000.
5 These 10 countries 
together host 86 percent of the around 76 million foreign-born individuals aged 15 and older 
that live in one of the 28 OECD countries for which data are available (data for Chile and 
Iceland are not available). Not surprisingly, given the heterogeneity in countries of origin and 
migration policies in place, there is substantial variation in the educational composition of the 
foreign-born population across destination countries. In Canada, for example, only 22 percent 
of the foreign-born aged 25-64 report lower secondary education (“low education”) as their 
highest educational attainment, while in France, Italy and Spain about 50 percent of the 
foreign-born have at most completed lower secondary education. At the other end of the 
educational spectrum, the share of foreign-born individuals with tertiary education (“high 
education”) exceeds 30 percent in Australia, Canada, the UK and the U.S., whereas in 
Germany and Italy, this share is below 20 percent. The composition of the foreign-born 
population in terms of their educational attainment becomes particularly relevant when seen 
in relation with the educational attainment of the native-born population (NB). Based on such 
comparisons, one can broadly divide the OECD destination countries into a group 
                                                 
5 We report OECD data for the year 2000, as these are the most recent ones that include comparable information 
on educational attainment. With the exception of Germany and France, the overall stocks of migrants have 
further increased across the OECD countries listed in Table 1a between the year 2000 and 2008, with an overall 
growth rate of approximately 37 percent (based on data from the International Migration Database). The most 
noticeable change over this period took place in Spain where the foreign-born population more than tripled to 
around 6.4 million in 2008. However, with the exception of Japan, whose stock of foreign workers increased 
particularly fast in this period, the countries listed in Table 1a remain the main OECD destination countries also 
in 2008.  
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characterised by a high-skilled foreign-born population consisting of Australia, Canada, and 
the UK, and a group characterized by a low-skilled foreign-born population consisting of 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the U.S., with Spain’s and Italy’s 
foreign- and native-born populations showing relatively comparable educational structures. 
For example, in Australia, Canada and the UK, the share of the foreign-born population with 
high education exceeds the share of the native-born population with high education by 5.5 
percentage points, 7.3 percentage points and 16.1 percentage points, respectively. On the 
other hand, in France, Germany and the U.S., the share of the foreign-born population with 
low education exceeds the share of the native-born population with only low education by 
14.6 percentage points, 25.5 percentage points and 22.8 percentage points, respectively.
6 
 
[Table 1a: Educational Attainment of Immigrants in receiving countries] 
 
But the relative educational attainment of the foreign-born in their destination 
countries is only one side of the coin. The other natural comparison group consists of the 
migrants’ compatriots who have remained in their country of origin. Table 1b provides some 
evidence for the 11 biggest immigrant-sending countries within the group of OECD 
countries.
7 Though again subject to substantial variation, a prominent feature in these figures 
                                                 
6 For a detailed analysis of worldwide international mobility by educational attainment, see Docquier and 
Marfouk (2006). 
7 The figures are constructed from OECD data by aggregating across all OECD countries all foreign-born by 
country of origin, restricting the sample of origin countries to OECD countries, and then selecting the 11 
countries from which the largest number of foreign-born individuals originated. Since not all potential countries 
of origin are separately recorded for each OECD country, this is not entirely accurate, but, given that for each 
OECD country the most important countries of origin are separately reported (and often many more), this 
procedure should correctly pick up the 11 biggest OECD immigrant-sending countries. Of course there are 
additional important non-OECD countries of origin such as (in descending order) China, India, the Philippines, 
Russia, and Vietnam for which, however, we do not observe the educational attainment of the population in the 
home country in the OECD data.  
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is that for the majority of origin countries, the share of movers with high education is 
substantially larger than the share of stayers with high education. For example, while about 
23 percent, 22 percent, and 34 percent of the native-born British, French, and Americans still 
living in their country of birth have high education (Column (7)), the corresponding shares 
among the group of those who left these countries are 40 percent, 40 percent and 61 percent 
(Column (4)), respectively. It appears that for these countries of origin, the better-educated 
individuals are the more mobile ones. However, for other countries the picture looks 
different. For example, for Mexico, the main source country of U.S. immigration, the share of 
movers with only low education is relatively similar to that of the stayers (around 70 percent), 
whereas the share of movers with high education (around 7 percent) is significantly lower 
than in the group of stayers (15 percent). Turkey, which is the main country of origin for 
Germany, and Portugal exhibit similar patterns. For these countries, those who decide to 
emigrate appear to come predominantly from the middle of the educational spectrum.  
 
[Table 1b: Educational Attainment of Emigrants in Sending Countries] 
 
The aggregate figures in Table 1a and Table 1b conceal the substantial variation in 
immigrants’ educational attainment that exists across origin countries for any given 
destination country (Table 1a) and across destination countries for any given origin country 
(Table 1b). Focusing on the former, Table 2 shows for each of the 10 main immigrant-
receiving OECD countries the foreign-born populations with the highest and lowest 
educational attainment. For instance, looking at the last row of the table, of all the main 
countries of origin of immigration to the U.S., the foreign-born originating from Mexico are 
the least well educated with about 69 percent having only low education (Column (3)). On 
the other hand, the most highly educated group in the U.S. are Indians of whom around 75  
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percent have high education (Column (8)). For Germany, the country of origin with the 
highest share of immigrants with only low education is Turkey with 73 percent (Column (3)), 
compared to French immigrants of whom only 9.8 percent have low education (Column (1)). 
The (unweighted) standard deviations reported in Columns (5) and (10) provide a summary 
measure of the extent of educational heterogeneity of each countries’ immigrant population 
across different countries of origin, showing that in many cases a given destination country 
attracts immigrants with high educational background from some countries, but with poor 
educational background from other countries. 
  
[Table 2: Variance/Min/Max of Share of Tertiary/Primary Education, by Country of 
Immigration/Country of Origin] 
 
Table 3 shows for each of the 11 main immigrant-sending countries in the OECD the 
destination countries that receive the highest and the lowest educated group of its emigrating 
population. For instance, looking at the first row of the table, only 5.0 percent of all Mexicans 
living in Sweden have low education (Column (1)), whereas this is the case for 69.0 percent 
of all Mexicans living in the U.S. (Column (3)). Similarly, only 7 percent of Poles living in 
the Czech Republic have high education (Column (6)) whereas the corresponding share in the 
UK is 48.7 percent (Column (8)). Clearly, highly heterogeneous subgroups of individuals 
from a given country of origin decide to move to specific host countries, as again summarised 
by the standard deviations reported in Columns (5) and (10). We will discuss possible reasons 
for these differences below.  
  





The educational attainment of the foreign-born population serves as a key indicator of 
their performance in the host country’s labour market. However, even if the foreign-born 
population in a given host country is as well educated as the native-born population in terms 
of the level of formal qualification or completed years of schooling, they are unlikely to 
perform equally well in the labour market. The educational skills immigrants bring with them 
may not be easily transferable to the host country labour market (e.g. due to language 
deficiencies), and a highly skilled immigrant is unlikely to command the same wage as a 
native-born worker with the same educational background, at least in the first years after 
arrival.  
We illustrate this in Column (1) of Table 4, which shows the median wage of the 
foreign-born relative to the median wage of the native-born in a selected set of OECD 
destination countries. Columns (2) to (4) show the corresponding wage ratios separately by 
education group. With the exception of Australia, the foreign-born earn overall less than the 
native-born, in particular in the U.S. where the median wage gap amounts to 21 percent. 
While in the lowest education group, immigrants tend to earn slightly more than comparable 
natives (with the exception of France and Sweden), they earn substantially less than natives 
in the medium- and high-education group. In Canada, France and Portugal, for example, 
immigrants with high education earn at least 10 percent less than natives with high education. 
Overall, wages of immigrants seem to rise more slowly with educational attainment than 
wages of natives, suggesting that immigrants face a lower return to schooling in the host 
country than natives do. 
 Columns (5) to (8) focus on the high education group and show relative wages of 
foreign-born men and women with high education, now distinguishing between individuals 
that received their tertiary education in their home country and those that received it in the 
host country. The difference between the relative returns reported here thus addresses, at least  
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in part, the issue of transferability of human capital from the origin to the destination 
country.
8 The less transferable the skills acquired in the home country, the lower their return 
relative to the return obtained from domestically acquired tertiary education. With the 
exception of men in France and Australia, the figures show that wages are always higher for 
foreign-born graduates with host country specific tertiary education, in some cases even 
exceeding the wages earned by native-born graduates with tertiary education. 
 
[Table 4: Relative Median Wage, by country and education level] 
 
2.2 Migration and Acquisition of Education 
 
As pointed out in the previous section, it is important to distinguish between 
education acquired in the home country before migrating, and education acquired in the host 
country. In particular minors, who arrive together with their parents, and young adults, who 
immigrate to attend one of the host country’s universities, add to their existing stock of 
human capital by acquiring further formal host country specific education. With education 
being a tradable good, some countries have specialized in its production. For instance, 
Australia’s third largest export article (after coal and iron ore) is international education.
9 
                                                 
8 While a lack of transferability of human capital will be necessarily reflected in lower relative wage ratios, it 
cannot be easily distinguished from differences in the quality of education obtained because of different 
educational systems and institutions in the origin and destination countries. Although the OECD data reported in 
Tables 1 to 4 are based on the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED 1997) which, in 
principle, is based on the educational content of the programmes assessed rather than institutional 
idiosyncrasies, an accurate and consistent measurement of actual educational achievements across different 
countries remains difficult (see also Hanushek and Zhang, 2009).  
9 In 2007/08, international education contributed 13.7 billion AUD to the Australian economy, measured 
through export earnings, which is the sum of international student expenditure on tuition fees, goods and 




This specialisation in the provision of educational services is apparent from Table 5, 
which shows for the 10 biggest immigrant receiving OECD countries the share of foreign 
students enrolled in tertiary education. Across all destination countries, foreign students 
constitute a significant fraction of the student population, with their share often exceeding 10 
percent. In Switzerland and the UK, about one in five students is a foreign student, a fraction 
that increases further to around 45 percent when restricting attention to advanced research 
programs such as doctorates. In terms of absolute numbers, the UK and the U.S. are the two 
main destination countries for foreign students, hosting around 460 and 620 thousand 
students in 2008, respectively. Column (4) in Table 5 shows by how much the number of 
foreign students in tertiary education has changed over the decade between 1998 and 2008. 
Across the board, foreign student numbers have increased substantially. This is not only true 
in countries that started from a relatively low base such as Italy and the Netherlands (where 
student numbers increased by 160 percent and 200 percent, respectively) but also in countries 
that were already popular destinations in 1998 such as Australia, the UK and the U.S. (where 
numbers increased by 111 percent, 121 percent and 45 percent, respectively). Overall, in the 
ten OECD countries listed in Table 5, the number of foreign students increased by 80.8 
percent between 1999 and 2008 which, given an increase in the corresponding overall stock 
of immigrants over the same period of around 42.5 percent
10, indicates that the acquisition of 
formal education in foreign countries is not only a widespread phenomenon, but one that has 
also been rapidly gaining importance in recent years.  
                                                 
10 The calculation of this figure is based on data from the International Migration Database and refers to the 
change of the sum of the foreign-born population in Australia, Canada, France, the Netherlands, Spain, and the 
U.S. and the population with foreign citizenship in Germany, Italy, Switzerland and the UK between 1999 and 
2008. The missing immigrant stocks for Canada and France were linearly extrapolated from available figures in 
2001 and 2006 (Canada) and 1999 and 2006 (France).  
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The last column in Table 5 shows estimated retention rates of graduates in their host 
countries following the completion of their studies. While the calculation of these figures is 
not unproblematic (for details, see OECD, 2010), the estimates show that between 15 to 30 
percent of all foreign graduates remain in their host countries after graduation, evidently to a 
large extent for work purposes.
11 These numbers suggest that the acquisition of education in 
countries that have established themselves as “learning centres” is a main reason for 
migration, and that individuals choose to return to their countries of origin in order to apply 
the skills accumulated (see Dustmann et al., 2010a, for modeling of such migrations, and our 
discussion in Sections 3.2 and 4.3). Of course, these numbers may also partly be driven by 
regulations that do not allow individuals to remain after the completion of their studies. 
Indeed, in many countries, particularly in Europe, existing policies make it difficult for 
foreign students to stay and obtain a work permit. In recent years, the transition from study to 
work has been facilitated in many student destination countries, for example by enabling 
students to work while studying, or by extending the period granted to search for work 
following the completion of study (see ICMPD, 2006, for a comparative study on retention 
policies in a large number of industrialised countries). For instance, several countries have 
recently started to issue a special residence permit to foreign graduates for the purpose of 
seeking a job, including the UK (for one to two years, introduced in 2004/2005), Germany 
(for one year, introduced in 2005) and France (for 6 months, introduced in 2006).
12 Other 
special provisions introduced to facilitate the transition from study to work for foreign 
                                                 
11 Retention rates are calculated as the number of international students who change their legal migration status 
between 2006 and 2007, for example from “student” to “work” or to “family formation”, divided by the number 
of international students who do not renew their student permit. On average 61 percent of international students 
change their status for work-related reasons (OECD, 2010). 
12 While in France and Germany these jobs have to correspond to the graduate’s qualification and are subject to 
labour market testing, permit holders in the UK are free to take up any employment they like. Contrary to the 
U.S. and Canada, the applicants in these countries do not already need to have a job offer at hand.  
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graduates include the allocation of extra points for a degree from a national institution of 
higher education (Canada, Australia and New Zealand), a waiver of an obligatory work 
experience record (Australia and the Czech Republic), the exemption from the regular quota 
for “key workers” (Austria), and a specific category with a special quota for foreign 
graduates (Australia, Italy, U.S.). These policy changes are a reflection of the increasing 
global competition in attracting and retaining highly skilled workers. Kato and Sparber 
(2010) show that students are indeed responsive to such immigration policies. Studying the 
effect of the sharp reduction in the number of available H-1B visas – the primary means of 
legal employment for college-educated foreign nationals in the U.S. – in 2003, they find that 
this restrictive immigration policy has had a negative impact on the quality of prospective 
international applicants to U.S. colleges. The intuition is that only the high ability students 
are affected by the new policy since low ability foreign students are unlikely to find U.S. 
employment even in the absence of visa quotas. Faced with a reduced prospect of gaining 
access to the U.S. labour market after graduation, the “best and brightest” of the global talent 
pool appear to choose other host countries to provide them with both valuable education and 
the possibility of applying this education in the local labour market.  
For the U.S., which is host to the largest number of foreign students in the world, 
there are no overall retention rates of graduate students available. However, Finn (2007) 
shows that for the group of foreigners who have earned a doctorate in an American 
university, the retention rate five years after they received their degree is around 65-70 
percent. In a cross-country comparison, this is likely to be at the upper end of the spectrum of 
retention rates.  
 




In terms of the students’ origin, there is once again substantial heterogeneity across 
destination countries. Looking at Table 6, three factors appear important for the choice of 
students where to obtain education: geographical distance, language, and former colonial ties. 
For instance, the majority of students in Australia (79.3 percent) originate from Asia, and in 
particular from China, which supplies a quarter of all foreign students. In Europe, Italy and 
Switzerland are countries that attract mostly foreign students from other European countries 
whereas France has a large share of students from its former colonies in Africa (43.5 percent 
of which 25.5 percent are from Morocco and 17.7 percent from Algeria), and Spain has a 
relatively large share of students from Spanish-speaking South America (40.7 percent of 
which 21.4 percent are from Colombia and 16.7 percent from Peru). In the two biggest 
student-receiving countries, the UK and the U.S., most foreign students originate from Asia 
(39.5 percent and 67.2 percent, respectively, of which 28.1 percent and 26.3 percent are from 
China).  
Figure 1 shows the development of the overall number of foreign students studying in 
the 10 main OECD destination countries listed in Table 5 between 1999 and 2008. There is a 
clear upward trend, in particularly from 2001 onwards, with student numbers increasing from 
a little more than 1.2 million in 1999 to more than 2.2 million in 2008. Most of this increase 
is driven by increasing numbers of students from Asia and, to a lesser extent, Europe and 
Africa. Although we cannot tell from these data whether these students came to their 
destination countries for the sole purpose of studying, or whether they already arrived as 
young children with their parents and are expecting a more permanent stay, the important role 
of many destination countries in providing education to non-citizens is clearly discernible. 
[Table 6: Origin of foreign students] 




The figures in the previous section suggest that many migrations today are undertaken 
for the purpose of acquiring education. According to the International Passenger Survey, for 
example, about 40 percent of all migrants arriving in the UK in the year 2009 cited as their 
main reason for migration the desire to pursue formal studies, up from around 23 percent in 
the year 2000. Migrations of this type are likely to be temporary. But temporary migrations 
are a more general phenomenon and widespread also among classical labour migrations. 
There are about 2.5 million temporary workers arriving in the OECD countries per year, 
mostly seasonal workers and young working holiday-makers with work permits for a duration 
of less than one year (OECD, 2008). The temporary character of these migrations has 
important implications for the type of immigrants’ educational attainments and their 
investments in human capital as we will see in Section 3.3. While until recently the analysis 
of immigrants’ earnings and human capital investments has largely assumed migrations to be 
permanent, modern migrations seem to be characterized by different patterns. Indeed, 
numbers suggest that a large fraction of the foreign-born population will at some point return 
to their home country. 
One way to study the time dimension of migration is to look at the duration of stay in 
the host country. Columns (1) to (3) of Table 7 show the share of the foreign-born population 
in the main OECD destination countries that have been in their host country for less than 5 
years, more than 10 years, and more than 20 years. Clearly these cross-sectional figures can 
only be indicative of the temporary nature of migrations since, for example, a high share of 
short durations could be either due to actual short migration durations or due to a large 
number of very recent arrivals (as, for example, in the case of Italy and Spain). However, 
with the exception of France, the share of migrants that have already been living in their host 
countries for more than 20 years (and could therefore be considered as permanent) does 
hardly ever significantly exceed 50 percent. In the U.S., for example, only 35.7 percent of the  
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foreign-born population has already lived in the country for more than 20 years. As these 
figures may be driven by changing cohort sizes of the inflows of immigrants, it is useful to 
look at the outflows of the foreign populations from their host countries. Column (4) in Table 
7 shows the outflow/inflow ratio of foreign nationals over the period 1998 and 2008. This 
ratio ranges from 9.8 percent in Australia, over 51.3 percent in Switzerland, to 86.0 percent in 
Germany. This suggests that there are indeed significant flows of foreign individuals out of 
their host countries. These out-migrations may be back to the countries of origin, but could 
also be to an alternative host country. Outflow/inflow ratios are still only a crude measure of 
return migration, as they do not necessarily relate to the same individuals. For a more precise 
measure, one requires data that follow immigrant entry cohorts over time. Column (5) in 
Table 7 provides some estimates of the share of foreign-born individuals that re-emigrate 
from their host country within the first 5 years of arrival. The estimates show the generally 
substantial extent of re-emigration, ranging from 19.1 percent in the U.S. to 39.9 percent in 
the UK.
13 Evidently, relatively short migration spells are a widespread phenomenon and, 
although the destination of the re-emigrating population is generally not observable, one can 
assume that a large fraction constitutes return migration to the country of origin.
14 As we will 
see later, this particular migration pattern has important implications for an immigrant’s 
                                                 
13 The OECD also provides corresponding re-emigration rates for Ireland (60.4 percent), Belgium (50.4 percent) 
and Norway (39.6 percent). Additional studies that estimate comparable 5 year re-emigration rates are Borjas 
and Bratsberg (1996) for the U.S. (17.5 percent), Bijwaard (2004) for the Netherlands (35 percent), Shortland 
(2006) for New Zealand (23 percent), Dustmann and Weiss (2007) for the UK (40 percent males, 55 percent 
females), Bratsberg et al. (2007) for Norway (50 percent), Jensen and Pedersen (2007) for Denmark (55 
percent), and Aydemir and Robinson (2008) for Canada (23.7 percent, males). 
14 Nekby (2004) is one of the few who distinguishes between return migration and secondary migration to a 
third country, using data for Sweden for the period 1991 to 2000. According to her results, the share that 
constitutes return migration is around 90 percent for Nordic immigrants, 70 percent for Western Europeans and 
North Americans, 50 percent for Eastern Europeans, 40 percent for Asians, and around 30 percent for Africans.  
Bratsberg et al. (2007) estimate the return migration share for Norway and find similar magnitudes. Over the 
period 1967 to 2003, the share of those who left Norway to return to their home country is 93 percent for Danes 
and Swedes, 86 percent for U.S. Americans, 87 percent for UK immigrants, 78 percent for Turks, 81 percent for 
Iraqis, 70 percent for Somalis, and 33 percent for Vietnamese immigrants.  
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behaviour both in the host and in the home country, and therefore requires particular 
attention. For an informative overview of the return migration issue including a detailed 
description of methodological approaches to measure it, see OECD (2008, Part III). 
 
[Table 7: Return migration (after 5 years); ratio inflow/outflow] 
 
2.4 The Next Generation 
 
The focus of the descriptive evidence presented so far has been on the educational 
attainment and investment as well as the labour market performance of the working-age 
immigrant population. Given that a substantial fraction of immigrants will remain in the host 
country for a considerable amount of time, their children, whether born in the home country 
before arrival or thereafter, will spend a large part or even their entire childhood in the host 
country, passing through its educational system and making educational investment decisions 
along the way. These decisions have wider consequences, not only for the performance of 
this next generation of immigrants in both the host and – in the case of a later return 
migration – the home country, but also for the host country more generally, for example 
through the immigrants’ impact on the fiscal balance (see, for example, Storesletten, 2000, 
and Dustmann et al., 2010b) or their integration prospects (see, for example, Constant and 
Zimmermann, 2008). Given the often substantial differences in family backgrounds and 
language proficiencies, it is not surprising that in many destination countries immigrant 
children do significantly worse at school than their native counterparts. To illustrate this, we 
use data from the PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) study that 
provides internationally comparable measures of proficiency in reading, mathematics and 
science of students aged 15 in 18 OECD countries, as well as information on a large set of  
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student and school characteristics.
15 Table 8 shows the raw differences in test scores in 
reading and mathematics between native children and children with an immigrant 
background, which include both children born abroad and children born in the host country. 
Both in reading and in mathematics, students with an immigrant background score 
significantly lower than native students. With an average native score in these tests of about 
500, the test score gaps are substantial with a relative magnitude of around 10 percent in a 
number of countries (Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland). The only exceptions 
to these patterns are Australia, Canada and, to a lesser extent, the UK, where students with an 
immigrant background do as well as, or better (in the case of Australia), than their native 
student counterparts. An obvious explanation for this heterogeneity across destination 
countries is the difference in socio-economic characteristics between the corresponding 
immigrant populations, largely driven by the selectiveness of each host countries’ migration 
policies. Australia, Canada, and the UK are all countries that have been applying a point 
system to select the immigrants they admit which strongly favours individuals with 
characteristics conducive to their performance in the labour market, such as education and 
language skills. Through the intergenerational transmission of human capital, these beneficial 
characteristics are likely to be reflected in their children’s performance at school. For 
illustration, we report the test score gaps (relative to natives) of students with an immigrant 
background that do not speak the language of instruction at home in Columns (3) and (4) of 
Table 8. In all but three cases (Canada, Italy and Spain in mathematics), these gaps are 
substantially larger than the gaps for the entire immigrant student population. For example, in 
the UK, those who do not speak English at home score 36.5 points below the native average 
in reading and 26.6 points below the native average in mathematics while overall the test 
                                                 
15 For detailed information on the PISA study, see OECD (2007).  
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score gaps only amount to 11.5 and 14.6 points respectively. We will analyse the role 
language and parents’ education play in explaining the achievement gaps between immigrant 
and native students more systematically in Section 5.3. 
 
[Table 8: Pisa Results] 
Do the lower test scores of immigrant children at age 15 carry over into their 
adulthood? One measure to assess this is to compare the average school leaving age of first- 
and second-generation immigrant adults relative to the native population. Figure 2 reproduces 
estimates for men obtained by Algan et al. (2010) for France, Germany and the UK using the 
latest available data sources. The corresponding results for women show broadly similar 
patterns. The differences in the average age left education shown in the left-hand side 
scatterplot are estimated coefficients on dummy variables for the main immigrant groups in 
each country, obtained from a censored linear regression. Additional controls in these 
regressions are a quadratic in year of birth, region dummies and time dummies. Each point 
represents the educational gap relative to natives of first-generation immigrants (x-axis) and 
second-generation immigrants (y-axis) for a particular country (or country group) of origin. 
For reference, we include a 45-degree line as well as a fitted linear regression line. The 
scatterplot shows that for those immigrant groups in Germany and France who started with 
the biggest disadvantage relative to natives there is some improvement in the educational 
attainment from one generation to the next (in the sense of a later age at which individuals 
leave education). However, there is still a significant difference in schooling remaining for 
these groups in the second generation. This persistence in educational differences between 
natives and immigrants translates into differences in labour market outcomes, as illustrated in 
the right-hand side scatterplot in Figure 2, which shows estimated relative earnings gaps, 
again taken from the Algan et al. (2010) study, where the only included control variables in  
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the estimated linear earnings equations are a quartic in potential experience, region dummies 
and time dummies. Most importantly, the regressions do not control for the differences in 
educational attainment illustrated in the left-hand side scatterplot. The figures show that for 
most immigrant groups there is some improvement in earnings from one generation to the 
next, in part due to the improved educational attainment. However, the majority of adult 
second-generation immigrants in these countries still experience a substantial wage 
disadvantage (of the order of 10 percent on average) relative to their native counterparts. 
Both scatterplots also reveal a significant correlation between first- and second-generation 
immigrants’ education levels and earnings. Despite some convergence, those immigrant 
groups that started with the biggest disadvantage relative to natives in the first generation 
continue to be the most disadvantaged in the second generation. We will get back to this issue 
in our discussion of intergenerational mobility of immigrants in Section 5. 
 
[Figure 2: Trend Education of 2
nd/1
st generation immigrants, selected countries] 
 
3. The Migrant 
3.1 The Migration Decision and Human Capital Investment 
In this section, we investigate the key drivers of individuals’ decisions of whether or 
not to emigrate, whether and when to return, and how these decisions interact with decisions 
about education and skill acquisition. In its simplest possible form, the migration decision is 
based on a comparison of expected lifetime earnings in the current region of residence and in 
an alternative region, to which the migrant has the possibility to emigrate. In most cases,  
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there is more than one possible destination region in the choice set of potential migrants. For 
simplicity, we will abstract from that, and consider only one potential destination country.
16 
What are the factors that determine the emigration decision? Abstracting for the 
moment from amenities that arise from living in the home or potential host country, the 
decision problem of the potential migrant is based on the comparison of the net monetary 
returns of that decision. In the simplest possible model, where migrations are permanent and 
the acquisition of human capital is completed before the migration, these will depend on the 
skill prices in the origin and destination country, as well as the degree to which skills 
acquired in the origin country are transferable to the economy of the destination country. In a 
more dynamic setting, the migrant compares lifetime net discounted earnings in the two 
countries, allowing for the possibility that additional human capital investment is undertaken.  
After migration, individuals will potentially acquire further skills in the host country. 
As skills obtained in the home country are not always fully transferable to the host country 
labour market, new immigrants should have lower earnings than natives, even when they 
belong to the same skill group as measured, for instance, by the years of schooling obtained. 
However, the subsequent transfer of existing skills, facilitated, for example, through the 
acquisition of complementary skills like language, and the acquisition of new skills lead to an 
increase in earnings, possibly at a faster rate than that of comparable native workers. A large 
literature has developed around measuring this process (starting with Chiswick’s 1978 
seminal paper), and we will review some of this literature in Section 3.4.  
As we have shown in Section 2, many migrations are temporary, with immigrants 
remaining for a limited amount of time in the host country, and then returning back home. 
                                                 
16 Papers by Dahl (2002), Grogger and Hanson (2008), Bishop (2008), Ortega and Peri (2009), Kennan (2010) 
and Kennan and Walker (2010) consider the choice problem of individuals when deciding between more than 
one potential destination region.   
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This behaviour can be optimal despite consistently more favourable economic conditions in 
the destination country (see Dustmann, 2003, and Dustmann, 1994a, 1995, for an early 
analysis of different return motives). But if immigrants plan to return to their home countries 
(or to move on to a third country), then this may affect many aspects of their behaviour, 
including their human capital investment. In particular, any investment decisions into further 
skills will now depend not only on the return to these skills in the host country, but also on 
the return to these skills back in the home country. Differences in the expected duration of 
migration introduce heterogeneity into the earnings paths of immigrants that are identical in 
all other measurable characteristics (such as age, education, and past employment history). 
Thus, understanding the distinct forms of migration is key to understanding immigrants’ 
human capital investment behaviour. 
Return decisions may be driven by preferences (if, for instance, the home country 
provides the migrant with amenities that are valuable itself or complementary to 
consumption) or purchasing power considerations (if, for instance, the host country currency 
has a high value in the home country). However, they may also be the outcome of an 
optimising strategy that consists of obtaining human capital in the destination country in 
order to apply it in the origin country. Examples of this type of human capital are university 
education or foreign language skills. In that case, return migration is the outcome of an 
optimal human capital investment plan over the individual’s life cycle. In addition, the 
possibility of a migration later in the individual’s life may already induce human capital 
investment in the home country. One reason may be that skills acquired at home have a high 
return in the host country. Another reason may be that skills acquired at home are a 
prerequisite for the possibility to acquire further valuable skills abroad, either directly 
because of minimum education requirements due to immigration policies or because of the 




3.2 A Simple Model of Return Migration and Investment in Human 
Capital 
In what follows, we set up a simple model that serves to clarify some key ideas of 
migrants’ decision processes. The model shows how individuals reach a decision of whether 
or not to emigrate and how this decision is intricately linked to the human capital they 
accumulate over their life cycle. It illustrates how the possibility of a temporary migration 
affects optimal human capital investment profiles, what these profiles imply for individuals' 
earnings and their growth over time, and how these patterns depend on initial observable 
skills and ability. The model will also help us to structure the vast empirical literature that 
exists on migrants’ education- and skill investment decisions in their home and host 
countries. This literature has focussed particularly on the analysis of earnings profiles of 
immigrants as a reflection of their human capital investments, on how these profiles depend 
on the time horizon of the migration as well as the language proficiency of the migrant, and 
on the issues of skill transferability, skill downgrading, and the role of ethnic networks. 
 
 








Length T  
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Our model has essentially three periods. Life is finite and time flows continuously. 
The duration of life is T+2. We have illustrated the timing of the model in Figure 3. The first 
two periods are “learning periods”, and they are of unit length. In period 1, individuals live in 
the home country. In that period, individuals do not work, but can acquire education, and 
choose how much to acquire. Acquisition of education is costly, and individuals differ in their 
efficiency to acquire education. After the first period, individuals decide whether or not to 
emigrate.
17 In the second period, individuals live either in the home- or in the host country, 
depending on whether they have chosen to emigrate after the first period. During this second 
period, individuals have another opportunity to acquire education. They divide their time 
between learning, and working in the labour market. Thus, abstracting from direct costs of 
education such as fees, the cost of acquiring further education is equal to the opportunity cost 
of forgone earnings. We think about this period as a period where post-secondary education 
is obtained. This may take the form of vocational training or college education. The third 
period has length T. If individuals decide not to emigrate after period 1, they will spend both 
the second and the entire third period in the home country. If individuals decide to emigrate, 
then they have the possibility to return to the home country either right after the second 
period, or after a duration t in the host country, with  T t ≤ . Therefore, the length of the 
migration is given by  1 + t , and the remaining time in the home country after re-migration is 
t T − . A permanent migration corresponds to the case where  T t = .  
In case no migration takes place, individuals stay at home until death, which occurs at 
T . Although there is no explicit learning in the third period, we allow the return back in the 
home country of human capital acquired in the host country in period 2 to increase with the 
length of stay in the host country.  
                                                 
17 For simplicity, we assume that immigrants have only the opportunity to emigrate after the first period.   
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In our model, individuals make a number of choices. These choices are made at the 
start of the first period, and at the start of the second period. To solve the model, we first 
consider the decision problem at the start of the second period. In case that no migration takes 
place, the individual decides about the optimal investment in learning in the home country in 
period 2. In case a migration does take place, the individual decides about the optimal 
investment in learning in the host country as well as the optimal time to spend in the host 
country. Given these decisions, we then go back to the start of the first period, where 
individuals decide about the optimal investment in their education while they are still in the 
home country. This decision depends on the returns to any such investment in the future, 
given the optimal decisions about human capital investment and the duration of migration at 
the start of the second period. Finally, the migration decision is based on a comparison of the 
net present value of their lifetime earnings if migration does or does not take place.  
We will first consider the decisions at the start of the second period. We will then 
consider the educational investment decision before a potential migration has taken place, 
and the migration decision itself. 
 
3.2.1 Skill Enhancement and Return Decisions of Migrants 
 
In case migration takes place, the individual maximises period 2 and period 3 earnings 
by choosing the optimal investment in period 2, 
*
D s , and the optimal time of return, 
* t : 
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where  j ω ,  D O j , = , is the rate of return to human capital X (acquired in the home 
country in period 1) in either origin country O or destination country D,  s is the time 
investment in human capital acquisition in the second learning period (the first period in the 
host country in case of a migration), and t and T denote the time in the host country and the 
total length of the last period of life, respectively. We assume throughout this section the 
typical case in which  O D ω ω > . The function  ) , , ( X A s f  translates human capital investment 
s in the host country in the second period into skills, where  A is the ability of the individual. 
We make the following standard assumptions:  , 0 , 0 , 0 > < > sA ss s f f f  
0 ) , , 0 ( , 0 = > X A f fsX . This means that skills are produced with decreasing returns, and 
that ability and the existing stock of human capital are complementary to the production of 
new human capital (see Ben-Porath, 1967, and, for empirical evidence of such 
complementarity, Chiswick and Miller, 1994, or Friedberg, 2000). The parameter  ) (t Oγ ω  is 
the rate of return to human capital, acquired in the host country, back in the home country. 
Notice that  ) (t γ  may increase with the time the migrant stays abroad after the second 
learning period, which reflects the possibility that staying abroad increases immigrants’ rate 






γ < ) 0 ( , human capital acquired in the host country in the second period, is less 






γ > ) 0 ( , human capital acquired in the host country has a higher return back home. 
In case migration does not take place, the individual only decides about human 
capital investment in the second period, 
*
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where  ) , , ( X A s g  translates human capital investment in the home country in the 
second period into skills and is subject to the same standard assumptions as  ) , , ( X A s f .  
In this model, return migration is induced by the possibility to acquire human capital 
in the host country that is yielding a high rate of return in the home country (see Dustmann, 
1994a, 1995, Borjas and Bratsberg, 1996, Domingues Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay, 2003, 
and Dustmann et al., 2010a, for a similar formulation).
18 A return to the home country may 





γ > ) 0 ( . An example are “student 
migrations”, where a migration takes place to acquire skills abroad that have a higher return 
in the home country.
19 Return migration can also be induced by a high return in the home 
country to human capital acquired in the host country “on the job”.
20 In our model, this is 
                                                 
18 We will only discuss human capital accumulation as a return motive in this chapter. There are other motives 
for why immigrants may want to return, such as higher purchasing power of the host country currency in the 
home country, or consumption amenities in the home country. See Dustmann (1994a, 1995) for a detailed 
discussion. 
19 There is relatively little direct empirical evidence on the returns of foreign education in the home country of 
an immigrant after he or she returned. One obvious problem for empirical analysis is selection of both those who 
decide to study abroad and those who return to their home country, which makes it difficult to identify a causal 
effect. Oosterbeek and Webbink (2006) exploit a discontinuity in the awarding of a specific grant to Dutch 
students for studying abroad. Their OLS estimates show a wage gain for graduates who studied abroad of 
around 4 to 7 percent relative to graduates who did not. However, their RD estimates, though of broadly similar 
magnitude, are inconclusive due to large standard errors. Wiers-Jenssen and Try (2005) find a wage premium 
for Norwegian workers who graduated abroad of around 3.5 percent while Palifka (2003), using survey data 
covering a complete cohort of graduates from a single Mexican university, finds a premium of around 20 
percent six months after graduation for graduates who spent at least some time studying abroad.  
20 There is evidence that, for migrants who returned to their home country, work experience acquired abroad 
enhances earnings by more than work experience acquired in the home country. Reinhold and Thom (2009) 
analyse earnings of Mexican emigrants who returned from the United States. They find that, for these 
immigrants, the labour market experience accumulated in the U.S. increases earnings by twice as much as 
experience accumulated in Mexico. Papers by Barrett and O’Connell (2001) and Iara (2006) report similar 
findings for Ireland and migrants who returned to Eastern Europe from Western European countries. Co et al. 
(2000) report a wage premium for having been abroad for female return migrants to Hungary.   
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γ < ) 0 (  so that an immediate return after period 2 is not 
optimal, returning before T may be an optimal strategy. 
 
3.2.2 Skill Investment in the Home County 
  
After having chosen the optimal duration abroad 
* t  and the optimal investment in 
learning 
* s , where we denote the payoff of these choices as  ) , (
* *
D
D s t F  in case of emigrating 
and  ) (
*
O
O s F  in case of not emigrating, we will now consider the first period problem. Before 
making the migration decision, individuals have the possibility to acquire education in the 
home country in the first period. To allow for this, we will make X, the human capital stock 
after the first period, a function of first period investment  ) ( : i X X i = . We assume that skills 
acquired in the first period are concave with respect to investment:  0 , 0 ≤ > ii i X X . The 
choice of i will depend on the possibility of a future migration. In case of migrating, the value 
function is then given by  
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where  ) , ( A i C  is the cost of investing into education in the home country, which has 
the properties  0 , 0 , 0 , 0 < < > > iA A ii i C C C C : costs are increasing in investment, 
convex, and lower as well as increasing at a slower rate for high ability individuals. In case of 
remaining in the home country, the value function is given by 
(4)  ) , ( ) ), ( ( max
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O
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3.2.3 The Migration Decision  
The choice whether or not to migrate will depend on the comparison of the optimal 
value functions: 
(5)    ] , max[ O
O
D
D V k V V η η + + − = . 
Assume that  j η ,  D O j , = , are iid extreme value distributed error terms capturing 
heterogeneity in the choice, and k  are the cost of migration. It follows that for a given 
individual the probability of a migration is given by  
 







Thus, if we assume that abilities follow a distribution G, with support  ] , 0 [ A , then the 
proportion of individuals who migrate from country O to country D is given by 
∫ =
A
migrate A dG A
0
migrate ) ( ) ( Prob Proportion . 
This model is simple, but instructive, as it allows for a variety of cases that have been 
studied in the empirical literature. For a permanent migration, the second period problem in 
(1) corresponds to the simple human capital model that underlies the early empirical papers 
on immigrant assimilation (see, for example, Chiswick, 1978). Adding the possibility of 
return migration with a pre-determined migration period leads to more complex empirical 
specifications, as we will illustrate below. The problem becomes even more difficult if the 
migrant chooses the time of return optimally. The model also allows consideration of the 
relationship between migration and return migration, and human capital accumulation in the 
host country. It includes the special case of student migrations, where some countries are 
“learning centres”, as documented in Table 5, and provide education that has a high return in 
the home country.   
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The choices made in the first period add additional insight into learning incentives 
induced by migration possibilities. For instance, acquisition of education in the home country 
in the first period may be a pre-requisite for acquiring further and higher education in the host 
country in period 2. Furthermore, the model allows for the possibility that human capital in 
the home country is acquired because it has a high return in the host country. In the following 
section, we will explore some of the implications of this model for empirical work. We will 
then discuss the empirical literature, using the model as a framework of reference. 
 
3.3 Implications of the Model 
3.3.1 The Optimal Investment in Skills and the Optimal Migration Duration 
We first consider the problem of the individual at the beginning of the second period. 
For those who do not migrate, the optimal investment in the second period 
*
O s  is simply 
obtained by differentiating (2) with respect to s  and equating the additional forgone earnings 
in the learning period from an extra unit of time investment,  X O ω , to the benefit arising from 
a higher earnings potential in the subsequent period,  T gs O ω . 
For those who migrate, the problem at the beginning of the second period 
corresponds to the decision about how much to invest in host country human capital, and 
when and whether to return to the home country. The FOC’s are given by  
(6-a)     0 ] ) ( ) ( [ :
) , (
= − + + − O D s D
D
t t T t f X
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t s dF
ω γ ω ω  
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γ ω γ ω ω . 
The equilibrium condition for the optimal investment in human capital while being in 
the host country in Equation (6-a) says that the cost in terms of forgone earnings in the  
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learning period from an additional unit of time investment (first term) must be equal to the 
benefit arising from a higher earnings potential in the subsequent period (as in the case of no 
migration). This, in turn, depends on the time spent in the host country t, on the increase in 
productivity in the second period through investments in human capital in the first period  s f , 
and on the transferability of human capital acquired abroad to the home country labour 
market  ) (t γ , which may depend on the time spent in the host country.  
The optimal migration duration derived from Equation (6-b) depends – for the 
optimally chosen human capital investment – on a comparison between spending a marginal 
unit of time in the host country, and spending the same unit of time back in the home country. 
The individual chooses the optimal s  and t simultaneously. The optimal human capital 
investment 
*
D s  will change in response to changes in exogenous parameter (for instance the 
rent on human capital  D ω ) directly, and indirectly, because any parameter change affects the 
optimal migration duration, 
* t , which in turn changes investment. Given our assumptions 
about  (.) f  and  ) (t γ , it is straightforward to show that, in case of an interior solution,  a 
unique optimum for s  and t exists. To derive the comparative statics is likewise 
straightforward. We will now investigate some special cases, which relate to the empirical 
literature in the area. 
 
3.3.2 Permanent Migration 
Assume first that the migration is permanent, i.e.  T t = . One way to generate a 
permanent migration in our model is to assume that  0 ' , 1 = = γ γ , and  O D ω ω > : human 
capital acquired abroad has the same value at home, the value is not increasing with 
experience abroad, and the rental rate on human capital is higher in the host country. In that  
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case, the optimal investment in human capital during the second period is chosen so that 
T f X s D D ω ω = : forgone earnings in the second period are equalised to the gain from human 
capital investment in the third period. Given our assumptions of the function  (.) f ,  we 
immediately obtain a number of results: First, human capital investment s  in the host country 
increases in T. A direct implication of this is that immigrants who arrive early in life will 
invest more into their skills, as their pay-off period is longer (Friedberg, 1992, Schaafsma and 
Sweetman, 2001, and Wilkins, 2003, explore this issue empirically). Secondly, investment 
may increase or decrease with the stock of human capital X upon arrival. Well-educated 
immigrants may lose considerably when spending time in learning activities. On the other 
hand, as human capital is productive in its own production, well-educated immigrants acquire 
additional skills more effectively. The larger the complementarity between skills upon arrival 
and acquisition of additional skills ( sX f ), the more likely it is that human capital investment 
after immigration is higher for well-educated immigrants (see Borjas, 2000, for a detailed 
discussion). Finally, the higher the ability  A of immigrants, the higher is their human capital 
investment.
21 
How is wage growth for permanent migrants in the host country related to these parameters? 
Wage growth from period 2 to period 3 is given by  ) (.) ( sX f w D + = ∆ ω . Thus, for a given 
investment  s , wages grow faster the higher the skills the individual has upon arrival. 
However, the effect of an increase in the initial skill level at arrival on skill investment itself 
is ambiguous, so that the overall effect of higher education upon arrival on wage growth is 
                                                 
21 The results follow from totally differentiating (6-a) after setting  T t = , where the total differential is given by 




22 Wage growth is unambiguously positively related to the level of the 
immigrant’s ability, as this raises third period wages per unit of investment, and human 
capital investment itself. Finally, wage growth is higher for immigrants who arrive at a 
younger age, as their investment in the first period is higher. Thus, our simple model predicts 
that immigrants who are positively selected in terms of ability should experience higher wage 
growth. Furthermore, immigrants who are younger at arrival have steeper wage profiles. The 
effect of the level of initial skills on the final investment is ambiguous. We will contrast these 
results with the empirical literature in Section 3.4. 
 
3.3.3 Temporary Migration 
The next case we will consider is that of a temporary migration, where the length of 
the migration period is exogenously determined. This could, for instance, be the result of a 
contract migration, or migrations that are restricted to a limited time period for other reasons. 
Let  t  denote the exogenously set migration duration We assume that the optimally chosen 
migration duration would be longer than the pre-determined one, so that the constraint is 





γ γ < = ) (  so that human capital acquired in the host 
country is less valuable back home than in the host country.
23 In that case, the optimal 
investment in skills s  is chosen so that  0 ] ) ( [ = − + + − O D s D t T t f X γω ω ω . 
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γ > , as this may lead to a return before t .  
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As before, investment into human capital increases in ability  A, and the effect of a 
higher level of skills upon arrival is ambiguous. Furthermore, an increase in the migration 
duration t  increases human capital investments: the longer immigrants are allowed to stay in 
the host country, the higher is their human capital investment in host country specific skills. 
Finally, notice that investments in human capital depend on the degree to which these skills 
are transferable to the home country labour market, i.e. the magnitude of γ . If γ  is small, 
then, for any given migration duration t , investments will be low. It is immediately obvious 
that temporary migrations pose a serious problem for empirical analysis: as we will discuss 
below, both t  and  γ  are usually not observed. Both introduce heterogeneity in earnings 
profiles that is likely to be correlated with many of the typical regressors in an earnings 
equation. 
We can now again investigate wage growth from period 2 to period 3 in the host 
country. As before, individuals with higher ability  A will have faster wage growth, and the 
effect of an increase in the skill level  X  upon arrival is ambiguous. However, wage growth 
will now be the larger the higher the transferability of human capital from the host country 
labour market to the home country labour market, γ . Furthermore, wage growth will be 
steeper the longer the contract migration period t . Thus, if migrations are non-permanent, 
there will be heterogeneity in the slope of immigrant’s wage profiles which is determined by 
the transferability of human capital, as well as the length of the migration period. 
  
 
3.3.4 Choosing the Optimal Migration Period and Investment in Human Capital 
So far we have assumed that the migration is permanent, or that t is exogenously 
given. We will now relax that assumption. The optimal migration period is determined by 




(6-b)’   0 (.) ) ( ' ) ( (.)) ) ( ( (.)) ( = − + + − + f t t T f t X f X O O D γ ω γ ω ω .     
 
The first term in (6-b)’ is the return to each unit of time spent in the country of 
destination. It is constant for the optimally chosen s . The second term is the opportunity cost 
of staying abroad: it is the forgone earnings in the home country by staying abroad. If 
0 ) ( ' > t γ , then this term increases with t. Finally the third term is the additional gain from 
staying one more unit of time abroad through accumulation of additional skills that increase 
the value of human capital in the home country. If  0 ) ( ' ' ≤ t γ , this additional gain will 
unambiguously decrease with time t spent in the host country. The reason is that although on 
the job experience in the host country is valued back home, there is less and less time 
remaining to reap the returns from applying human capital acquired in the host country back 
in the home country. 
In our simple model, and assuming that  D O ω ω <  (i.e. the rental rate on home country 
specific human capital is higher in the host country), a return migration will occur for two 
reasons. First, the return on human capital acquired in the second period in the host country is 





γ > ) 0 ( , and the accumulation of home country relevant skills by staying 
in the host country is sufficiently slow, so that directly after the second period 
(.) ) 0 ( ' (.)) ) 0 ( ( (.)) ( f T f X f X O O D γ ω γ ω ω − + < + . In this case, the (constant) marginal gain 
from delaying return by one period is lower than the marginal cost of staying. Although 
emigration itself is optimal after the first period, the individual decides to return immediately 
after the second period. This situation is depicted in the left panel of Figure 4 below. 
Migrations that are characterised by this pattern are student migrations, or migrations that  
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take place predominantly for the purpose to acquire particular skills or experience in the 
country of destination. In Column (5) of Table 5 in Section 2, we demonstrate that these 
student migrations are frequent, and that many – typically around 70 percent – are terminated 
after education has been acquired. 
But even if   (.) ) 0 ( ' (.)) ) 0 ( ( (.)) ( f T f X f X O O D γ ω γ ω ω − + > +  (which means that it is 
optimal for the migrant to initially remain in the host country after the second period), a 
return migration may occur if human capital acquired while working abroad increases the 
earnings potential of the immigrant in her home country ( 0 ) ( ' > t γ ). In this case, the marginal 
costs of staying in the host country increase with time spent there due to the increasing 
forgone earnings in the home country, and the immigrant may choose an optimal 
* t  so that 
T t < <
* 0 .












                                                 
24 A sufficient condition for the marginal costs of staying to be increasing in t   is that  0 ) ( ' ' ≤ t γ :  the gain 
from remaining an additional unit of time abroad (in terms of enhancing the home country skill stock) decreases 
with time in the host country. 
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Figure 4: Immediate and Postponed Return Migration 
 
It is apparent that, if the return time is optimally chosen, the analysis of immigrants’ 
earnings paths becomes more complex than before, as the optimal migration duration may 
affect human capital investment, and is in turn affected by the optimal skill accumulation. 
The earnings paths of immigrants who choose their migration duration optimally will 
therefore depend on parameters that determine their return choice as well. This further 




3.3.5 Choosing the Optimal Investment in Learning in the First Period   
So far we have not considered the decisions in the first period. Having solved the 
second period problem by choosing the optimal migration period 
* t  and the optimal 
investment 
* s , the individual will now choose the optimal investment in learning in the first 
period. Assuming that individuals are endowed with a base level of productivity (which could 
include compulsory schooling: 
0 ) 0 ( X X = ), the optimal investment in the case of migrating 
is given by (invoking the envelope theorem): 
(7-a) 
) , ( ) ( ) )) ( ( 1 ( )) ( ( ) 1 ( ) ( )) ( 1 (
* * * * A i C i B f i t X i t T f X i t X i s i
D
X i O X i D i D D = = + − + + + − γ ω ω ω , 
and in case of non-migrating by: 
                                                 
25 Derivation of the partial effects is straightforward, although tedious. For the assumptions made, and for 
0 > − O D ω ω , an increase in  D ω  decreases investments in human capital s , while an increase in  O ω  leads 
to an increase in investments. Those with higher ability  A will invest more, while the effect of an increase in 
human capital upon arrival  X  on s  is ambiguous.    
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 (7-b)    ) , ( ) ( ) 1 ( )) ( 1 (
* A i C i B g X T X i s i
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Thus, in the migration case, the individual will compare the marginal cost of 
investing in the first period (which are costs invoked by effort, and possibly monetary cost) 
with the marginal benefit, which is the impact of an extra unit of investment in the first period 
on future lifetime earnings.
26 Given our assumptions about the cost function and the learning 
technology in the first period, the individual will invest in learning in period 1 if the 
expressions on the left hand side of Equation (7-a) and (7-b) are larger than the marginal cost 
for the first unit of investment. Note that – as the marginal cost schedule decreases in ability – 
higher able individuals will always invest more in learning. Once the optimal investment in 
the first period 
* i  has been obtained for both the migration case (together with 
*
D s  and 
* t ) 
and the non-migration case (together with 
*
O s ), the migration decision of the individual is 




O V . 
This framework allows us to explore a number of interesting cases. Let us first 
consider the simple case where migration is permanent and no investment in human capital 
after period 1 is allowed ( 0 = s ).  In this case, conditions (7-a) and (7-b) simplify to 
) , ( ) 1 ( A i C T X i i D = + ω  and  ) , ( ) 1 ( A i C T X i i O = + ω . If (as we assume throughout)  O D ω ω > , 
the return to period 1 investment is clearly larger in the case of a migration, and investment in 
learning in the first period will be higher for the case of a permanent migration than for the 
case of non-migrating. This is the core of the argument by Mountford (1997). In his model, 
                                                 
26 To simplify the analysis, we assume here that the preference shocks  D η   and  O η  are drawn after the 
investment decision is made.  
42 
 
individuals have an (exogenous) probability of migrating π , so that the optimal investment is 
given by  
) , ( ) 1 ( ) ) 1 ( ( A i C T X i i O D = + − + ω π πω . 
  There are two insights from this relationship. First, there is (for a given π ) a 
particular ability level A, only above which it will be worthwhile to invest into learning. 
Secondly, even if the probability of emigration is small, individuals will invest more into 
learning, as long as the return in the country of destination is sufficiently high. Thus, an 
increase in π  may lead to more accumulation of human capital than in the non-migration 
case. Furthermore, although emigrants take with them the human capital they acquire in the 
home country (which is usually associated with a brain drain), some of those who acquired 
more skills remain in the home country, and may therefore increase the overall per capita 
level of skills in that country, compared to the case where no migration is possible. This may 
then lead to a brain gain, rather than a brain drain. Thus, the country of origin could overall 
benefit from a migration of skilled workers – see Mountford (1997) for an insightful 
discussion. In Section 4.4, we discuss papers that investigate the empirical relevance of this 
hypothesis. 
Another situation that is encompassed by this model is the acquisition of human 
capital in the home country as a pre-requisite to enter the destination country. Suppose the 
potential host country has particular entry requirements such as a specific educational degree. 
The newly introduced point-based immigration system in the UK, and similar existing 
systems in Australia and Canada reflect exactly this scenario. Thus, if (for optimally chosen 
* s  and 
* t ) the value of migrating is sufficiently higher than the value of non-migrating, then 
individuals will invest in education in the home country to obtain the critical level of 





D V k V > −
>
min ) ( . 
Again, such a policy will lead to a selection of high ability immigrants to invest into 
the minimum necessary level of education, as for them the cost of acquiring education is 
lower. 
 Another (but similar) situation occurs if learning in the second period in the country 
of destination requires a certain level of education to be obtained at home. For instance, PhD 
studies in the U.S. may require a Bachelor’s degree in the country of origin. In that case, 
optimal investment in the home country will take this requirement into account.  
 
3.4 Empirical Studies 
3.4.1 Assimilation and Adaptation 
The first generation of papers that studies the performance of immigrants in their 
countries of destination, starting with Chiswick (1978), concentrates on the earnings profiles 
of immigrants after arrival in their destination country, viewing these as a reflection of the 
human capital investments undertaken by the migrants and the skill transferability between 
origin and destination country. These studies do not distinguish between permanent and 
temporary migrations and there is no consideration of immigrants having undertaken 
investments in the home country with a view of obtaining returns in the host country as 
illustrated in the previous section. The key question these studies address is whether 
immigrants perform similarly, worse, or better than natives with the same set of 
characteristics. This depends on two factors: First, their quality, and secondly, their effort to 
invest in further knowledge.   
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Why is this important and why have so many papers been published that address this 
issue? Foremost because the relative position of immigrants in the distribution of earnings 
determines the contribution they make to the host country economy. Higher earners 
contribute more to tax and benefit systems, and may increase per capita GDP. For many 
years, the study of immigrant assimilation was perhaps the largest empirical literature on 
immigration in the economic discipline (see Table 10 for a comprehensive list of studies). 
Chiswick’s (1978) work suggests that immigrants – although starting with a lower 
level of earnings than comparative natives – experience a higher earnings growth, and 
eventually out-perform natives after about 10-15 years.
27 He obtains these results by 
“augmenting” a simple Mincer wage equation and allowing immigrants to have – conditional 
on education and potential experience at entry – different entry wages than natives, as well as 
different earnings growth. Earnings of immigrants grow due to two types of work experience: 
Experience accumulated in the home country and experience accumulated in the host 
country. Experience accumulated in the host country has two components: new, host-country 
specific human capital, and human capital that allows already existing knowledge to be used 
in the destination country. An example for the latter is accumulation of language proficiency. 
Chiswick concludes that the foreign-born seem to be able to compensate any potential 
earnings disadvantage arising from initially lower host country specific human capital by 
greater investments in training, higher work motivation, and greater ability, due to being 
positively selected. Some subsequent papers supported these findings (Carliner, 1980, and De 
Freitas, 1980); thus, at least for the U.S., the early literature on immigrant assimilation draws 
a picture of immigrants as being high achievers, who – after initial disadvantages – 
                                                 
27 Holding other characteristics constant, Chiswick’s results show that the earnings of the foreign-born are 9.5 
percent lower than those of the native-born after 5 years, equal after 13 years, and 6.4 percent higher after 20 
years in the country.  
45 
 
outperform natives through ability, hard work, and investment into their human capital and 
productivity. 
  However, this positive picture of immigration to the U.S. was soon challenged by a 
series of papers starting with Borjas (1985). Borjas argues that estimation of earnings 
equations based on simple cross-sectional data – as in Chiswick (1978) – does not allow a 
distinction between cohort- and years of residence effects. An immigrant who has been in the 
U.S. for 10 years in 1970 has arrived in 1960, while an immigrant who has been in the U.S. 
for 20 years in 1970 has arrived in 1950. Thus, if the composition of immigrants has changed 
(as it had at the time, since the abolition of country quotas originally established by the U.S. 
Immigration Act of 1924, through the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, significantly 
increased the share of immigrants from South- and Central America), earnings profiles based 
on cross-sectional data may over- or underestimate the earnings growth of immigrants. In the 
case of the U.S., Borjas argues, entry wages of subsequent cohorts have gone down, so that a 
cross-sectional analysis over-estimates the earnings paths of immigrants. He shows that 
distinction between cohort- and years of residence effects is possible by simply adding an 
additional census year to the data. More specifically, Borjas’ (1985) proposes the so-called 
































it EX ED y ε π γ β α + Τ + + + = ∑ , 
                                                 
28 Originally, many studies did not allow the effect of education and experience to vary between immigrants and 
natives, assuming 
N I β β = and 






it y  and 
N
it y  are log earnings of individual i in year t,  ik Τ  is an indicator 
variable for the year in which individual i is observed that is set equal to unity if  t k = , and 
I
k π and 
N
k π  are time effects on log earnings for immigrants and natives, respectively. The 
variable  im C  is an indicator variable for the year m  in which individual i arrived in the host 
country, and ED, EX, and YSM measure educational attainment, potential (overall) labour 
market experience, and potential labour market experience in the U.S., respectively.
29 The 
parameter of interest is given by 
N I I γ γ δ θ − + = , with immigrants’ earnings converging to 
those of natives when  0 > θ .
30 The coefficient 
I β  shows the return to education obtained in 
the home country on the host country labour market (assuming the migrant worker arrived in 
the host country as an adult). It thus reveals, in conjunction with 
N β , the transferability of 
human capital between home and host country. This setup is called the synthetic panel 
approach since it typically uses repeated cross-sectional data, for instance from U.S. 
Censuses, to construct a pseudo-panel of cohorts that can be followed over time without 
actually observing any worker more than once. 
A fundamental problem with estimating Equation (8-a) is that years since migration 
equal the difference between calendar year of observation and the cohort entry year, so that 
these variables are perfectly collinear. This means that the coefficients 
I δ , 
I
m λ , and 
I
k π  
cannot be separately identified without imposing additional identification restrictions.  
                                                 
29 To simplify the notation, we ignore higher-order terms of years since migration and experience. 
30 In a similar setting, LaLonde and Topel (1992) define assimilation differently as occurring if  0 >
I δ , hence 
comparing the economic value of spending an additional year in the host country relative to a year spent in the 
source country.  
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To identify the model, Borjas (1985, 1995a) assumes equal time effects for 




t π π = , while allowing cohort quality to vary freely over time. 
In this case, time effects are effectively estimated from the native earnings equation which in 
turn ensures identification of the cohort effects in the immigrant equation. In contrast, 
Chiswick (1978) who only had one cross section of data at his disposal, assumed in addition 
to constant time effects that cohort effects did not change over time, so that, after 
normalisation,  0 =
I
m λ  for all m .
31 
  Using data from the 1970 and 1980 U.S. Census, Borjas (1985) shows, that the 
quality of immigrants admitted to the U.S. declined over time. As a consequence, the positive 
impact of the years since migration variable in cross-sectional earnings equations is picking 
up not only the intended effect of U.S.-specific human capital accumulation, but also the 
effect of the higher quality of earlier immigrant cohorts. Separating these effects by looking 
at within-cohort earnings growth reveals that the assimilation profiles of immigrants’ 
earnings are significantly flatter than previously estimated, with the true growth rate being up 
to 20 percentage points lower in some immigrant cohorts, so that the point of overtaking 
happens much later in the life cycle, if at all. Borjas (1995a) confirmed these results in a 
follow-up study that included the 1990 U.S. Census: the decline in cohort quality continued 
into the 1980s, albeit at a slower rate than in the 1970s, and, for the bulk of first-generation 
immigrants, earnings parity with the typical native-born worker will never be reached over 
the life cycle. 
                                                 





m C C λ λ = ∑ . As  it ik im YSM T C − = , 
the parameter Chiswick estimates on YSM is 
I I λ δ − ; clearly if 
I λ <0 (cohort quality deteriorates), the 
estimate is upward biased.  
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Motivated by these first studies, a large literature has developed that examines the 
earnings paths of immigrants for different countries and different time periods. In Table 10 
we provide an extensive overview, focussing on the estimated returns to education and 
experience, both in the home and the host country, and the transferability of home country 
human capital to the host country labour market. 
  
[Table 10: Summary of Assimilation Studies.] 
 
3.4.2 Extensions of the Basic Approach 
 
Although more flexible than Chiswick’s (1978) cross-sectional approach, there are a number 
of restrictive assumptions underlying the synthetic panel methodology in its standard 
formulation in Equations (8-a) and (8-b). First, it assumes that – although the entry wage of 
different immigrant cohorts may differ – their wage growth is the same. Our model in Section 
3.2 shows that this assumption may be quite restrictive. We show that immigrants who are 
more able do not necessarily start off with higher earnings, as they may initially invest more 
into their human capital, but that their wage growth is likely to be steeper than those of less 
able immigrants.
32 If we distinguish cohort quality by the amount of measured human capital, 
X , then wage growth is – as described in our model – likewise affected. Thus, the 
assumption that wage growth is the same for different entry cohorts if these differ in terms of 
their average ability or their measured human capital appears quite strong. As in the 
benchmark study by Borjas (1995a), it should be justified in each individual case, in 
particular since the common interpretation of the estimated entry wages of different 
                                                 
32 This seems to suggest that it is important to use wages rather than earnings for assimilation studies. However, 
even wages may reflect an increased human capital investment, if contracts are of the Lazear (1979) type in 
which employees accept lower wages in return for training.  
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immigrant cohorts as a measure of their "quality" hinges crucially upon the validity of this 
assumption. Duleep and Regets (1999, 2002) and Green and Worswick (2004) provide a 
detailed discussion of the issues involved in the estimation of immigrant earnings profiles in 
the context of a human capital investment model. They make a strong case for not relying on 
entry earnings as a measure of relative cohort quality, with Green and Worswick (2004) 
suggesting instead a more comprehensive measure based on the estimated present value of all 
future earnings in the host country. 
Another strong assumption in the standard synthetic panel methodology is that 
business cycle and time effects for natives and immigrants are the same. This assumption 
implies that macroeconomic trends and transitory shocks as well as aggregate labour market 
conditions affect immigrants’ and natives’ earnings in the same way. This is unlikely, as 
immigrants and natives have – as we illustrate in Section 2 - usually different skills, and are 
allocated to different occupations and industries. Dustmann et al. (2010e) illustrate for 
Germany and the UK that the economic cycle has – even conditional on education, potential 
experience, and industry allocation – a stronger impact on the employment of immigrants 
than on the employment of non-immigrants, and that these differences are more pronounced 
for non-OECD immigrants than for OECD immigrants. Two studies by Barth et al. (2004, 
2006) for Norway and the U.S., respectively, argue that failure to consider these differences 
may severely bias the assessment of the earnings assimilation process of immigrant workers. 
As a solution, the authors suggest to augment the earnings equations by including measures 
of local unemployment and allowing their impact on earnings to vary between immigrants 
and natives. Conditional on unemployment, time effects can then be assumed to be equal for 
both groups. Using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1979 to 2003, Barth 
et al. (2006) show that wages of immigrants in the U.S. are indeed more sensitive to changes 
in local unemployment than wages of natives. As a result, since the native-immigrant wage  
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gap contracts during economic expansions, the standard estimation strategy with equal time 
effects yields upwardly biased estimates of both the cohort quality of recent immigrant 
arrivals in the U.S. and of immigrant wage growth as the wage effects of the improving 
labour market conditions in the 1990s are erroneously attributed to immigrant quality and 
wage assimilation.  
In the light of our model presented in Section 3.2, another shortcoming of the 
standard model stated in Equations (8-a) and (8-b) is that there is no distinction between 
returns to education obtained in the home country and education obtained in the host country. 
This strategy yields meaningful estimates under the assumption that all immigrants arrive in 
the host country after they finished education. In this case 
I β  measures the returns to 
education obtained in the home country. However, if some immigrants arrive at an age when 
they are still in the process of obtaining formal education, the estimated parameter 
I β  
compounds the potentially different returns to education obtained in home and host country. 
In a study for Israel, Friedberg (2000) explicitly distinguishes education obtained in the host 
country from education obtained in the home country. She shows that the return to an 
additional year of schooling obtained in Israel is 10.0 percent for natives and 8.0 percent for 
immigrants whereas the return to schooling obtained in the immigrants’ home countries is 
only 7.1 percent. She also finds very low returns to work experience accumulated before 
arrival. An additional year of experience in the country of origin yields a return of only 0.1 
percent compared to 1.1 percent for an additional year of experience in Israel’s labour market 
and a 1.7 percent return to experience for natives. The finding of low returns to home country 
education and experience in comparison with host country education and experience has been 
confirmed in a number of additional studies for a variety of destination countries, for example 
Kossoudji (1989), Schoeni (1997) and Bratsberg and Ragan (2002) for the U.S., Beggs and  
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Chapman (1988a, 1988b) for Australia, Kee (1995) for the Netherlands, Schaafsma and 
Sweetman (2001) for Canada, Cohen-Goldner and Eckstein (2008) for Israel, Sanromá et al. 
(2009) for Spain, and Basilio and Bauer (2010) for Germany (for details of these studies, see 
Table 10). Thus, transferability of human capital from home to host country appears to be 
quite low in many migration contexts. The only exception appears to be human capital that 
was acquired in developed countries of origin, which typically yields relatively high returns 
in developed host countries (see, for example, Schoeni, 1997, Friedberg, 2000, or Bratsberg 
and Ragan, 2002). This could be either because home and host country are more similar in 
terms of cultural, institutional and technological aspects of their economies so that skills are 
easily transferable, or because more developed countries of origin simply have higher quality 
education systems. Interestingly, immigrants from developed countries also receive higher 
returns to human capital acquired in the host countries after their arrival compared to 
migrants from less developed countries, pointing towards complementarities between 
education obtained at home and education obtained in the host country (see, for example, 
Sanromá et al., 2009, and Basilio and Bauer, 2010). Such complementarities are also 
supported by the observation that obtaining education in the host country tends to have a 
positive effect on the return to home country specific education (Friedberg, 2001). One 
reason is that host country education enables the migrant to transfer their pre-migration skills 
more effectively to the host country labour market. 
A related literature concerned with the transferability of human capital has studied 
the extent of over-education of immigrants defined as the difference between the formal 
qualifications held by the immigrants and the typical qualifications required in the 
occupations they hold (see, for example, Chiswick and Miller, 2007, 2008, Green et al., 2007, 
Lindley and Lenton, 2006, Nielsen, 2007, Sanromá et al., 2008). The main findings from this 
literature show that immigrants are more likely to be over-educated than natives but that with  
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time in the host country this difference in over-education relative to natives decreases, a 
pattern reminiscent of the assimilation of immigrants’ earnings to those of natives over time.  
One important implication arising from the theoretical model set up in Section 3.2 is 
that the expected time the migrant will spend in the host country has an important effect on 
the decision to invest in host country specific human capital, as it determines the time horizon 
over which the benefits from such investments can be reaped by the immigrant. The longer 
the horizon, the higher are the investment incentives. Even under the assumption that 
migrations are permanent, this implies that immigrants who arrive at a younger age should 
have more incentives to invest in host country specific human capital and thus experience a 
larger initial earnings gap and steeper earnings profile. Wilkins (2003) confirms these 
predictions using Australian survey data for 1997, distinguishing four age at migration 
groups: 0–14, 15–24, 25–34, and 35+ years of age. His results show that, for a given stock of 
human capital at the time of migration, initial wages of immigrants who arrive as children are 
significantly lower, at least 15 percent, than those of any other age at migration group, but 
that their wage growth with time in Australia is significantly higher.
33 More explicitly 
focusing on the human capital acquisition, Gonzalez (2003) shows that for Mexicans arriving 
in the U.S. before the age of 19, each year of delayed entry results in about 0.25 to 0.30 less 
years of overall schooling, and, because this reduction in schooling is due to less U.S.-
specific education, significantly lower future earnings. This negative relationship between the 
eventual educational attainment of immigrants that arrive in the host country in their youth 
and their age at arrival is a fairly consistent finding in the literature (see, for example, 
Hirschman, 2001, Chiswick and DebBurman, 2004, Cortes, 2006, and Perreira et al., 2006). 
                                                 
33 Friedberg (1992) and Borjas (1995a) find that age at migration has an important overall negative effect on 
immigrant earnings in the United States. According to their results, a worker who arrived at age 30 earns about 5 
percent less than one who already arrived at age 20, all else equal. See also Schaafsma and Sweetman (2001) 




3.4.3 Return Migration 
Relaxing the assumption that all migrations are permanent and allowing for non-
permanent migrations, the estimation of immigrant earnings profiles becomes far more 
complex. Consider first the case of a temporary migration, where the return time is 
exogenously given and where this constraint is binding (in the sense that the migrant would 
otherwise wish to stay longer). As we have shown in Section 3.3.3, in that case the 
immigrant’s investment in learning in the host country depends on the level of skills upon 
arrival as well as on the expected economic opportunities in the home country, which are 
directly affected by the return to any human capital investment when back home. Estimating 
equations as stated in (8-a) and (8-b) would therefore omit an important set of conditioning 
variables. The evolution of earnings of the migrant in the host country (measured by the 
return to experience and the return to the number of years since migration) should depend on 
the length of the migration. This in turn should also depend on the labour market 
characteristics in the home country, introducing additional heterogeneity if immigrants come 
from different origin countries. Neglecting these variables may lead to biased estimates of 
earnings profiles.
34 
The situation becomes more complex when return migrations are chosen by the 
immigrant. In that case, investment into human capital in the host country and the optimal 
migration time are chosen simultaneously, and should be modelled accordingly. Table 7 in 
                                                 
34 For instance, our model in section 3.2 suggests lower initial earnings (due to larger human capital 
investments), but a steeper earnings profiles for immigrants who have a longer expected duration in the host 
country. Thus, assimilation profiles will depend on the duration of migration. Omission of variables that capture 
this in the estimation of earnings profiles will lead to sample-specific returns to time in the host country, which 
depend on the distribution of anticipated migration durations. Our model also suggests that an increase in 
migration durations will lead to steeper earnings paths for higher able immigrants, which adds further 
identification problems.  
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Section 2 shows that return migrations are very common, and in most cases, returns and total 
migration durations are chosen by the migrant. In principle, the re-migration decision and the 
human capital investment decision have to be estimated simultaneously. This poses a number 
of difficulties for the empirical researcher. Although the simple model we describe above is 
deterministic, re-migration decisions in the real world are unlikely to remain unrevised over 
the migrants’ migration history. Thus, even if (as is possible now in some register data sets) 
completed migration histories were observable, the completed migration duration may have 
been different than the migration duration that was intended when human capital decisions 
were made. But what matters for economic decisions is the expected migration duration at the 
time a decision is taken, and not the completed migration duration.  
The data thus required are information on the expected duration of a migration rather 
than on the completed duration of a migration. Unfortunately, these return intentions are 
usually unobserved. An exception is the German Socio-Economic Panel, which asks a boost 
sample of immigrants in each wave how long they would like to remain in Germany, and 
whether or not they would like to return home at all. In an early paper, Dustmann (1993) uses 
this information to estimate earnings profiles of immigrants. Only about a third of all male 
immigrants intend to stay in Germany for 30 more years or forever, while slightly more than 
60 percent of immigrants intend to return to their home countries within the next ten years, 
most of them before they reach retirement age. Allowing assimilation profiles to vary by the 
intended years of stay in Germany, he finds that “permanent” immigrants have indeed steeper 
earnings profiles than “temporary” immigrants. After five years of residence, an additional 
year in the host country improves immigrants’ earnings by 0.4 percent if the total intended 
duration of stay is 10 years, 1.05 percent if it is 20 years, and 1.26 percent if it is 30 years. 
Dustmann (1997, 1999, and 2000) provides additional evidence of differential labour market 
behaviour of immigrants with different return intentions.   
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Following this line of argument, Cortes (2004) suggests that one of the main reasons 
for the steeper earnings profile of refugee migrants compared to economic migrants in the 
U.S. is the implicit difference in their expected duration of stay. As refugees are typically 
unable or unwilling to return to their home countries for fear of persecution or violent 
conflict, they have a longer time horizon in the host country and therefore more incentives to 
invest in country-specific human capital. Her empirical findings support this hypothesis, as 
do those of Khan (1997) who finds a higher propensity of Cuban and Vietnamese refugees in 
the U.S. to invest in schooling compared to other foreign-born immigrants. 
Thus, although – as we show in Section 2 – return migrations today are likely to be 
the rule rather than the exception, the empirical literature has so far largely ignored the 
implications for the estimation of immigrants’ earnings profiles. Careful estimation of 
earnings profiles of immigrants with different migration plans, taken in conjunction with their 
human capital investment decisions, requires modelling of the processes of human capital 
investments and return plans simultaneously. This needs to be addressed within a well-
defined structural setting. 
An additional problem with return migration, apart from the behavioural reasons 
stated above, is that it is likely to be selective, in the sense that those who return are not 
randomly chosen. Returning migrants may be either those who do not perform very strongly 
in the host country labour market, or those who perform above average. In the latter case, for 
example, the average quality of a given immigrant cohort in the host country will decrease 
over time, leading to an underestimation of the true earnings profiles of immigrants of that 
cohort relative to natives. Lubotsky (2007) addresses this problem by using longitudinal 
earnings data from U.S. Social Security records that allow following individual migrants over 
time. His results show that in the U.S. case, out-migrants are negatively selected, implying 
that previous studies have systematically overestimated the wage progress of immigrants who  
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remained in the U.S., by a factor of around 2.
35 We will discuss some reasons for selective 
immigration and out-migration in Section 4.1. 
 
 3.4.4 Language 
One dimension of human capital that deserves particular attention in the context of 
migration is language capital. Language is, on the one hand, a crucial human capital factor for 
the productivity of immigrants in the host country. Not only is language important in its own 
right, but it is complementary to many other skill components. For instance, a qualified 
physician is unlikely to be able to work as a general practitioner when she does not master the 
language of the host country. On the other hand, investments in language skills are likely to 
be of little use in the home country. For instance, a migrant from Bosnia to Sweden is 
unlikely to benefit much from speaking Swedish after having returned home.
36 Thus, while 
being very important as a complement to existing and future skills, language may at the same 
time be less transferable to other countries’ labour markets in the future. In any case, the 
improvement in language skills over the time spent in the host country is an important driver 
of the observed earnings assimilation profiles of immigrants in their host countries. 
A key question in this context concerns the return to language capital: what is the 
percentage increase in earnings if an immigrant speaks the host country language well as 
compared to speaking it poorly? This parameter has important policy implications, as it helps 
assessing the benefits of language schemes, or of selective migration policies that 
                                                 
35 It is, however, not clear that the hypothetical assimilation profile of immigrants had no return migration taken 
place is the interesting policy parameter. If the interest in wage profiles of immigrants is driven by their 
potential contributions to the economy and the tax- and benefit system, what matters are those immigrants who 
remain in the host country. 
36 English may be an exception, with the acquisition of English being an important reason for a migration in the 
first place. It is not completely surprising in this context that the most popular destination countries for tertiary 
education are all English-speaking countries: Australia, the UK and the U.S. (see Table 5).  
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discriminate according to language proficiency. However, this parameter is difficult to 
measure, for several reasons. First, immigrants who acquire language proficiency may be 
positively selected, thus introducing a classical selection bias in estimations that regress 
economic outcomes on language proficiency measures. Secondly, most available language 
measures are self-reported. This introduces two types of measurement error: a classical 
measurement error, due to the interviewer reporting with error, and a systematic measurement 
error, due to the fact that individuals have different “scales” on which they assess their own 
language skills: the same proficiency may be evaluated as “poor” by one individual, and as 
“good” by another individual. We will discuss below attempts that address these problems, 
after reviewing the literature and its main findings.  
In much of the literature, the return to language proficiency is obtained by estimating 
a standard earnings equation where a measure of language skills is added as an additional 
regressor (see, for instance, early work by Carliner, 1981, McManus et al., 1983, Grenier, 
1984, Kossoudji, 1988, Tainer, 1988, Rivera-Batiz, 1990, 1992, Chiswick, 1991, Chiswick 
and Miller, 1992, 1995, and Dustmann, 1994b). These studies rely on self-reported language 
information in survey questionnaires, typically on either a 4-point or 5-point scale, and ignore 
the problems pointed out above. In all these papers, language proficiency is found to be 
strongly positively associated with earnings in the host country. For instance, for a sample of 
illegal immigrants in the U.S., Chiswick (1991) estimates that immigrants who can read the 
English language well or very well have earnings that are about 30 percent higher than those 
of immigrants with low English reading skills. He also finds that reading skills dominate 
speaking skills and that the latter does not have an additional separate effect on earnings. For 
a more representative sample of adult foreign-born immigrants in the U.S., Chiswick and 
Miller (1992) report that English language fluency is associated with around 17 percent 
higher earnings. Dustmann (1994b) estimates that immigrants in Germany who speak  
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German well or very well earn about 7 percent more than immigrants who speak German on 
an intermediate level, badly or not at all. Similarly, those who have good or very good 
German writing skills earn between 7.3 percent (males) and 15.3 percent (females) more than 
those with bad or no German writing skills.
37  
Language proficiency is also found to have a complementary effect on the 
transferability of pre-immigration human capital in the form of education and experience. 
Chiswick and Miller (2002, 2003) show that language skills enhance the return to human 
capital obtained before migration, so that a migrant’s greater proficiency in the languages 
spoken in the host country enhances the effects on earnings of her pre-immigration schooling 
and labour market experience. These results hence support the hypothesis that language is an 
important complementary skill to other forms of human capital: if immigrants cannot conduct 
a conversation in the host country language, human capital acquired prior to immigration 
cannot be translated into higher earnings in the host country. 
The importance of language as a factor to enhance the productivity of other forms of 
human capital is also demonstrated in studies that investigate the capacity of different 
immigrant communities in acquiring further human capital. Sanromá et al. (2009) show that 
returns to schooling obtained in Spain are significantly higher for immigrants from Latin 
America (4.4 percent), who speak Spanish, than for immigrants from other less developed 
countries such as those situated in Eastern Europe (3.6 percent). Beggs and Chapman (1988b) 
show that the return to schooling in the Australian labour market in 1981 was 9.0 percent for 
the native-born, 8.4 percent for immigrants from English-speaking countries, and only 4.9 
percent for immigrants from non-English speaking countries. These findings are suggestive 
                                                 
37 Additional studies show an earnings advantage associated with host country language fluency of 12 percent in 
Canada (Chiswick and Miller, 1992), 8 percent in Australia (Chiswick and Miller, 1995), and 12 percent in 
Israel (Chiswick, 1998, and Chiswick and Repetto, 2001).  
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for language being important for the acquisition of further skills, although estimates may be 
compromised by selection, and do not isolate the effect of language from other country of 
origin specific factors that may be driving the differential returns to human capital. 
Language proficiency is also a key factor in explaining the educational outcomes of 
the children of immigrants. Dustmann et al. (2010f) show that the single most important 
factor explaining achievement gaps between children of immigrants and natives in the UK is 
language spoken at home. In Section 5.3.1, we will discuss the importance of language for 
children born to foreign-born parents in more detail. 
As we discuss above, a key difficulty in determining the impact language has on 
economic outcomes is selection, possibly leading to an upward bias in the return to language 
proficiency in straightforward earnings equations, and measurement error in self-reported 
language measures. Dustmann and van Soest (2001, 2002) were the first to argue that 
measurement error may lead to a substantial downward bias in simple OLS regressions, 
which possibly over-compensates the upward bias through selection. To illustrate the possible 
magnitude of the attenuation bias, they use repeated information on self-reported language 
proficiency from a panel of immigrants in Germany. Assuming that from year t to year  1 + t  
deterioration in language proficiency is not possible, Dustmann and van Soest (2001) 
estimate that 85 percent of the within-individual variance, and at least 24 percent of the 
overall variance in language measures is due to unsystematic measurement error, in the sense 
that it varies unsystematically over time. They discuss as a further difficulty of self-reported 
language information that individuals may have different scales of evaluation. In a cross-
section, these individual-specific scales cannot be distinguished from measurement error. 
However, with panel data, and if differences in scales across individuals are constant over 
time, such a distinction is possible. Dustmann and van Soest (2001) develop an estimator that 
separates time-varying from time-persistent misclassification. Further, to address the  
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endogeneity problem, they use parental education as an instrument for language proficiency 
conditional on individuals’ education, noting that this is less problematic than instrumenting 
individuals’ education with parental education. The findings show that over-reporting 
language ability is more frequent than under-reporting, and that there is substantial time-
persistent misclassification. According to their results, the return to a one standard deviation 
increase in true German language fluency decreases from 2.8 percentage points to 0.9 
percentage points once unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account. However, controlling 
subsequently for both time-varying measurement error and time-persistent misclassification, 
the return to German language fluency increases to approximately 7.3 percentage points. 
Thus, measurement error may lead to a large downward bias of the estimated return to 
language proficiency that over-compensates any upward bias due to unobserved ability.
38 
 
If repeated information on language ability is available, an alternative way to address 
the endogeneity problem is by conditioning on individual-specific effects (or estimating 
difference equations). However, the downward bias through measurement error in the 
language variable will be greatly enhanced by such techniques. In most panel data sets that 
contain repeated information on language ability, immigrant populations have been resident 
for a large number of years, so that the noise-to-signal ratio is too large to allow estimation.
39 
Berman et al. (2003) use repeated information on the language proficiency of male 
immigrants from the former Soviet Union that moved to Israel after 1989, focusing on the 
first few years after arrival in which typically the largest improvements in language skills 
take place. They find large wage gains of language proficiency for workers in high-skilled, 
                                                 
38 Dustmann and Fabbri (2003) find a similarly large downward bias due to measurement error for the UK, 
while Dustmann and van Soest (2004) compare parametric and semi-parametric estimators to address 
measurement error in language variables. 
39 See Dustmann and van Soest (2002) for a discussion.  
61 
 
but not low-skilled professions as well as evidence for an upward ability bias in cross-
sectional estimates, particularly for workers in low-skilled professions.  
Bleakley and Chin (2004) present a further strategy to address the endogeneity 
problem of language proficiency. Based on census cross-sections, they devise an IV strategy 
that exploits the psychobiological phenomenon that young children tend to learn languages 
more easily than adolescents and adults. Focussing on childhood immigrants, an immigrant’s 
age at arrival in the host country is therefore a strong predictor of his or her language 
proficiency later in life. It can be used as a valid instrument once its effect on earnings 
through other channels than language, is controlled for. Bleakley and Chin (2004) use 
immigrants from English-speaking countries as a control group to net out the effects of age at 
arrival that are not associated with language. Their findings show that OLS estimates of the 
returns to English language fluency in the U.S. are severely downward biased – which is 
unexpected if selection is the only problem. They explain this by the IV estimator possibly 
revealing a local average treatment effect, and by measurement error. Using data on language 
test results, they estimate that attenuation bias through measurement error may lead to a 
reduction of the estimated coefficient by one-half – which is similar in magnitude to the 
effects found by Dustmann and van Soest (2001).  
One particular feature of language capital is that it is in most cases not transferable to 
the country of origin. For instance, German language proficiency is unlikely to be of much 
use in the Italian or Turkish labour markets. Thus, in the formulation of our model in Section 
3.2, language capital should be sensitive to the duration individual immigrants would like to 
spend in the country of destination. This hypothesis is analysed by Dustmann (1999), who 
investigates the impact of immigrants’ intended duration of stay on their language skills. As 
migration durations are endogenous in a language equation, he uses an indicator for whether 
parents who are residing in the home country are still alive as an instrument for the planned  
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migration duration. The findings show that an increase in the total intended duration in 
Germany by 10 years is associated with a 5-percentage point higher probability of being 
fluent in German. 
 
3.4.5 Downgrading and Ethnic Networks 
The low wages immigrants often receive upon arrival may be partly explained by 
initial “downgrading”, possibly due to a lack of important complementary skills that allow 
individuals to fully utilise their human capital in the host country’s labour market. The 
stereotypical cab-driving physician vividly captures this phenomenon. Friedberg (2001) and 
Eckstein and Weiss (2004) study directly the type of jobs immigrant workers perform after 
arrival, using data for Israel. They find substantial occupational downgrading of Russian 
immigrants who arrived in Israel in the 1990s. While these immigrants worked in Russia 
predominantly as engineers, managers, physicians and teachers, their most important 
occupations in Israel turned out to be occupations such as service workers, 
locksmiths/welders, and housemaids. However, over time, particularly highly educated 
immigrants climb up the occupational ladder. Eckstein and Weiss (2004) show that the 
proportion of highly-educated immigrants working in high-paid professional occupations 
rises from about 30 percent at arrival to about 70 percent twenty years later, compared to an 
increase from 60 percent to 80 percent for equally-educated natives over the same time 
interval. Overall, around 17 percent of immigrants’ wage growth in the first 10 years after 
arrival in Israel can be attributed to occupational transitions. Mattoo et al. (2008) provide 
similar evidence of “underplacement” of immigrants in the U.S. labour market, where in 
particular skilled immigrants from countries with lower expenditures on tertiary education  
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and non-English languages of instruction, such as Latin American or Eastern European 
countries, tend to end up in unskilled jobs. 
An important consequence of this occupational downgrading is that an allocation of 
immigrants to particular skill groups based on observed measurable skills such as their 
education – for example in order to assess with which subgroup of the native workforce they 
are most likely to compete in the labour market – is likely to be highly inaccurate and not 
reflecting the true section of the labour market in which the immigrants are active. Dustmann 
et al. (2008) illustrate how, due to downgrading, an allocation of immigrants in the UK based 
on their observed education levels misrepresents their true position in the native wage 
distribution: while these immigrants are on average significantly better educated than natives, 
they earn wages at the lower end of the native wage distribution in the UK.  
Not only complementary skills (such as language) may be important for immigrants 
to being able to fully utilise their human capital, but also the reduction in informational 
deficiencies with respect to the host country’s labour market. Here ethnic networks may play 
an important role. Bartel (1989) and Jaeger (2007) demonstrate the tendency of immigrants to 
settle in areas where there are already established communities of their ethnic group. 
Chiswick and Miller (2005) show that living in a region of the U.S. with a high linguistic 
concentration of the immigrant’s mother tongue has a negative effect on the immigrant’s own 
English language skills which in turn tends to reduce her earnings potential. This would 
speak against ethnic networks operating to the advantage of immigrants. However, 
straightforward correlations of ethnic segregation and economic outcomes may be affected by 
a sorting problem. In two papers, Edin et al. (2003) and Piil Damm (2009) use random 
dispersal policies of refugee immigrants in Sweden and Denmark to investigate the effects of 
living in enclaves on labour market outcomes. By using the ethnic concentration in the initial  
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assignment area (Edin et al.) and the past inflow of assigned co-nationals (Piil Damm) as an 
instrument, these authors convincingly address the sorting problem. They find that living in 
an ethnic enclave has positive effects on wages and employment, in particular for workers 
who have low skill levels. Dustmann et al. (2010d) find similar evidence of a positive effect 
of obtaining a job through an ethnicity-based network on wages and job stability in the 
German context. This speaks in favour of networks as a mechanism to reduce informational 
uncertainties.  
 
3.4.6 Observed Post-Migration Schooling Investment and Learning Centres 
Most of the assimilation literature discussed so far draws conclusions about the 
human capital investment of immigrants after arrival in the host country indirectly from the 
observed earnings patterns. A more direct approach, given suitable data, is to look at the 
actual acquisition of additional education by immigrants, and the factors that determine it. 
Using data from the 1976 Survey of Income and Education (SIE) and the 1980 U.S. Census, 
and focusing on the years of schooling obtained after migration and enrolment status as 
dependent variables, Khan (1997) finds that the acquisition of human capital of foreign-born 
adult men decreases with age at migration, and is higher for refugee immigrants and those 
who are naturalised, and in states with low tuition fees and better quality of schooling. In the 
SIE data, she also finds that pre-immigration schooling up to the post-bachelor professional 
level is a substitute for schooling in the U.S., a finding in support of an earlier study by 
Borjas (1982) of male Hispanic immigrants. In contrast, Chiswick and Miller (1994), who 
study adult immigrants in Australia, find a positive effect of pre-immigration schooling and 
occupational status on post-immigration schooling, concluding that these are complementary.  
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As briefly pointed out in Section 3, one reason for immigration can be the acquisition 
of human capital in a host country. This was a particular aspect of our model, which 
encompasses migration situations where the sole purpose of a migration is the acquisition of 
human capital that has a high value upon return to the home country (see Section 3.3.4 for 
details). This phenomenon is particularly pronounced in higher education and in countries 
like Australia, the U.S. and the UK (compare Table 5), which receive large numbers of 
foreign students to study at their universities.
40 In the U.S., for example, foreign-born 
students (mostly from India, Taiwan, South Korea and China) accounted for 31 percent of all 
PhD recipients in 2006, with even higher shares in specific fields such as physical science (44 
percent), engineering (59 percent), and economics (59 percent).
41 Bound et al. (2009) provide 
an excellent overview of the latest developments in the U.S. context. In the U.K., foreign 
students account for 42 percent of all PhD recipients and 55 percent of all recipients of a 
Master’s degree in 2007/2008.
42 Many students that acquire doctoral degrees stay on after 
completing their studies. Finn (2007), for example, estimates that about 58 (71) percent of 
foreign citizens that received a PhD in science or engineering from a U.S. university in 1991 
(1999) are still living in the U.S. in 2001.  
                                                 
40 This type of immigration is institutionalized in many host countries by issuing specific visas created explicitly 
to permit temporary study (for example the F-1 visa in the U.S. or the Student Visas in the UK). 
41 Source: National Science Foundation: Science and Engineering Doctorate Awards 2006. Own calculations. 
Foreign students are defined as non-U.S. citizens with temporary visa. 
42 Source: Higher Education Statistics Agency. Foreign students are identified as those with non-UK domicile.  
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4. The Effect of Migration on the Skill Base and Educational 
Attainment of Non-Migrants 
 
In the previous section, we discuss the relationship between education and migration 
from the perspective of the migrant. In this section, we address the issue from the perspective 
of those who have chosen not to migrate – both in the origin- and in the destination country. 
Our focus will be on the consequences of migration for the skill base and the acquisition of 
education in the two countries. Migration can affect the skill base of the origin country 
directly, by changing the skill composition and the talent base. Here the question of selection 
– who migrates – becomes important. Migration can also affect the skill base of the origin 
country indirectly through generating incentives to invest into learning and skill acquisition. 
In the destination country, besides the direct effect because of the inflow of immigrants, 
migration may change the skill base through responses of the native population, by creating 
incentives for additional skill accumulation, or for specialising in particular skills where 
natives have a comparative advantage. Migration can also create spillover effects, for 
example through complementarity of the migrant population with the existing populations. In 
this section, we will discuss some of these aspects. 
We start with re-investigating one of the key questions in the literature on migration, 
which has important consequences for the issues we raise here: Who migrates? In an early 
paper, George Borjas (1987) uses the Roy (1951) model to relate the skills and abilities of 
immigrants to the distribution of wages and earnings in the host and home country. His 
analysis provides deep insights, and has been empirically tested in a number of subsequent 
papers. However, many of these papers have focussed on a particular case of Roy’s model, 
where skills are one-dimensional. Here we will re-examine the original Roy model, and  
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explore more closely the implications of multi-dimensionality in skills. We believe that in the 
context of migration this will provide much additional insight. 
 
4.1 The Selection of Migrants  
 
We will start with addressing the question of who migrates. In Section 3, we discuss 
the incentives to emigrate from the perspective of the potential migrant, and show that these 
depend – among others – on the capacity of the individual to produce knowledge, which we 
termed “ability”. The optimal migration plan – in the simplest setting where the return to 
human capital is higher in the host country – usually provides higher migration incentives to 
those who have a lower cost of human capital production: those with higher ability. In those 
considerations, we only looked at the migration decision of a single individual, the “average” 
individual. We did not compare this individual to other individuals in the origin- or 
destination country, by characterising a distribution of skills. Further, we thought about 
“skills” as a one-dimensional concept – an individual that has more skills is more productive 
in both countries. 
In this section, we give up this assumption, by introducing multiple skills, which – 
added up and weighted by skill prices that may differ across the two countries – determine 
the productive capacity, or human capital, of an individual in a particular country. We argue 
that considering skills as a multi-dimensional concept, with different prices in different 
countries, is particularly sensible in the context of migration. We investigate the selection of 
individuals along the distribution of these skills, and state the conditions for positive and 
negative selection.   
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Our considerations are based on the Roy (1951) model which we will formalise as a 
multiple skill model (concentrating on the special case of two skills), and in which we allow 
for the possibility that one skill has a higher price in one country, while the other skill has a 
higher price in the other country.
43 This generates the possibility of “non-hierarchical sorting” 
(to use the terminology of Willis, 1987), where those who are most productive in the host 
country migrate and those who are most productive in the home country do not migrate.
44 We 
will develop this aspect of the Roy model which, as we believe, has not received sufficient 
attention in the migration context. In our view, thinking about migration as a decision that 
considers the prices for multiple skills is appropriate in a world where diversely structured 
national economies trade their comparative and absolute advantages on globalised markets. 
We show that some of the observed migration patterns that seem not compatible with the 
one-dimensional skill version of the Roy model can be accommodated by a multi-
dimensional skill model. Drawing on Dustmann et al. (2010a), we then show how the basic 
static Roy model can be extended to a dynamic Roy model by allowing for learning of skills 
in the two countries, so that each country is not only characterised by prices for skills, but 
also by learning opportunities.  
 
                                                 
43 The Roy model goes back to a paper by Andrew D. Roy published in the Oxford Economic Papers in 1951. In 
this paper, Roy develops the implications of multi-dimensional abilities for occupational choice, the structure of 
wages, and earnings distributions. The model has in later years been formalised and developed further (see, for 
example, Heckman and Honoré, 1990, Willis and Rosen, 1979, and Willis, 1987).  
44 Borjas does, in principle, consider this case, which he terms “refugee sorting”, but does not develop its 
implications in much detail. Most of the literature (e.g. Chiquiar and Hanson, 2005, Orrenius and Zavodny, 
2005, McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007, Ibarrarán and Lubotsky, 2007, Belot and Hatton, 2008, Fernández-
Huertas Moraga, 2010, Kaestner and Malamud, 2010) considers a special case of the Roy model, where skills 
are one-dimensional, which leads to hierarchical sorting. A very interesting and insightful extension is provided 





4.1.1 A Multiple Skill Model of Migrant Selection 
 
Consider two countries, an origin country (O ) and a destination country ( D ). Further, 
suppose individuals have two latent skills,  1 S  and  2 S  (this can be easily generalised to more 
skills). We will here refer to these skills as “analytical skills” ( 1 S ) and “manual” or “trade” 
skills ( 2 S ). Suppose the two countries have different technologies and industry structures. 
Thus, we can think about the two countries rewarding the two skills differently, according to 
the two equations   
(9-a)   Di D i D i D D Di Di u S b S b y Y + = + + = = µ µ 2 2 1 1 ln      
(9-b)   Oi O i O i O O Oi Oi u S b S b y Y + = + + = = µ µ 2 2 1 1 ln  .                                 
In (9-a) and (9-b),  1 j b  and  2 j b  represent the prices for the two skills in country  j , 
D O j , = . Notice that this set-up allows for many interesting combinations. For instance, if 
countries specialise in particular industries and exchange goods in global markets, then in one 
country the price for skill 1 may be high and the price for skill 2 low, whereas in the other 
country the price for skill 2 may be high and that of skill 1 low. If both countries are equipped 
with the same distribution of skills, migration in both directions may create a more efficient 
skill allocation. 
To compare this with the notation used in much of the literature (e.g. Borjas, 1987), 
we combine the weighted skills to two measures  i D i D D D S b S b K u 2 2 1 1 ln + = =  and 
i O i O O O S b S b K u 2 2 1 1 ln + = = , where  j K  is the productive capacity of a person if she works in  
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country  j . Therefore, we can characterise every worker by either a pair of latent skills ( 1 S  
and  2 S ) or a pair of productive capacities in the two countries ( D K  and  O K ).  
We can think about  j µ  as the log of the rental rate to human capital in country  j  so 
that  j j
Y
j K R e y
j = = , with  j j R ln = µ . The rental rate of human capital in the country of 
destination,  D, for example, could be persistently higher if it had a superior technology and 
if it regulated the inflow of immigrants so that only some of those who wish to enter are 
allowed in. 
We assume that both countries have identical distributions of the two skills  1 S  and 
2 S  before migration, and that these distributions are normal and independent with mean zero 
and variance 1:  N(0,1) ~ k S .
45 It then follows that the random variables  D Y  and  O Y  are 
likewise normally distributed, with means  D µ  and  O µ  and variances and covariance
46 








1 O O O O O D D D D D u Var b b Y Var u Var b b Y Var = = + = = = + = σ σ  
 (10-b)    2 2 1 1 ) , ( ) , ( O D O D DO O D O D b b b b u u Cov Y Y Cov + = = = σ  .   
We define 









2 2 2 2 2 2 ) ( O D O D O O D D DO O D O D b b b b b b b b u u Var − − + + + = − + = − = σ σ σ σ ,  
which is the variance of the difference in the log of productive capacity between country  D  
and country O. Further, let  σ / ) ( O D u u u − =  and σ µ µ / ) ( D O k z − + = , where k  are 
migration costs (in time-equivalent units). Also, let 
                                                 
45 The latter assumption simplifies notation, but can easily be relaxed. 




(11-a)   σ σ σ σ σ / )] ( ) ( [ / ) ( ) , ( 2 2 2 1 1 1
2
O D D O D D DO D D DU b b b b b b u u Cov − + − = − = =  
and  
(11-b)   σ σ σ σ σ / )] ( ) ( [ / ) ( ) , ( 2 2 2 1 1 1
2
O D O O D O O DO O OU b b b b b b u u Cov − + − = − = = .
   
These covariances are the weighted sums of the differences in skill prices between host and 
home country, where the weights are the skill prices for the host and home country, 
normalised by σ . Notice that  σ σ σ + = OU DU  so that  0 > − OU DU σ σ . 
Finally, define the correlation between the log of productive capacities in the home and host 
country as 
(12) 







1 2 2 1 1 )] )( /[( ) ( ) /( ) , ( O O D D O D O D O D DO O D b b b b b b b b u u Corr + + + = = = σ σ σ ρ .   
We are now ready to establish the different migration scenarios, and to compare the wages of 
those who decide to migrate, and those who decide not to migrate. It follows from (9-a) and 
(9-b) that an individual will migrate from country O to country D if  Oi Di Y k Y > − , or  
(13)    
z u
k u u
k S b b S b b
D O O D
i O D i O D O D
> ⇔
− + > − ⇔
> − + − + −
σ µ µ σ
µ µ
/ ) ( / ) (
) ( ) ( 2 2 2 1 1 1
   
Denoting the density function and the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
distribution by  ) (⋅ φ  and  ) (⋅ Φ , the expected earnings of individuals who decide to emigrate 
are given by
47 
(I)  ))] ( 1 /( ) ( [ ) | ( z z Y k Y Y E DU D O D D Φ − + = > − φ σ µ . 
                                                 
47 See Johnson and Kotz (1972), Heckman (1979) and Heckman and Honoré (1990) for details.  
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Likewise, the expected earnings of those in the home country who decide not to migrate are 
given by  
(II)  )] ( / ) ( [ ) | ( z z k Y Y Y E OU O D O O Φ − = − > φ σ µ . 
How much would those who decide to migrate earn in the home country, and how much 
would those who decide not to migrate earn in the host country? These two counterfactuals 
are given by 
(III)   ))] ( 1 /( ) ( [ ) | ( z z Y k Y Y E OU O O D O Φ − + = > − φ σ µ  
 (IV)  )] ( / ) ( [ ) | ( z z k Y Y Y E DU D D O D Φ − = − > φ σ µ . 
It follows from (I)-(IV) that the selection of migrants depends on the size and the relative 
magnitude of the covariances  DU σ  and  OU σ . We can distinguish 3 regimes. 
Regime 1:  0 > DU σ  and  0 > OU σ . It follows that the mean earnings of those who decide to 
emigrate are higher than the mean earnings in the host country (I), and higher than the mean 
earnings in the home country (III). On the other hand, the mean earnings of those who decide 
not to migrate are lower than the mean earnings in the host country (IV), and lower than the 
mean earnings in the home country (II). This case is one of positive selection of immigrants: 
those who migrate have higher than average earnings in both countries, those who do not 
migrate have lower than average earnings in both countries.
48 A necessary condition for 
regime 1 is a higher variance of the earnings distribution in the destination country compared 
to the origin country and a sufficiently high correlation between the productive capacities in 










ρ >  (see Borjas, 1987, 1999). 
                                                 
48 Note that mean earnings always refer to the pre-migration period.  
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In terms of the underlying skill distribution, regime 1 states that the return to both 
skills must be sufficiently large in the host country. It follows from (11-a) and (11-b) that the 
sum of the price differentials for the two skills between host and home countries, weighted by 
the host country prices, is larger than the sum of the price differentials weighted by home 
country prices. This is certainly the case if the returns to both skills are higher in the host 
country. 
One special case, which is frequently assumed in the literature on the selection of 
immigrants (see for example Chiquiar and Hanson, 2005, Belot and Hatton, 2008), is that 
O D cu u = , where c is some constant. This occurs if either the return to one skill equals zero 
in both countries (for instance  0 2 2 = = O D b b ), or if the ratios of skill prices are equal in the 
two countries ( c b b b b O O D D = = 1 2 1 2 / / ). In both cases, the correlation between  D u  and   O u , 
ρ , is equal to one. Notice that the two cases have different interpretations. In the first case, 
the skill distribution reduces to one dimension. In the second case, the skill distribution is still 
two-dimensional (both “analytical” and “manual/trade” skills are needed in the two 
countries), and individuals may still have different endowments of the two skills; however, 
the production technologies in the two countries are such that the skill price proportions are 
exactly equal. A particular case is the one where  1 = c , which implies identical skill prices in 
both economies.  
Regime 2:  0 < DU σ  and 0 < OU σ . This case leads to opposite conclusions to regime 1.  
Regime 1 and 2 are the two cases that are usually considered in the migration literature. They 
correspond to the “positive selection” and “negative selection” scenarios in Borjas (1987).   
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Regime 3:  0 > DU σ  and  0 < OU σ . In this case, the mean earnings of those who decide to 
migrate are higher than the mean earnings in the host country (I), but they are lower than the 
mean earnings in the home country (III). On the other hand, the mean earnings of those who 
do not migrate are lower than the mean earnings in the host country (IV), but higher than the 
mean earnings in the home country (II). Thus, those who migrate have a below-average 
productive capacity in their origin country, but an above-average productive capacity in the 
destination country. Their departure increases the average productivity level in the home 
country (as individuals below average productive capacity leave the country), and increases 
the average productivity level in the host country. Thus, if the initial skill distribution is the 
same in the two countries, this situation may lead to a “brain gain” in both countries.
49  
Borjas (1987) refers to regime 3 as “refugee sorting”, the underlying idea being that 
highly skilled individuals are discriminated against in dictatorial systems, receiving a return 
for their skills that is below average, while being rewarded according to market prices in 
countries that accommodate refugees. However, this case has many more interesting 
implications for the study of modern migrations. As we discuss above, global trade has led 
national economies to focus on particular industries, like manufacturing, or financial services. 
These industries may have different skill requirements across more than one dimension, and 
many migrations we observe today may be a response to these processes. The idea that 
migration is a response to skill demands along more than one skill dimension is compatible 
with the literature on task usage and polarisation, which argues that jobs can be characterised 
by multiple tasks, such as cognitive, routine and manual tasks (see, for instance, Autor et al. 
2003, Goos and Manning, 2007, and Acemoglu and Autor, 2010). 
                                                 
49 It is important to define brain drain / brain gain. We think about brain gain as an event that increases per 
capita productivity in either country, and a brain drain as an event that decreases per capita productivity in 
either country.   
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Regime 3 is “non-hierarchical”, in the sense that both those who migrate and those who do 
not migrate have above average earnings in the country of their choice: individuals are sorted 
based on their comparative advantage. Note that the case  0 < DU σ  and  0 > OU σ  is not 
possible if we allow for regime 3, as it would contradict  0 > − OU DU σ σ . Notice further that 
the assumption  O D cu u = , which is made in many papers that study the selection of 
immigrants, rules out regime 3.  
A special case of regime 3 occurs when each skill is only priced in one of the two countries; 
for example,  0 2 1 = = O D b b . Now the correlation between productive capacities in the two 
countries is zero: the productive capacity of an individual in one country does not give any 
insight about her productive capacity in another country. An individual who possesses skill 
1 S  will only be able to obtain a return in the home country, while an individual with skill  2 S  
will only obtain a return in the host country.  
 
4.1.2 Skill Prices, Productive Capacity and Selection  
 
It follows from (11-a) and (11-b) that whether migration is selective in terms of productive 
capacity depends on the underlying skill prices. Changes in these prices will change the type 
of migration that occurs, and the nature of selection. Which regime characterises a particular 
migration situation depends on the two expressions 
σ σ σ σ σ / )] ( ) ( [ / ) ( 2 2 2 1 1 1
2
O D D O D D DO D DU b b b b b b − + − = − =  
and 
σ σ σ σ σ / )] ( ) ( [ / ) ( 2 2 2 1 1 1
2
O D O O D O O DO OU b b b b b b − + − = − = ,  
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where  σ σ σ + = OU DU . To illustrate how the different regimes depend on skill prices, 
consider the top left graph in Figure 5, where we have fixed  , 1 , 2 , 1 2 2 1 = = = O D D b b b  and we 
allow  1 O b  to vary between 0 and 5. The dashed and dotted lines in the figure are  DU σ  and 
OU σ , respectively. For  1 O b  in the range between 0 and 1.62,  0 > DU σ  and  0 > OU σ ; thus we 
are in regime 1, with migration being positively selective. In the range where  1 O b  is between 
1.62 and 3,  0 > DU σ  and  0 < OU σ , and we are in the non-hierarchical regime 3, where those 
who would do best in the host country migrate and those who would do best in the home 
country do not migrate. Finally, above  3 1 = O b , both  DU σ  and  OU σ  are negative; we are in 
regime 2 where migration is negatively selective. This demonstrates that the selection of 
immigrants in terms of their productive capacity depends on relative skill prices, which may 
change over time.  
In the remaining two graphs in Figure 5, we plot the respective variances and the covariance 
(right top), and the correlation coefficient (left bottom). In the range where positive selection 
occurs, the variance of productive capacity is higher in the destination country, and the 
correlation between skills is high. In the range where negative selection occurs, the variance 
of productive capacity is higher in the country of origin, and the correlation between skills is 
lower. Notice that there is a range where the variance of productive capacity is higher in the 
destination country; yet, we are in regime 3, where we cannot hierarchically sort immigrants 
in terms of their average productive capacity. The migration decision of an individual migrant 
is based on a comparison of individual earnings in the home and host country. Using (9-a), 

























[ Figure 5: Selection Scenarios ] 
 
4.1.4 Explaining Different Selection Patterns 
There is by now a large empirical literature that attempts to assess the direction of 
migrant selection. Most of the papers in this literature draw on Borjas (1987) as an underlying 
theoretical framework, but consider the special case where  O D cu u = . The evidence these 
papers establish is mixed. Some papers (including Borjas’ 1987 original analysis) find 
evidence that is compatible with the predictions of the simple one-dimensional skill model, 
namely that selection is positive from country O to country D if skill prices are higher in 
country D, and that selection is negative if skill prices are lower in country D. Examples are 
Cobb-Clark (1993) or Ramos (1992), who finds that, consistent with negative selection, non-
migrants in Puerto Rico are more educated than individuals migrating from Puerto Rico to the 
United States and that those individuals migrating back from the United States to Puerto Rico 
are more educated than those who remain in the United States. Others (for example Feliciano, 
2005, Orrenius and Zavodny, 2005, McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007, Belot and Hatton, 2008) 
find limited, or no evidence that is compatible with this simple model. 
In an influential paper, Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) investigate migration from 
Mexico to the United States. They argue that as the return to schooling is higher in Mexico, 
individuals with high levels of schooling are less likely to migrate. They compare actual 
wage densities for residents of Mexico with counterfactual wage densities that would be 
obtained were Mexican immigrants paid according to skill prices in Mexico – thus comparing 
the conditional distributions whose means are given by (I) and (III). The findings suggest 
that, were Mexican immigrants in the United States paid according to Mexican skill prices,  
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they would fall disproportionately in the middle and upper middle of Mexico’s wage 
distribution. As Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) point out, this does not support negative 
selection, but rather suggests intermediate or moderate positive selection of Mexican 
immigrants. This empirical finding is not compatible with the original model they started off 
with, which is our model above, but restricted to the special case where  O D cu u = . To 
reconcile the empirical evidence with the model, they introduce non-linear migration costs. 
They assume that costs are large, but decrease in schooling at a decreasing rate, so that the 
net advantage of migration is highest for those in the middle of the distribution of skills. We 
re-produce their explanatory graph in Figure 6, which illustrates the case of constant 




way we have drawn the figure, skills are one-dimensional and migration costs k  are equal to 
) exp( S k π π δ µ − = . The way the figure is drawn for the constant migration cost case 
( 0 = π δ ), the rent on human capital is higher in the destination country (U.S.),  O D µ µ > , but 
the return to skill S  is higher in the origin country (Mexico). Thus, those with levels of skill 
S  below 
* S  will emigrate, but those with levels of skill S  above 
* S  will remain in Mexico 
– which is what Chiquiar and Hanson expected to find in the data. If  0 > π δ , and for 
sufficiently high fixed costs of migration, those at the low end of the skill distribution, below 
level 
L S , may now find it too costly to emigrate, while migration is advantageous for those in 
the middle of the wage distribution, between level 
L S  and level 
U S . Chiquiar and Hanson 
                                                 
50 The case of migration costs that are linear in schooling is straightforward in that it either leaves the overall 
selection pattern unchanged or it reverses it entirely, depending on the pace at which migration costs decrease 
with educational attainment.   
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conclude that such cost schedules may provide a possible explanation for the observed 
migration pattern from Mexico to the United States.
51 
Figure 6: Non-linear Migration Costs 
 
Non-linear migration costs are one reason why the one-dimensional model may not fit 
the data. Another reason may be that the one-dimensional model is overly restrictive, and 
omits an important aspect of migration decisions. Our discussion in the previous section has 
illustrated that migration decisions may be taken by considering the prices of multiple skills 
in the home- and potential host country. Clearly, education is a one-dimensional measure of 
                                                 
51 For a further discussion of how different assumptions regarding the migration costs affect predicted selection 
patterns - for example whether or not migration costs are assumed to be fixed in time-equivalent units or in 
monetary units - see Rosenzweig (2007) and Hanson (2010). 
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skills, which may for instance reflect well the academic skills of individuals, but may 
measure less well trade- and manual skills. If the latter are highly valued in the destination 
country, and are more prevalent for individuals in the middle of the education distribution, 
then migration patterns like those illustrated by Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) can be explained 
without making assumptions about migration costs, as the following example illustrates. 
Consider the case where the skill distribution is two-dimensional. Suppose further that 
the first skill (which we termed “analytical” skill) is strongly correlated with education, but 
the second skill (which we termed “manual” or “trade” skill) is more strongly present in 
individuals with intermediate years of education. A multi-dimensional education system like 
the German apprenticeship system could produce such patterns, with individuals with 
intermediate levels of education having often gone through vocational training in crafts and 
trades. In countries without well-developed vocational training schemes, those with 
intermediate years of education may still have specialised in manual- or trade-related skills, 
as development of many of these skills requires some basic level of schooling. Measured 
education may reflect mainly skill  1 S  but not necessarily skill  2 S . 
For the case of Mexican-U.S. migration, the manual/trade related skill dimension, although 
probably not highly valued in Mexico (as these skills are in plentiful supply), may command 
a relatively high price in the United States. This seems to be compatible with the occupational 
distribution of Mexicans immigrant workers in the United States, with the three main 
occupations falling exactly into this category of skills: cooks (6.1 percent of workers), 
construction labourers (5.8 percent), and grounds maintenance workers (4.9 percent).
52  
In Table 11, we give a numerical example. We distinguish between three education groups, 
“low”, “medium”, and “high”. We have chosen the skill prices such that skill 1 has a higher 
                                                 
52 Figures calculated from the 2009 IPUMS CPS sample using all Mexican-born individuals in the U.S. who are 
currently at work and aged above 16.  
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return in the origin country, and skill 2 has a higher return in the destination country. Skill 1 
increases with education but skill 2 is particularly high for those in the middle of the 
education distribution, and less developed for those who are either low educated or highly 
educated.  
 
[Table 11: Example Intermediate Selection] 
 
For simplicity, suppose migration costs are zero and the rental rate of human capital is 
identical in both countries and normalized to zero. The differentials between wages that can 
be obtained in the destination- and the origin country are reported in the last column of Table 
11. Those who are low educated will not migrate and are better off in their country of origin, 
while those with intermediate levels of education will gain from migration, and those with 
high levels of education will again lose. Thus, this scenario creates a migration situation 
where only those in the middle of the education distribution will want to emigrate.  
The scenario corresponds to the empirical evidence of intermediate selection 
provided by Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) without introducing non-linear migration cost. This 
illustrates the capacity of the multi-dimensional Roy model to accommodate different 
migration patterns that remain unexplained in a simple one-dimensional skill model. 
To conclude, we believe that the full potential of the Roy model has not been 
explored in the migration context. The situation where individuals are characterised by 
multiple skills, and where these skills are priced differently in different countries, is, in our 
view, important in an ever more globalised world economy where individual countries 
specialise in particular industries. 
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4.2 Selection and Return Migration 
 
The framework above explains selection of immigrants, but does not address return 
migration. Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) use the one-dimensional Roy model to explore the 
selection of emigrants as well as those who return. We will briefly introduce the main 
features of their model, and extend it below to a multi-dimensional skill model. 
Using our notation, log earnings in the origin- and destination country in their model are 
given by  O O O u Y + = µ  and  D D D u Y + = µ , respectively. They further assume that  D O cu u = . 
Thus, 
2 ) ( , 1 ) ( c u Var u Var O D = = , and  1 ) , ( = O D u u Corr , so that the variance of earnings is 
higher in the host country when  1 < c . They allow workers to have three options: to stay at 
home, to migrate temporarily, or to migrate permanently. A return migration may be optimal 
for the same reason we discuss in Section 3.3.4: staying abroad for a period t increases 
human capital that is valuable at home by an amount κ . Thus, earnings when emigrating and 
returning are given by  ) )( 1 ( ) ( κ µ µ + + − + + = O O D D DO u t u t Y . No migration will take place 
if  D O Y Y >  and  DO O Y Y > ; a permanent migration will take place when  O D Y Y >  and 
DO D Y Y > ; and migration and return migration will take place when  D DO Y Y > and  O DO Y Y > . 
We illustrate the ensuing regimes in Figure 7 for the case where  1 < c  (which is the case 





Figure 7: Selection with Return Migration 
The figure shows the distribution of skills, where those with the lowest skills (below the 
threshold  τ τ κ µ µ / ) 1 ( − − − D O ) will decide not to emigrate, those with the highest skills 
(above the threshold  κ µ µ + − D O ) will decide to emigrate and remain permanently, and 
those between the two thresholds will decide to emigrate, but return home after spending time 
t abroad. Thus, those who return have higher skills than those who have not emigrated, but 
lower skills than those who decide to remain permanently. Further, an increase in the rent on 
human capital in the country of destination  D µ  will lead to a shift in the thresholds to the left, 
while an increase in the value of human capital acquired abroad back in the home country, κ , 
leads to a widening of the distance between the two thresholds and thus to increased return 
migration. It is easy to show that selection of emigrants and return migrants will be exactly 
O D u u −  
Return Migration  Permanent Migration  No Migration 
τ τ κ µ µ / ) 1 ( − − − D O   κ µ µ + − D O   
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the opposite when the price of skills is higher in the country of origin. We will now extend 
this model to a multi-dimensional setting. 
 
4.3 Learning, Multi-Dimensional Skills, and Return Migration 
 
The multi-dimensional model described in Section 4.1 is a static model, in the sense that it 
assumes that the skills individuals have cannot be augmented. In Section 3, we illustrate – 
within a one-dimensional skill framework – that many migrations take place for the purpose 
of skill accumulation. Student migrations, for example, have increased by more than 80 
percent between 1999 and 2008, constituting an increasingly important component of 
international migration as illustrated in Figure 1. 
In a recent paper, Dustmann et al. (2010a) extend the two-dimensional framework, and 
develop a dynamic Roy model with learning, where migration- and return migration 
decisions do not only depend (for given skill prices) on the skills individuals possess, but also 
on learning opportunities in the origin- and destination countries, i.e. where skills can be 
acquired more efficiently. As before, they allow skills to command different prices in 
different countries, but, in addition, add the possibility that individuals can accumulate skills 
in different countries at different rates.  
We will briefly sketch their model, using the same notation as before. Human capital is again 
an aggregate that summarises individual skills: 
  ) ( ) ( ) ( ln ln 2 2 1 1 t S b t S b t K y Y j j j j j j j + + = + = = µ µ ,   
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where   D O j , = , and where the skills S  now carry a time index as they can be augmented in 
a “learning by doing” way. Dustmann et al. (2010a) concentrate on the case where 
2 2 1 1 , D O O D b b b b > > , which implies non-hierarchical sorting. 
Individuals accumulate skills  1 S  and  2 S  while working. However, the extent of human 
capital accumulation differs between the two countries, due to different learning rates, and 
due to different prices for the two skills. Denoting the rate of accumulation of skill  S  in 
country  j  by  jS γ , and assuming that skill  1 S  can be accumulated at a faster rate in country 
D, while skill  2 S  can be accumulated at a faster rate in country O, one obtains 
1 2 2 1 , O O D D γ γ γ γ > > . Assuming continuous time, a person who works in country D 
accumulates local productive capacity ( D D K , ) and productive capacity applicable in the 
country of origin ( D O K , ) at rates 
DD D D D D
D D
D D g b b
K
K




;      OD D O D O
D O
D O g b b
K
K





Further, human capital is accumulated in country O at rates 
OO O O O O
O O
O O g b b
K
K




 ;    DO O D O D
O D
O D g b b
K
K





The parameters g measure the rates at which productive capacity for either country can be 
augmented in each country. For example, the parameter  OD g  measures the rate at which 
productive capacity for the origin country can be acquired in the destination country D. This 
depends on the rate at which the two skills  1 S  and  2 S  are acquired in country D ( 1 D γ  and 
2 D γ ), and the prices these skills command in country O ( 1 O b  and  2 O b ).  
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The model is analysed under certainty, with infinitely long-lived agents, and a fixed 
interest rate. There is a fixed learning period: learning can take place only until age T , and 
remains constant thereafter, so that substitution between learning abroad and at home occurs. 
The time line is given in Figure 8. Individuals are born at 0, emigrate at τ , and have the 
possibility to return at ε . The length of the learning period is given by T , and the return time 
ε  may be before or after T . 
 
 
Figure 8: Timeline Return Migration 
Three cases are distinguished that relate to the intensity to which staying in the host country 
affects human capital in the two countries, referred to as partial transferability, strong 
transferability, and super transferability. We will here briefly consider the first two cases. 
Partial transferability characterises a situation where  OD OO DD g g g > > , while strong 
transferability characterises a situation where  OO DD OD g g g > > . Thus, with partial 
transferability, experience in the host country leads to less accumulation of human capital that 
is applicable to the home country than experience in the home country. Furthermore, 
experience in the home country leads to less accumulation of human capital that is applicable 
to the home country than experience in the host country leads to accumulation of human 
capital applicable in the host country.  Thus, those who have a high endowment of  D K  will 
emigrate (and they will do so at the first possible opportunity,  0 = τ , as this maximises the 
amount of human capital that can be accumulated). Furthermore, as experience in the host 
0  emigration : τ   return : ε   period learning end T :   
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country enhances human capital in the host country by more than human capital in the home 
country, those who have decided to emigrate will never return. 
With strong transferability, time in the host country will enhance human capital applicable in 
the home country by more than human capital in the host country and by more than time in 
the home country. Country  D is a “learning centre”. Again, those who decide to emigrate 
will do so at  0 = τ , and some of those who decide to emigrate will return prior to  T .  
In Figure 9, we display the marginal gain and marginal cost schedules from delaying the 
return back home for the case of strong transferability.
53 The intersection of these two curves 
presents the optimal return time. The cost of a delayed return rises with the time in the host 
country, as the migrant’s home country human capital  O K  increases at a faster rate than her 
host country human capital  D K  ( DD OD g g > ). A return will occur if the two schedules cross 
at  T < ε . If the schedules cross at  T > ε , Dustmann et al. (2010a) show that return will occur 
either at T , or the migration will be permanent. 
                                                 
53 Notice that this situation is similar to the one-dimensional model we discuss in Section 3.3.4, where a return is 
triggered by an increase in human capital that is valuable in the home country. The reason for the increasing 
marginal gain schedule is that Dustmann et al. (2010a) allow for imperfect transferability of productive capacity. 
They assume that the rent on human capital in the destination country is initially the same as in the origin 
country ( O R ), but converges to the rent on human capital in the destination country ( D R ). The discontinuity in 




Figure 9: Return Migration in 2-Dimensional Skill Framework with Learning 
Consider now the question who leaves, and who will return. In the case of partial 
transferability, migrations will either not occur, or they will be permanent, as the gap between 
home and host country human capital will increase with the migration duration. This situation 
is not dissimilar to the two-dimensional Roy model we have discussed in Section 4.1. The 
















> , where now the skills  1 S  
and  2 S  are evaluated at  0 = τ , and Ω depends on the present value of lifetime earnings, and 
is endogenously determined. As before, who migrates (and the type of selection) depends on 
the skill prices.  
More interesting is the case of strong transferability. In this case, return migration occurs, 
given the assumptions on skill prices and their accumulation rates in the host and home 
country ( 2 2 1 1 , D O O D b b b b > > , and  1 2 2 1 , O O D D γ γ γ γ > > ). Figure 10 illustrates the migration 
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and re-migration choices in the  ) 0 ( 1 S  and  ) 0 ( 2 S  space. Those with relatively more  ) 0 ( 1 S  
(which commands a higher price in the country of destination) will emigrate and, among 










Figure 10: Selection in 2-Dimensional Skill Space with Learning. 
 
In Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) the motive for a return is the same as the one we 
discuss here: the time in the host country may increase immigrants’ home country human 
capital by more than their host country human capital. However, they do not consider 
learning (which in our case affects both emigration- and re-migration decisions), and they 
consider the return decision in the one-dimensional case. The model collapses to the one-
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that case, the two-dimensional distribution of  1 S  and  2 S  collapses to a one-dimensional 
distribution along the 45 degree line (or along the  ) 0 ( 2 S  axis if  0 1 1 = = O D b b ). It is obvious 
that in that case, selection will be either positively or negatively selective, according to the 
relative skill prices – similar to Figure 7 in Section 4.2. For the way Figure 10 is drawn, 
emigration and re-migration will be negatively selective. 
 
4.4 Empirical Studies 
 
The selection of immigrants and return migrants, and the effect of migration on the 
skill base of the origin- and destination country, are important to understand the 
consequences of migration for those who do not migrate. The last sections have developed a 
framework within which these processes can be understood and analysed. We have also 
discussed some empirical papers that try to assess the direction of selection, and we have 
suggested some possibilities of how to think about selection in a multi-dimensional skill 
world. 
In this section, we will discuss some of the empirical papers that study additional 
ways in which migrations affect non-migrants and their skills and skill accumulation. Much 
of this work can be directly related to the theoretical models we discussed in the previous 
sections. 
 
4.4.1 Emigration and Human Capital Investment in the Sending Country 
Emigration – or the possibility of emigration – may have important consequences for 
the skill accumulation in the origin country through several channels. First, emigrants may re- 
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distribute some of the migration surplus they capture to family members back home by means 
of remittances which may then be used for educational investments that would otherwise not 
have been possible due to a lack of available funds and credit constraints (for a formal model 
describing this mechanism, see Rapoport and Docquier, 2006). A number of studies suggest 
that this is happening. Yang (2008), for instance, studies how sudden shocks in exchange 
rates due to the Asian financial crisis in 1997 affected child schooling and educational 
expenditures in the Philippines through their effect on remittances, taking advantage of the 
diverse set of host countries Filipino emigrants are located in. He finds positive effects on 
human capital accumulation in the origin households. Similarly, Cox Edwards and Ureta 
(2003) and Acosta (2006) provide evidence that remittances increase educational attainment 
of children in El Salvador, and López-Córdoba (2005) shows that municipalities in Mexico 
that receive more remittances have higher literacy and school attendance rates among their 6 
to 14 year-old children.  
 Secondly, the possibility of a future migration may increase the incentives to invest 
in further education. This point has first been made by Mountford (1997), and we have 
illustrated the basic idea in Section 3.3.5: if the return to education is higher in a potential 
destination country, and if there is a positive probability of a future migration, then this will 
lead to a higher incentive to invest in human capital. While higher returns to education in the 
host country have a negative direct effect on the home country’s skill base by inducing 
skilled emigration, it encourages human-capital formation in the longer-run. Mountford 
shows that this can potentially be beneficial for the country of origin (“beneficial brain 
drain”), as long as the probability of an actual future emigration is smaller than 1 (see also 
Stark et al., 1997, Vidal, 1998, and Beine et al., 2001). Such uncertainty of migration could  
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result, for example, from the unpredictability and restrictiveness of migration policies in 
potential destination countries.  
In a series of empirical studies, Beine et al. (2001, 2008, and 2010) assess the 
possibility of a beneficial brain drain using both cross-sectional and panel data for a large set 
of developing countries. Their findings provide some evidence that higher emigration rates 
may indeed have a positive effect on average human capital levels. For example, their work 
shows that in those countries that are characterised by low levels of human capital, low 
income and relatively low emigration rates of skilled workers (not exceeding 20 to 30 
percent), the net effect on the average human capital level of the remaining population is 
positive, implying a beneficial brain drain effect. Such a positive incentive effect of 
emigration on human capital accumulation may be further reinforced in the presence of 
positive externalities of human capital in production (Stark and Wang, 2002) and perpetuated 
through the intergenerational transmission of human capital from one generation to the next. 
Schiff (2005) takes a more sceptical view regarding the likelihood and magnitude of a 
beneficial brain drain through the incentive effect of skilled emigration, a view supported by 
empirical evidence provided by Lucas (2005) and Checchi et al. (2007). These studies 
suggest that in many countries that experience emigration of their skilled workers, the net 
effect on the average educational attainment of those remaining in the country is likely to be 
negative.
54 
Thirdly, selective emigration, as discussed in the previous section, may affect skill 
acquisition in the origin country by changing the existing skill base, which in turn affects the 
return to education. For example, if emigrants are predominantly high-skilled, then the 
                                                 
54 This is more likely for those countries where skilled emigration rates are excessively high, such as many sub-
Saharan African and Central American countries where they often exceed 40 percent. See also Marchiori et al. 
(2009), who come to this conclusion based on an overlapping-generations general equilibrium model.  
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reduction in the relative supply of high-skilled workers in the home country should lead to an 
increase in skilled workers’ wage rates. Mishra (2007) analyses this relationship for the 
Mexican case. Following an empirical strategy first suggested by Borjas (2003), she finds 
that Mexican emigration to the United States has had a significant positive effect on Mexican 
wages, a conclusion supported by evidence provided by Hanson (2007) and Aydemir and 
Borjas (2007). According to Mishra’s results, a 10 percent decrease of Mexican workers in a 
skill group (measured by education and experience) due to emigration increases average 
wages in that group by 4 percent. Since emigrants are disproportionately drawn from the 
middle of the Mexican skill distribution (high school graduates and those with some college 
education) wages of medium-educated workers in Mexico have risen the most as a result of 
emigration. The resulting increase in the return to education may induce more individuals to 
invest in additional schooling. 
Lastly, as discussed in Dustmann et al. (2010a), emigration and return migration may 
lead to an increase in the productive human capital stock in the sending country if a 
sufficiently large fraction of the migrations are temporary and the returning migrants 
accumulate valuable human capital while being abroad. The empirical evidence suggests that 
return migration of high-skilled workers – in particular the highest-skilled ones such as PhD 
recipients – is comparatively limited. One channel through which human capital of return 
migrants may lead to economic growth in their home countries is through facilitating 
knowledge and technology spillovers from the typically more advanced host countries. 
Domingues Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay (2004) derive the theoretical conditions required for 
such an overall positive effect to occur. 
While each of the four channels presented may individually lead to a positive effect 
of migration on educational attainment in the origin country, there are also counteracting  
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factors, likely to depend on the particularities of the considered migration situation, that tend 
to reduce educational attainment. For example, while the positive income effect through 
remittances may well alleviate credit constraints and lead to higher investments in education, 
the absence of a parent, and in particular of a mother, is likely to negatively affect overall 
parental inputs into the children’s development. It may also force children to undertake 
additional household chores or other work to help maintaining the household. Cortés (2010), 
for instance, provides evidence that children of migrant mothers in the Philippines are 
approximately 10 percentage points more likely to be lagging behind in school compared to 
children with migrant fathers. 
 Also, the possibility of a future migration may create opposite incentive effects if the 
return to education in occupations potential emigrants consider as attainable is lower in the 
destination country than in the origin country (this could be due to a high return to trade 
(manual) skills and low returns to academic skills), or if migration is seen as an alternative to 
the acquisition of education. Due to these counteracting factors, the overall effect of 
migration on human capital acquisition in the home country is a priori ambiguous. McKenzie 
and Rapoport (2010) empirically assess this net effect of migration for the Mexican case 
based on data from the National Survey of Demographic Dynamics, using historical 
migration rates to instrument for current migration. Their findings show a significant negative 
effect of migration on school attendance and attainment of 12 to 18 year-old boys and 16 to 
18 year-old girls: living in a migrant household is estimated to lower the probability of 
completing high school by 13 percent for males and 14 percent for females. These effects are 
somewhat mitigated for children from a poorer background which is consistent with a more 
prominent role of credit constraints in these households. Overall, most of the negative effect 
of migration on educational attainment is due to young males migrating themselves rather  
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than attending school, and young females dropping out of school to work at home.
55 For a 
detailed discussion of this literature, including earlier work, see Commander et al. (2004) and 
Docquier and Rapoport (2009). 
 
4.4.2 Immigration and Human Capital Investment in the Receiving Country 
In the last section, we considered the possible channels by which emigration can 
affect skill accumulation and education of those in the country of origin who do not emigrate. 
We now turn to the destination country. Again, there are various channels by which 
immigration may affect the accumulation of skills and education. First – and similar to what 
we discussed in the previous section – immigration may affect the price of skills by changing 
the relative factor supplies in the host country’s economy. For example, a large inflow of 
low-skilled immigrants could lead to a decrease in the relative wages of low-skilled workers 
and to an increase in the relative wages of high-skilled workers. Most of the existing papers 
do not find large wage effects of immigration, although there is still a lot of controversy in 
the literature investigating this issue, which includes studies by Card (1990), Altonji and Card 
(1991), Butcher and Card (1991), Borjas et al. (1997), Card (2001), Friedberg (2001), Borjas 
(2003), Dustmann et al. (2005), Manacorda et al. (2006), Ottaviano and Peri (2008), 
Dustmann et al. (2008), and Glitz (2011).
56  
In the simplest model of an economy with one sector and unskilled and skilled 
labour, the effect of immigration depends on assumptions about the elasticity of capital 
supply as well as the share of skilled immigrants relative to the share of skilled workers in the 
                                                 
55 See also De Brauw and Giles (2006) and Antman (2009), who similarly find a negative overall effect of 
migration on investments in education in China and Mexico, respectively, and Hanson and Woodruff (2003) 
who find a positive effect on the schooling of less-educated mothers’ teenage daughters in Mexico. 
56 For a comprehensive overview of this literature, see Okkerse (2008).  
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native population. We have seen in Table 1a in Section 2 that this share differs substantially 
across countries, so that we cannot expect immigration to have the same effects in different 
countries. If immigration is unskilled and affects skill prices by, for example, generating 
higher returns to education, then this may create incentives to invest into education. Findings 
for the U.S. by Jackson (2010) show that a 1 percent increase in relatively unskilled 
immigrant labour raises the rate of native college enrolment by 0.33 percent. This crowd-in 
effect is driven primarily by natives aged 18 to 24 due to their higher sensitivity to the returns 
to college education relative to older natives. In a more specific case, if immigrants are 
complementing labour supply of highly skilled women by providing domestic services that 
are otherwise not available or considerably more costly, then this is likely to increase the 
return to higher education for women. Such immigration should then not only lead to higher 
female labour supply (as shown by Cortés and Tessada, 2009, Cortés and Pan, 2009, and 
Farré et al., 2009) but also more human capital investment.  
Secondly, immigration may create incentives for native-born workers to specialise in 
areas where they have a comparative advantage, for instance through their knowledge of the 
host country language or of existing networks. Such specialisation may well imply the 
accumulation of additional skills. More generally, if immigrants and natives have different 
comparative advantages in the labour market, then immigration will lead to shifts in the skill 
distribution of the native workforce. For example, Peri and Sparber (2009) show that natives 
reallocate their task supply towards occupations that are more communication and language 
intensive when faced with an inflow of immigrants that increases the supply of manual and 
physical labour intensive occupations. Task specialisation also extends to the highly educated 
segment of the labour market, where immigrants with a graduate degree tend to specialize in 
occupations demanding quantitative and analytical skills whereas native-born graduates  
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specialize in occupations requiring interactive and communicative skills (Peri and Sparber, 
2008). 
Thirdly, immigrants may affect the human capital acquisition of natives through their 
presence in the educational system, both on the tertiary and prior levels. Borjas (2006a) finds 
that admitting foreign students to doctoral programs has a negative effect on the earnings of 
native doctoral recipients in the corresponding field. According to his results, a 10 percent 
increase in the supply of doctorates in a specific field reduces earnings of competing workers 
by 3 to 4 percent, half of which is due to a shift towards lower-paid postdoctoral 
appointments. He also finds some evidence of foreign students crowding out white native 
men (Borjas, 2007) which, although in line with earlier evidence provided by Hoxby (1998), 
stands somewhat in contrast to other findings showing no significant crowd-out effect of 
native students (Jackson, 2010). Crowding-out of native students has also been found at the 
secondary school level. Betts and Fairlie (2003) found evidence that for every four 
immigrants who arrive in public high schools, one native student switches to a private school, 
and that this “native flight” is particularly pronounced among white native students and in 
response to the arrival of non-English speaking immigrant children. Gould et al. (2009) show 
that the presence of immigrants during elementary school has a negative long-term effect on 
the probability of passing the high school matriculation exam in Israel, which enables 
students to attend college. Neymotin (2009), on the other hand, provides evidence that 
immigration did not negatively affect the SAT-scores of native high school students in 
California and Texas. 
Finally, in a wider context, immigration may affect the stock of human capital in the 
host country by its contribution to new innovations. For instance, Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle 
(2010), using the 2003 National Survey of College Graduates, show that the large number of  
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immigrants with science and engineering degrees in the U.S. adds significantly to the number 
of patents granted: a 1 percentage point increase in the immigrant college graduates’ 
population accordingly leads to an increase in patents per capita by 9 to 18 percent. Hunt 
(2010) and Kerr and Lincoln (2010) find complementary evidence regarding immigrants’ 
contribution to general productivity-increasing activities such as patenting, publishing and 
company start-ups. 
 
5. The Children of Immigrants 
 
In the previous sections, we have considered the relationship between education, skill 
accumulation, and migration. We focussed on the way education interacts with migration 
decisions, and how migration affects skill accumulation and the skill base of those 
populations that do not migrate. In this context, we have touched on the educational 
achievements of the children of emigrants in the home countries, and on the incentives to 
invest in education for young people in the host countries as a result of immigration. In this 
section, we will focus explicitly on the children of immigrants in the countries of destination. 
We will study their educational achievements and ensuing labour market outcomes, and 
relate these to their parent generation and their peers born to native parents.  
The educational achievement of the children of immigrants is one of the key issues in 
the immigration debate in many countries. Under-achievement of immigrant children is often 
seen as a major factor for the long-term segregation of immigrant communities, and 
educational achievements of immigrant children in comparison to their native-born peers are 
considered an important indicator of successful immigration policy (see, for example, OECD, 
2006). As Table 8 in Section 2 shows, the test score results for children with a migration  
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background, based on the PISA data, are indeed on average below those of children of native-
born parents, although there is quite some variation across countries. This is in line with the 
limited set of findings for individual countries that are based on alternative standardized 
performance measures. For instance, Rampney et al. (2009) show that the reading 
(mathematics) score gap in the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) 
between White and Hispanic students in the U.S. in 2008 was 9.2 (6.4) percent for the 9 year-
olds, 9.7 (7.9) percent for the 13 year-olds, and 8.8 (6.7) percent for the 17 year-olds. 
As Figure 2 shows, educational achievement of immigrant children is related to the 
educational achievement of their parents. This suggests that the relatively low achievement of 
immigrant children in some countries is at least partly due to the lower educational 
background of their parent generation, and does not necessarily reflect the failure of the host 
society to educate second-generation immigrants. However, in the public debate the 
comparison between children born to immigrants and native parents is often unconditional on 
parental characteristics – a comparison that seems not very meaningful. If the first generation 
of immigrants is less educated than the native population (which is the case for a number of 
countries, see Section 2), then even a strong educational progress of immigrant children may 
still result in educational outcomes that are lower than those of natives. We will discuss this 
issue below.  
How should we then think about the dynastic assimilation of immigrant 
communities? What is it exactly that determines the educational outcomes of immigrant 
children? There are at least three factors that matter. First, as just argued, the educational 
achievements of immigrant children are linked to their parental background. There is a large 
literature on the intergenerational transmission of human capital, for example Behrman and 
Taubman (1985), Solon (1992), Zimmermann (1992), Björklund and Jäntti (1997), Corak and  
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Heisz (1999), or Blanden et al. (2004), which shows that there is considerable 
intergenerational immobility across generations in a large number of outcomes. 
Second, immigrant children may be differently affected by the institutional setting 
and support structures of the host countries’ education systems. Another large literature in 
economics studies the different features of educational production, and how it relates to 
resources, institutions, and parental input (see, for example, Todd and Wolpin, 2003, Cunha 
et al., 2006, or Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008, 2010). Even without differential access to 
these educational institutions across populations in the same country, the same resources may 
affect immigrant children’s educational outcomes in a different way than those of children 
born to native-born parents – for example due to complementary forms of knowledge that are 
not sufficiently available in immigrant communities
57 – and prevent immigrants’ children 
from making full use of existing educational support structures.  
Third, the social context in which immigrant children grow up is an important 
determinant of their educational outcomes. Borjas (1992, 1995a) was among the first to 
emphasise what he calls the effect of “ethnic capital” on the educational achievements of 
immigrant children. The ethnic context of immigrants shapes their own, and their parents’ 
values and incentives. For instance, immigrant children who grow up in an ethnic 
environment that is characterised by particular educational- and occupational choices are 
likely to make similar choices. Ethnic capital summarises things like peer effects, role 
models, and community ambitions, which may all be strongly related to immigrants’ 
educational outcomes. This may reduce the overall educational attainment of second-
generation immigrants, but it may also enhance it. A good example is the success of South- 
                                                 
57 On of those is, for instance, language. Dustmann et al. (2010f) illustrate that language is the key factor that 
holds children of ethnic minority background back in the first years of full-time education.   
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and South-East Asian immigrant children that may be partly due to the high value attached to 
education within their communities (which in turn may be related to the Confucian tradition, 
which emphasises the importance of study). In the UK, for example, Chinese students, who at 
the beginning of their compulsory schooling at age 6/7 start off with a 7.6 percent of a 
standard deviation lower English test score than White British students, outperform their 
native counterparts by more than 50 percent of a standard deviation by the time they reach 
age 15/16 (Dustmann et al., 2010f).  
There are other important factors that relate to the educational achievement of 
immigrant children. Parental considerations that affect their own investment in learning may 
also influence decisions about their children. For instance, we have seen that in the case of 
temporary migrations, and if skills acquired in the host country are only partially transferable 
to the home country labour market, immigrants will invest less in their human capital than 
they would in case of a permanent migration. In the same way, it is not unlikely that parental 
decisions about the educational attainment of their children are affected by where parents see 
their children’s future. For instance, if a migrant household intends to return to the home 
country, and if this planned return migration is including the children, then this may induce 
parents to invest less into their children’s education than they would do in the case of a 
permanent migration. Dustmann (2008) has made this point, and provides empirical evidence 
that supports this hypothesis. 
As before, we will commence with a formal discussion, laying out some of the key 
issues. We will then review and interpret the empirical evidence that exists to date. 
 




The empirical approach to study the relationship between outcomes of parents and 
outcomes of children is to regress a permanent outcome measure (for example earnings) of 
the child on a permanent outcome measure of the parent, by applying a Least Squares 
estimator to the regression equation 






it y y ε ρ α + + = −1 log log , 
where 
j
it y log  and  
j
it y 1 log −  are some permanent measures for outcomes (such as 
education, wealth or earnings) of a child and parent, respectively, belonging to group  j  
(which could be immigrants and their children, or natives and their children). For 
simplification, in what follows, we will refer to the outcome as “earnings”. According to 
Equation (14), the earnings of family i’s child is determined by family i’s parental earnings 
and other influences ε  (which we will discuss further below). The parameter 
j α  can be 
thought of as the average effect on earnings of these other influences, which can differ 
between groups. Assuming that the variances of 
j
it y log  and 
j
it y 1 log −  are the same, 
j ρ  is the 
population correlation coefficient between 
j
it y log  and 
j
it y 1 log − . Assume that the 
j
it ε  are iid 
distributed with mean zero and  ( Var
j
it y log ) =  ( Var
j
it y 1 log − ) = 
j
y
, 2 σ , so that estimation of  
Equation (14) gives a consistent estimate of 
j ρ , 
j ρ ˆ .
58 The coefficient 
j ρ  represents the 
fraction of economic advantage (in terms of earnings, education, or wealth) that is on average 
transmitted across the generations. It is called the intergenerational correlation coefficient or 
transmission parameter. A coefficient close to zero suggests high intergenerational mobility, 
while a coefficient close to one indicates low mobility. The coefficient (
j ρ − 1 ) is often 
referred to as the degree of regression to the mean. 
                                                 
58 If the variance of log wages differs across the two generations, the OLS estimator ρ ˆ  measures  1 − yt yt σ ρσ .  
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For immigrants, the study of intergenerational mobility has a particular significance. 
If first-generation immigrants are disadvantaged, in the sense that they are less well educated 
or have lower earnings than the native population, then immigrant and native populations 
may differ for many generations, depending on the magnitude of ρ .  
To illustrate this point, consider Equation (14), and index outcomes of immigrants 
and natives by I  and  N , respectively. Further, allow the intergenerational transmission 
parameter to differ between the two groups, so that  ζ ρ ρ + =
I N . Then the wage differential 
between the two populations in generation t is given by 







N I N I
t
N
t y E y E y E y E y E − − − + − + − = − ζ ρ α α . 
Consider the case where  0 = ζ  (intergenerational transmission ρ  is the same in the 
two populations) and assume for simplicity that 
I N α α = . In this case, the native-immigrant 
gap in outcomes disappears from one generation to the next only if  0 = = =
I N ρ ρ ρ . If 
1 = ρ , the initial outcome differential will be fully transmitted to the next generation. If ρ  is 
smaller than 1, inequality between the two groups will fall and assimilation across groups 
will take place, but not within one generation. The magnitude of ρ  determines the speed of 
convergence. For example, for  4 . 0 = ρ , a 20 percent average earnings disadvantage for 
immigrants in the parent generation translates into an 8 percent earnings disadvantage in their 
children’s generation. Now suppose “other influences” determining outcomes as captured by 
the parameter α  differ across the two groups. If  0 > −
I N α α , the difference in outcomes in 
the next generation may even be larger than in the parent generation, despite regression to the 
mean, as indicated by  1 < ρ . In the next section, we develop a simple model of  
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intergenerational mobility, and we will show that one reason for differences in the mean 
influence of other factors could be discrimination. 
Now consider the case where  0 ≠ ζ : the intergenerational transmission parameter 
differs between the two groups. It follows from Equation (15) that if  0 > ζ   (i.e. 
intergenerational mobility in the advantaged groups – natives – is smaller than in the 
disadvantaged group), outcome differentials in the next generation may even be larger than 
those in the previous generation despite regression to the mean in both groups. The degree of 
assimilation between the two groups across generations depends on the parameters ζ , 
N ρ , 
and 
I N α α − . 
In general, earnings of immigrants in the next generation will converge to the 








































α α . 
Thus, if mean log earnings of natives are larger than those of immigrants in generation  1 − t , 
there will always be convergence as long as  0 = −
I N α α ,  0 = ζ and  1 < = = ρ ρ ρ
I N . On 
the other hand, both a higher ζ  (less intergenerational mobility of natives) and a higher 
I N α α −  (stronger effect of other influences on native earnings than on immigrant earnings) 
lead to slower convergence. For sufficiently high values of either of these parameters, the 
difference in expected earnings between immigrants and natives in the next generation could 
be larger than in the previous generation.  
What is the interpretation of the parameters ρ  and α , and how do they relate to an 
underlying structural model and its parameters? This is what we will explore next. We will  
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show why these parameters are likely to differ between immigrants and natives and generate 
different intergenerational correlation coefficients and intercepts and hence different 
intergenerational persistence of outcomes for these groups. We will also demonstrate why the 
assumption that  it ε  is iid is unlikely to hold in reality, which may affect the actual estimation 
of the parameter ρ . 
5.2 A Model of Intergenerational Mobility of Immigrants 
 
Becker and Tomes (1979) develop a theoretical model for the intergenerational 
transmission of wealth and human capital, and Solon (2004) provides a parameterisation that 
derives an intergenerational transmission function of the type illustrated above. In the 
following, we will draw on Solon’s formulation, and simplify and adjust it to emphasise what 
we believe are some key insights for the study of educational attainments of the children of 
immigrants in comparison with natives. The model is a permanent income model of 
intergenerational mobility with parental investments in the child’s earnings potential.
59 Consider a 
one-person household with one child, situated in the host country. There are two periods. In the 
first period (period  1 − t ) the parent has earnings equal to  1 − t y  and the child is in full-time 
education. In the second period (period t) the parent retires while the child participates in the 
labour market and has earnings  t y , which depend in magnitude on investments in education 
in the first period. The parent is altruistic and maximises an intertemporal utility function by 
choosing first period savings  1 − t S , and investment in the child’s human capital in the first period, 
1 − t I :  
                                                 
59 See Dustmann (2008) for an extension that takes account of the way the probability of a permanent migration – 
as opposed to a future return – may affect the decision of the parent to invest in their offspring’s human capital.  
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(16)     ] log ) ( [ ) ( 1 t t t y c u c u V γ δ + + = − , 
where  (.) u  is the parent’s utility from consuming  t c  and  1 − t c  in periods t and  1 − t , respectively, 
and δ  is a discount factor. The parameter γ  is an altruistic weight. If  0 = γ , the parent does 
not consider the child’s earnings in period t. Assume that parental investments  1 − t I  translate 
into human capital of the child ( t H ) according to the following production technology:  
(17)   t t t t e I h H + = = −1 log log θ . 
The parameter θ  is a technology parameter measuring the productivity of investments. 
This parameter can be viewed as the “talent” or the “ability” of the child, but may also be related 
to institutional settings and school quality. The term  t e  is the human capital the child receives 
without any direct parental investments. This term represents the attributes endowed upon the 
child, depending on characteristics of the parents, the child’s upbringing, genetic factors, 
environment, and luck. It may also depend on existing networks, as well as the lack of opportunity 
to move out of social and economic structures from one generation to the next. Becker and Tomes 
(1979) refer to this term as endowments of capital that “are determined by the reputation and 
‘connections’ of their families, the contribution to the ability, race, and other characteristics of 
children from the genetic constitutions of their families, and the learning, skills, goals, and other 
‘family commodities’ acquired through belonging to a particular family culture. Obviously, 
endowments depend on many characteristics of parents, grandparents, and other family members 
and may also be culturally influenced by other families”. The influence of cultural factors and 
family background may be particularly important for immigrants and we will discuss the 
implications in Section 5.2.3. These factors include what Borjas (1992) calls “ethnic capital” – 
the quality of the environment in which parental investments are made.  
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Human capital translates into earnings of parents and children according to the following 
relationship: 
(18-a)   , log 1 1 1 1 − − − − + = t t t t h r y µ  
(18-b)   t t t t h r y + = µ log . 
Our formulation allows for different “rental rates” on human capital in the different 
periods, µ , as well as different returns to human capital, r . It follows from (17) and (18-b) that 
the child’s earnings in the second period are related to parental investments by: 
(19)   t t t t t t e r I r y + + = −1 log log θ µ .  
The parent’s consumption in period  1 − t  equals  1 1 1 1 − − − − − − = t t t t S I y c , where  1 − t y  
are earnings in period  1 − t . For simplicity, we assume that the parent cannot borrow against the 
child’s future earnings and does not bequeath financial assets to the child. As the parent retires 
in period t, period t consumption is thus equal to period  1 − t  savings,  1 − = t t S c .  
Choosing a simple logarithmic utility function for consumption, and substituting (19) 
for the child’s earnings into (16), the optimisation problem of the parent can be expressed as  
(20)    )] log ( [log ) log( max 1 1 1 1 1 , t t t t t t t t t I S e r I r S S I y V + + + + − − = − − − − − θ µ γ δ . 
Maximising (20) with respect to savings and investment, and solving the first order 
conditions for the optimal investment  1 − t I  yields: 
(21)    1 1 ) 1 (











The term in the numerator (which is the same as the second term in the denominator)  
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is the expected discounted utility gain to one log unit of parental investment in the child’s 
human capital. The first term in the denominator is the expected lifetime utility gain from one 
log unit of additional lifetime consumption. Thus, investments into the child as a fraction of 
income equal the expected fraction of utility resulting from this investment. Simple comparative 
statics show that investment in the child’s human capital increases with altruism γ , the 
productivity of investment θ , the return to human capital  t r , and the discount rate δ .  
Human capital and earnings of the child are related to human capital and earnings of 
the parent as follows: 
(22-a)    t t t t
t
t
t e h r
r
r












(22-b)    t t t t
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θ µ . 
Equations like (22-a) and (22-b) are usually estimated in the literature when regressing 
education (or earnings) of children on those of their parents. Consider first Equation (22-a). The 
level of education obtained by the child depends on all the parameters that affect investment. 
These may differ between immigrants and natives. If, for instance, the rate of return to skills  t r , 
is perceived to be lower for immigrants, the level of human capital acquired by immigrant 
children will also be lower as will be their earnings. Neal (2006), for example, discusses 
statistical discrimination as one reason that has frequently been brought forward to explain the 
low attainment levels of black youth in the U.S., in the sense that employers are not likely to 
view them as skilled no matter what their level of education is. Also, a lower price for human 
capital,  1 − t µ , in the parent generation of immigrants relative to natives, due to, for instance, a 
lack of important complementary skills such as language, leads to a lower level of education  
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of their children. Finally, education of children depends on “inherited” traits as well as 
institutional features such as access to schooling and school quality, which are all captured in 
the term  t e . If these differ between the immigrant and native population, both their education 
and earnings may differ due to this channel, too (see, for example, Parent, 2009). 
Suppose now that we regress log earnings (or education) of immigrant children on 
log earnings (or education) of their parents, following much of the literature that we will 
discuss below. What does the OLS coefficient we estimate measure? Following Becker and 
Tomes (1979) and Solon (2004), assume that  t e  follows an AR(1) process, reflecting a serial 
correlation in the parent’s and the child’s human capital endowments so that 
t t t v e e + + = −1 1 0 λ λ , where  t v  is a white noise error term and  ) 1 , 0 ( 1 ∈ λ . As discussed above, 
these endowments may include ability, but may also be related to networks, ethnic reference 
groups, or other “ethnic capital”. Then, in steady state, the probability limit of the OLS 

























respectively. Thus, the coefficient estimate of ρ  in the simple model we discussed at the 
beginning of Section 5.1 is larger the larger the return to human capital and the productivity 
of human capital production,  t r  and θ , and it also increases in the correlation in heritable 
traits,  1 λ . All these parameters can differ between populations. For instance, if the heritability 
parameter is larger in the immigrant population because family structures are tighter, the 
intergenerational correlation coefficient will also be larger for this population, implying less 
mobility from one generation to the next.  




5.3.1 Schooling Outcomes of Immigrant Children 
We start in this section with the first important period in an immigrant’s life, his or her 
childhood. To this end, we return to the data from the PISA study that we already introduced 
in Section 2. As we have seen in Table 8, with the exception of Australia and Canada, the 
student population with immigrant background tends to score significantly lower than the 
native population in both mathematics and reading. One of the main explanations for these 
differences could be the lack of fluency in the host country language. The last two columns of 
Table 8 indeed show that students who speak a different language at home than the language 
of instruction at school fare particularly badly. In addition to language, the general skill level 
of the parents is likely to play a major role in the ability of their children to acquire human 
capital and, given that in most host countries the immigrant population is less educated than 
the native population, may contribute significantly to any observed differences in the raw test 
scores.  
[Table 12:  PISA Summary Statistics] 
Table 12 shows a number of descriptive statistics for our 10 most important immigrant 
receiving OECD countries. For the sake of brevity, the immigrant student populations we 
consider include all children whose parents are both foreign-born, no matter whether the 
children themselves were born in the host country or not.
60 As Column (4) shows, except for 
Australia and Spain, the majority of immigrant students speak a foreign language at home 
that is different from the language of instruction at school.
61 This pattern is particularly 
pronounced in Italy and the United States, where the share of those speaking a foreign 
                                                 
60 The results we present in this section draw on work by Dustmann et al. (2010c). 
61 Whether or not a student speaks a foreign language at home is obviously only an imperfect measure of 
language skills as it may very well be that a student is proficient in the language of instruction but still speaks 
another language at home with his or her parents.  
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language at home exceeds 60 percent. Given the complementarity between language and 
human capital accumulation, this is bound to affect the performance of these children in the 
different proficiency tests. Columns (5) and (6) show that relative to the native student 
population, immigrant students have parents with, on average, significantly lower educational 
attainment. With the exception of Italy and Spain, the share of native students whose both 
parents have low educational attainment (measured as not exceeding lower secondary 
education), is fairly low, ranging between about 2 and 15 percent, whereas it ranges between 
10 and 40 percent for immigrant students (not considering Australia and Canada). The 
differences in parental educational attainment are particularly large in France, Switzerland 
and the United States. These results also hold when looking at alternative measures of 
economic status, such as the Highest International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational 
Status (HISEI) of the parents (not reported), which is designed to capture those features of 
occupations that convert education into income (Ganzeboom et al., 1992). 
So how do these differences in language and family background contribute to the 
measured raw test score gaps between natives and immigrants? Column (7) shows again the 
raw proficiency gaps in mathematics between immigrant students and native students. As we 
already discussed in Section 2, immigrant students do substantially worse in all destination 
countries except Australia and Canada, with the largest gaps arising in Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland. However, controlling for language reduces these gaps 
significantly as shown in Column (8). The reduction is particularly large in Germany, Italy, 
Switzerland, the UK and the United States. In the latter two countries, including an indicator 
for language spoken at home actually closes the test score gap entirely, with none of the 
remaining small differences being statistically significant. Adding control variables for the 
educational attainment of the parents in Column (9) has a further mitigating effect on the test  
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score gaps between natives and immigrants, in particular in France, the Netherlands and the 
United States. The only major exception is Spain where the test score gap actually widens 
once controls for parental education are included, owing to the, on average, better educational 
background of immigrant children’s parents (compare Columns (5) and (6)). Very similar 
patterns hold for immigrant and native students’ reading proficiency (not reported) where, 
naturally, the impact of language spoken at home is an even stronger determinant of 
performance. Both language and the educational attainment of the parents thus go a long way 
in explaining the large gap in mathematics and reading skills between native and immigrant 
students (for additional evidence, see for example Entorf and Minoiu, 2005, and Schnepf, 
2007).  
The significance of language spoken at home for the – at least initial – achievements 
of immigrant children at school is also documented in other work. In a recent paper based on 
the British school census, Dustmann et al. (2010f) investigate the school curriculum of 
children from ethnic minority backgrounds and compare it to children from non-minority 
families, from the age of 5 until the age of 16. Their findings show that just before they start 
school, ethnic minority children significantly underperform in early cognitive tests compared 
with white British-born children. However, by the end of compulsory schooling at age 15/16, 
most ethnic minority groups catch up with (Bangladeshi, Pakistani and black non-Caribbean 
pupils) or even overtake (Indian and Chinese pupils) their white British counterparts (in key 
stage 4 tests). The analysis shows that improvements in their proficiency of the English 
language is the single most important contributor to the catch-up of ethnic minority pupils 
relative to white British pupils, accounting for up to two thirds of their relative progress. The 
importance of language proficiency, in particular, for school performance and integration 
more generally has been recognized by many host countries by implementing a variety of  
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policies and practices to support immigrant students’ acquisition of the language of 
instruction. For a detailed overview of these policies across OECD countries, see OECD 
(2006).  
[Table 13: PISA Regression Results] 
 
5.3.2 Intergenerational Transmission of Human Capital 
The results presented in Table 12 demonstrate that parental background and language 
spoken at home matter importantly for the educational success of the children of immigrants. 
We now briefly review the empirical evidence regarding the intergenerational transmission of 
human capital and the long-term assimilation of second-generation immigrants.
62  
Chiswick (1977) and Carliner (1980) were the first to look at the intergenerational 
aspect of immigrant earnings in the United States. These studies do not relate one 
generation’s earnings to the earnings of its parent generation in the spirit of Equation (14) but 
compare directly the earnings of different generations of immigrants using cross-sectional 
data from the 1970 U.S. Census. They distinguish male first- and second-generation 
immigrant workers and native workers, with the latter defined as individuals who have two 
native-born parents. Both studies’ key finding is that the earnings of second-generation 
immigrant workers are higher than those of natives.
63 In addition, Carliner (1980) finds that 
second-generation immigrant men also earn more than first-generation immigrant men from 
the same ethnic group. Pointing again to the substantial changes in cohort quality over the 
                                                 
62 For an overview of the literature on intergenerational mobility, see Solon (1999, 2002), Corak (2004, 2006) 
and D’Addio (2007). 
63 Note that Chiswick only looks at white second-generation immigrant men who, at the time of the study, had 
predominantly a European background.  
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course of the 20
th century and the bias this can induce in cross-sectional analyses, Borjas 
(1993) employs grouped data from the 1940-1970 Censuses to isolate cohort effects from 
intergenerational earnings mobility. He compares the relative earnings of foreign-born men in 
1940 with the relative earnings of their potential offspring 30 years later, in 1970. His 
findings show that the earnings of second-generation immigrants are strongly correlated with 
the earnings of the corresponding first generation, with an estimate of the intergenerational 
correlation coefficient of around 0.45. Hence about half of the differences in relative 
economic status across different ethnic groups in one generation persist into the next 
generation. Using more recent data reaching up to the year 2000, but based on a similar 
methodology of grouping immigrants and their potential offspring, Card et al. (2000) and 
Borjas (2006b) show that the intergenerational correlation of earnings has remained relatively 
unchanged over the last decades: native-born children of immigrants can expect to close 50 to 
60 percent of the gap in relative earnings experienced by their father’s generation. Card et al. 
(2000) also estimate the intergenerational correlation in the years of education obtained and 
find a very stable estimate over time for both sons and daughters in the range of 0.41 to 0.47. 
These estimates are comparable with those we report in Figure 2 for the pooled sample of 
immigrant groups in France, Germany and the UK, where the slopes of the regression lines 
with respect to education and log wages are 0.53 and 0.36, respectively.
64 Overall, the 
empirical evidence suggests that most of the strong intergenerational linkages between 
immigrant fathers and their native-born children work through education. 
With increasing data availability and the passing of time, it has become possible in 
some cases to analyse the correlation between first and third generation immigrants. Using 
                                                 
64 Dustmann and Theodoropoulos (2010) analyse the educational attainment and economic behaviour of ethnic 
minority immigrants and their children in Britain and compare it to that of their white British born peers, 
showing that Britain’s ethnic minority immigrants and their children are on average better educated than their 
white native-born peers, and that groups with better educated parents have higher levels of education.  
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data from the 1910 U.S. Census as well as the General Social Surveys to link a sample of 
American-born workers to their grandparents who arrived in the U.S. during the first Great 
Migration at the beginning of the twentieth century, Borjas (1994, 2006b) estimates an 
intergenerational correlation in relative wages between the first and the third generation of 
about 0.22, which implies that 22 percent of the wage gap between any two groups in the 
immigrant generation persisted into the third generation. Note that this is compatible with a 
correlation coefficient across subsequent generations of about 0.5 – similar to the one 
estimated in the studies discussed above. Current differences in economic status among first-
generation immigrants are thus likely to shape the labour market experience of their offspring 
for generations to come.
65 Table 13 summarises the existing literature on the 
intergenerational mobility in earnings and educational attainment of immigrants across a 
variety of different countries. Column (7) reports estimated intergenerational correlation 
coefficients based on specifications such as the one in Equation (14). Overall, the evidence 
suggests that intergenerational mobility is lower for immigrants than for natives, higher for 
immigrant women than for immigrant men, relatively high in Scandinavian countries (with an 
estimated correlation coefficient for men of around 0.1-0.2), relatively low in the U.S. (with 
estimates of around 0.5-0.6), and somewhere in the middle in Canada and Germany (with 
estimates of around 0.2-0.4). 
 
[Table 13: intergenerational correlation coefficients with respect to earnings and 
educational attainment] 
                                                 
65 Deutsch et al. (2006) and Hammarstedt (2009) provide evidence on the relative outcomes of first- second- and 
third-generation immigrants in Israel and Sweden, respectively.  
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As we discussed above, the investment decisions of immigrants into their own 
education, and that of their children, may be shaped by their return intentions. Dustmann 
(2008) extends the standard permanent income model of intergenerational mobility as 
sketched in Section 5.2 by allowing for the possibility of return migration. As we have 
already alluded to on various occasions throughout this chapter, the prospect of returning 
home has important consequences for an immigrants’ human capital investment in the host 
country. In an intergenerational context with altruistic parents, such considerations also affect 
the parents’ investment into the human capital of their children (under the assumption that the 
child’s perceived return probability increases with the return probability of the parent) and 
thus the measured intergenerational earnings mobility. More specifically, Dustmann (2008) 
shows that as long as the return to human capital is higher and the preference for 
consumption lower in the host- than in the home country, investments into the children’s 
human capital will increase with the probability of a permanent migration. This is because the 
latter increases the expected monetary gain from an additional unit of human capital for the 
child, and because it decreases the expected utility gain from consuming in the home country, 
leading to a reduction in parents’ savings for future consumption and an increase of their 
investments into their children. Using German panel data on father-son pairs that include 
information on parental return intentions, Dustmann (2008) shows, first, that parental 
investment in children’s education increases with the permanent migration probability of the 
parent and, second, that the son’s permanent earnings increase with the father’s permanent 
migration probability, conditional on father’s permanent earnings and education. Accounting 
for measurement error in parental earnings by using repeated wage observations reveals 
substantial downward bias in a standard estimation of the intergenerational earnings 
correlation, increasing the parameter estimate from about 0.140 to 0.344. The corresponding  
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estimates for native father-son pairs are 0.177 and 0.251, which, although not statistically 
different, suggest less intergenerational mobility for immigrants than for natives. 
 
5.3.3 Intergenerational Transmission and Language 
In Section 3.4.4, we discussed language as one of the key human capital 
characteristics determining the economic outcomes of immigrants in their host country. Since 
the language skills of parents are likely to at least partly determine the language skills of their 
children, they could be an important factor underlying the observed persistence in economic 
status between first- and second-generation immigrants. A number of studies have 
investigated the link between the language proficiency of children and their parents. For 
Australia, Chiswick et al. (2005) find strong links between parents’ measured and 
unmeasured determinants of language proficiency and the language skills of their children, in 
particular between mothers and their children. Bleakley and Chin (2008) show that parental 
language skills have a significant positive causal effect on U.S.-born children’s ability to 
speak English. Interestingly, this positive effect is only present while the children are young 
but fades out by the time they reach middle school. However, the poorer language skills when 
young turn out to have detrimental long-term consequences for the children’s educational 
outcomes in terms of drop-out rates, attendance of age-appropriate grades and attendance of 
preschool.
66 Unlike Bleakley and Chin (2008), who use data from the 2000 U.S. Census, and 
Chiswick et al. (2005), who use data from the 1996 Australian Census, Casey and Dustmann 
(2008) use repeated information on both parents and their children from the German Socio-
                                                 
66 As in Bleakley and Chin (2004), the authors use the parents’ age at arrival interacted with a dummy for non-
English-speaking country of origin as an instrument for their English language skills, making this the probably 
most convincing strategy to deal with the endogeneity of parental language skills.  
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Economic Panel. This allows them, first, to address the problem of measurement error that is 
widespread in self-reported data on language proficiency (see Dustmann and van Soest, 
2001), second, to avoid sample selection due to children leaving the parental household, and 
third, to analyse the association between parental language proficiency and children’s later 
economic outcomes. The results from this study show a significant and sizeable effect of 
parental language fluency on that of their children. While for males, language proficiency 
does not significantly affect any of the labour market outcomes considered (wages, labour 
market participation, employment, and unemployment), it has a beneficial effect for the 
labour market outcomes of women, in particular those who were born abroad but arrived in 
Germany before the age of ten. This differential pattern could be due to women’s higher 
propensity to work in occupations where language fluency is important, such as white-collar 
jobs in the service sector. Overall, the empirical evidence so far suggests a strong 
intergenerational transmission of language skills, in particular at younger ages of the second-
generation immigrants, which may contribute to the relatively low intergenerational mobility 
in educational attainment and earnings that characterises many immigrant groups in the host 
countries studied. 
 
5.3.4 Intergenerational Transmission and Ethnic Networks 
In an important contribution, Borjas (1992) extends the standard framework for 
analysing the intergenerational transmission of human capital by assuming that ethnicity acts 
as an externality in the human capital accumulation process. In the model outlined in Section 
5.2, such an externality would be captured in the term  t e . This implies that a correctly 
specified economic model of intergenerational mobility should not only include parental  
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inputs as a determinant of the children’s skills, but also the average quality of the ethnic 
environment in which the child is raised, the so-called “ethnic capital”. As long as ethnic 
capital plays an important role in the intergenerational transmission of skills, ignoring it in a 
regression based on individual level data may lead to a severe underestimation of the true 
persistence in earnings across generations. Using data from the General Social Surveys and 
the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth that include information on both the 
respondents’ and their parents’ educational attainment and occupation, as well as the 
respondents’ wages (NLSY only), Borjas (1992) finds overall intergenerational correlations 
of educational attainment, occupations and log wages of around 0.35-0.40, 0.57, and 0.60, 
respectively, where all of these estimates reflect the sum of the effects due to parental 
variables on the one hand, and ethnic capital on the other hand. The latter, measured by the 
mean of the characteristic in the corresponding ethnic group, has a positive and significant 
effect of roughly similar (for education and wages) or greater (occupations) magnitude as the 
corresponding parental variable, suggesting an important role in the intergenerational 
transmission process. Neglecting ethnic capital will thus lead to an underestimation of the 
intergenerational correlation coefficient and hence to an overestimation of the speed of 
economic convergence of ethnic groups across generations.
67 Aydemir et al. (2009) work 
with a somewhat broader interpretation of what the average group characteristics may 
capture, including social factors such as discrimination or lack of access to good schools and 
credit markets. Using grouped data from the 2001 Canadian Census, they employ quantile 
regression methods to separate the influence of social capital from the influence of broader 
social institutions. Their findings suggest that social institutions limit intergenerational 
                                                 
67 In later work, Borjas (1995b) shows that segregation into particular neighbourhoods could be one reason for 
the external effects of ethnicity, a point that has been reemphasized by Nielsen et al. (2001) and Rooth and 
Ekberg (2003). See also Cutler et al. (2005).  
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earnings mobility and that parental education is the key ingredient necessary to circumvent 




This chapter addresses the relationship between migration and education. What seems 
at first view a small and rather specific area in the research on the Economics of Migration 
turns out to be at its front and centre. The chapter attempts to provide a first overview of the 
issues we consider important when studying migration in relation to education. 
Overall, this is a rapidly growing field, illustrated by the rising number of papers over 
the last decades,
68 and there are exciting new research avenues at its frontier. It is also an area 
that reflects the challenge to single economies to develop competitive structures that prevail 
on increasingly globalised markets, and that are based on a flexible and highly responsive 
skill base. Both education and migration are key ingredients to achieve this.  
Our first reference is to Sjaastad (1962), who viewed migration – as education – as an 
investment in the human agent. As the various sections of this chapter show, migration 
decisions and decisions about learning and human capital investments are indeed closely 
related. Migration is not only intertwined with human capital investment decisions of those 
who move, but has also important consequences for education and knowledge acquisition of 
those who do not move, both in the home- and in the host countries. Migrations are dynamic 
and dynastic processes, forming countries for generations to come, and one of the key 
                                                 
68 Searching on Google for papers written in Economics, Business or Finance with migration, immigration or 
emigration and education, human capital, or skill in the title gives 36 papers between 1991 and 1999, 40 papers 
between 2000 and 2004, and 65 papers between 2005 and 2009.  
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determinants of the success of the children of immigrants is their educational attainment. We 
decided to focus in this chapter on three aspects that we believe are the cornerstones of the 
connection between migration and education: the economic aspects of the individual 
migration decisions and how they relate to the acquisition of education, the connection 
between the acquisition of education and the skill selection of immigrants, and the nature of 
intergenerational spillovers. Although we attempted to be exhaustive in our coverage, we 
have almost certainly missed out important additional contributions that investigate these 
subjects.  
The chapter commences with a section (Section 2) that provides an overview of the 
stylised facts that connect immigration and education. The following three sections (Sections 
3-5) each start off with a discussion of a simple theoretical framework, which helps to 
structure the large empirical literature that exists in each of the areas considered. In Section 3, 
where we focus on the migrant, we show that educational choices and the accumulation of 
skills are inherently connected to migration- and re-migration decisions. We emphasise that 
decisions about non-permanent forms of migration are key to understand educational choices 
and decisions about skill acquisition, and we demonstrate the challenges for obtaining 
estimates of immigrant career paths that are generated if migrations are non-permanent and if 
migration decisions are taken in conjunction with decisions on human capital investment. In 
our view, this is an area where many research questions are still unexplored. For instance, as 
we show in Section 2, in many cases the acquisition of education rather than the pursuit of 
higher wages may be the main motive of migration – a hypothesis that is supported by the 
growing fraction of student migrations in the overall migration flows. Also, the forms of 
migration and implied career paths of immigrants have been changing, with temporary 
migrations today being the rule rather than the exception. Yet, most papers that study career 
paths of immigrants are still assuming permanent forms of migration.   
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In Section 4, we discuss the way in which migration affects educational choices and 
skill accumulation of individuals who do not migrate, both in the home- and in the potential 
host countries. This area overlaps with many issues in development economics. We argue 
that while, as in the quote of Sjaastad, the return to education has been the main motive for 
migration, it is the acquisition of education itself that is becoming an important trigger for 
migration movements, and we explore the consequences for the destination- and the origin 
countries. Another important aspect – from the perspective of both sets of countries – is who 
migrates. The answer to this question has important implications for the effect of immigration 
on the economies of both countries, through mechanisms such as the brain gain and the brain 
drain. We argue that additional insights can be gained when considering an application of the 
Roy (1951) model to the migration context that takes account of the multi-dimensionality of 
skills, in order to be able to explain recent migration patterns. Modern economies have 
specialised in different industries to gain competitiveness in international markets. As a 
consequence, the return to different skills may differ across countries, changing the incentives 
underlying individual migration decisions. Yet, most of the literature that studies the selection 
of immigrants focuses on a special case of the Roy model where skills are one-dimensional. 
In the final section, we take a more dynastic view of immigration. Here we focus on 
the children of immigrants, their educational achievements, and their human capital 
accumulation and ensuing career paths. This long-term aspect of immigrant integration and 
assimilation is likely to be a particular focus of research over the next decade due to the 
increasing number of countries that have recently experienced significant increases in their 
foreign-born populations. The existing evidence we discuss suggests that education is the key 
factor determining both the degree and the pace of the economic integration of immigrants 
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 Destination 
Country
Number FB Share FB














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Australia 3,860,215               26.0
United Kingdom (26.1), New Zealand (8.2), 
Italy (5.6)
36.8 32.6 30.6 43.8 31.2 25.1
Canada 5,355,210               22.4
United Kingdom (11.4), China (5.9), Italy 
(5.9)
22.1 31.8 46.1 22.9 38.3 38.8
France 5,600,198               11.7
Algeria (21.6), Marocco (12.3), Portugal 
(10.1)
48.4 29.9 21.7 33.8 44.1 22.1
Germany 7,831,959               11.5 Turkey (15.2), Poland (13.1), Russia (11.9) 40.1 42.8 17.2 14.6 61.4 24.0
Italy 2,020,934               4.1
Switzerland (8.9), Germany (8.3), Marocco 
(6.8)
50.2 35.4 14.4 57.3 31.9 10.8
Netherlands 1,419,940               11.2
South and Central America and Carribean 
(20.4), Indonesia (12.5), Turkey (11.2)
45.6 32.8 21.6 32.4 43.8 23.8
Spain 1,914,920               5.5 Marocco (14.5), Ecuador (9.9), France (7.8) 52.8 22.7 24.5 60.9 15.9 23.2
Switzerland 1,454,185               24.1
Italy (15.9), Germany (12.1), Serbia and 
Montenegro (9.1)
38.8 34.6 26.6 16.3 60.8 22.9
United Kingdom 4,503,466               9.4 Ireland (11.7), India (10.1), Pakistan (6.7) 39.1 21.6 39.3 51.3 25.5 23.2
United States 31,389,926             14.5
Mexico (26.3), Philippines (4.3), Puerto Rico 
(4.1)
35.3 33.9 30.9 12.5 53.2 34.3
Table 1a: Educational Attainment of Immigrants in Ten Biggest Immigrant-Receiving OECD-Host Countries, around 2000
Note: Data taken from Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC) provided by the OECD. Baseline population aged 15 and older. Ten countries with highest number of foreign-born (FB) and main
countries of origin are determined using all education categories and age groups. Columns (7) to (9) refer to the native-born (NB). For each destination country the three biggest countries of origin are given. Low
educational attainment means up to lower secondary education, medium educational attainment means completed upper secondary education and high educational attainment means tertiary education.
Observations with unknown education level and unknown place of birth were excluded from the calculation of education shares. Education shares are calculated for the population aged 25-64 and are reported in
percentages. Country of Origin
Share Living in 
Other OECD 
Countries












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mexico 13.3 68.7 24.5 6.8 70.7 14.6 14.7
United Kingdom 6.8 22.0 37.7 40.3 51.3 25.5 23.2
Germany 4.6 20.8 44.2 34.9 14.6 61.4 24.0
Italy 4.8 51.0 32.9 16.1 57.3 31.9 10.8
Poland 6.8 19.0 53.8 27.3 19.0 67.2 13.8
Turkey 4.4 69.9 22.6 7.5 77.2 14.1 8.8
Portugal 14.5 68.4 24.8 6.8 77.7 11.9 10.4
France 2.4 27.4 32.3 40.3 33.8 44.1 22.1
Canada 4.5 11.2 38.5 50.3 22.9 38.3 38.8
South Korea n/a 10.3 37.7 52.0 n/a n/a n/a
United States 0.4 10.7 28.6 60.7 12.5 53.2 34.3
Table 1b: Educational Attainment of Movers and Stayers, around 2000
Note: Data taken from Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC) provided by the OECD. Baseline population aged 15 and older. Eleven OECD-countries
with highest number of native-born residing in a foreign OECD country (listed in descending order) are determined using all education categories and age groups (for
South Korea data on native-born residing in country of birth are not available). Share living in other OECD countries is relative to overall population currently living in
the country of origin. Low educational attainment means up to lower secondary education, medium educational attainment means completed upper secondary
education and high educational attainment means tertiary education. Observations with unknown education level and unknown place of birth were excluded from the
calculation of education shares. Education shares are calculated for the population aged 25-64-year-old. Shares are given in percentages.Destination 
Country




Country of Origin with 
Minimum Share
Maximum 




Country of Origin with 
Maximum Share











Country of Origin with 
Minimum Share
Maximum 




Country of Origin with 
Maximum Share
Standard Deviation of 
High Education 
Shares within 
Destination Country  
across Origin 
Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Australia 7.9 United States (1.2) 71.6 Malta (1.2) 19.4 6.5 Malta (1.2) 63.3 United States (1.2) 19.3
Canada  6.9 South Korea (1.4) 61.7 Portugal (2.9) 16.6 11.7 Portugal (2.9) 66.5 South Korea (1.4) 16.2
France 15.6 United Kingdom (1.4) 75.1 Turkey (3.0) 18.4 4.3 Portugal (10.1) 57.0 United Kingdom (1.4) 13.7
Germany 9.8 France (0.7) 73.0 Turkey (15.2) 19.1 4.2 Turkey (15.2) 49.7 France (0.7) 12.0
Italy 21.7 United States (2.2) 84.0 Senegal (1.4) 17.5 3.9 Senegal (1.4) 37.7 United States (2.2) 8.1
Netherlands 14.9 France (0.8) 75.0 Turkey (11.2) 17.9 6.0 Turkey (11.2) 76.4 United States (0.6) 16.9
Spain 28.1 Cuba (2.4) 82.4 Portugal (2.8) 15.6 8.5 Portugal (2.8) 40.3 Cuba (2.4) 10.6
Switzerland 7.4 United States (1.2) 81.1 Portugal (6.5) 25.7 2.9 Portugal (6.5) 71.9 United States (1.2) 20.3
United Kingdom 10.8 United States (2.8) 74.1 Bangladesh (3.2) 20.4 15.4 Bangladesh (3.2) 70.5 United States (2.8) 16.9
United States 4.9 Japan (1.4) 69.1 Mexico (26.3) 20.4 6.5 Mexico (26.3) 75.1 India (3.1) 19.2
Table 2: Variation in Educational Attainment across Foreign-Born Populations from Different Origin Countries in OECD-Host Countries, around 2000
Note: Data taken from Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC) provided by the OECD. Ten countries with highest number of foreign-born and the twenty main countries of origin for each destination country are determined using all education
categories and age groups. The minimum and maximum education shares are obtained from the sample of the 20 biggest origin countries for each destination country. Figures in brackets behind origin country names show the percentage share of the given 
origin country in the overall foreign-born population in the corresponding destination country. Low educational attainment means up to lower secondary education, medium educational attainment means completed upper secondary education and high
educational attainment means tertiary education. Observations with unknown education level and unknown place of birth were excluded from the calculation of education shares. Education shares are calculated for the population aged 25-64-year-old and
are reported in percentages. The standard deviation of educational shares within each host country is unweighted with respect to the origin countries. 

















































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Mexico 5.0 Sweden (0.0) 69.0 United States (99.1) 20.4 6.5 United States (99.1) 77.8 United Kingdom (0.1) 20.9
United Kingdom 5.6 United States (23.4) 46.1 Spain (3.0) 13.8 26.1 Italy (1.5) 57.0 France (2.4) 11.2
Germany 8.1 United States (34.2) 49.1 Italy (5.4) 13.7 12.9 Italy (5.4) 43.3 Canada (5.8) 9.9
Italy 31.2 United States (22.0) 72.3 Belgium (5.5) 13.4 8.2 Germany (14.2) 36.5 Spain (1.0) 10.4
Poland 11.6 Sweden (1.7) 31.1 Czech Republic (1.2) 6.1 7.0 Czech Republic (1.2) 48.7 United Kingdom (2.8) 14.0
Turkey 14.2 United States (4.0) 81.8 Austria (5.4) 20.8 2.5 Austria (5.4) 52.7 United States (4.0) 15.2
Portugal 51.5 United States (16.4) 82.4 Spain (4.2) 9.8 2.2 Luxembourg (3.0) 20.5 United Kingdom (2.6) 5.8
France 6.9 United States (16.6) 51.2 Italy (11.1) 19.4 12.1 Poland (2.9) 65.9 United Kingdom (7.5) 19.5
Canada 0.7 Japan (0.6) 35.7 Italy (2.1) 11.4 16.7 Italy (2.1) 91.8 Japan (0.6) 20.2
South Korea 3.2 New Zealand (1.4) 13.7 Denmark (0.7) 3.8 27.5 New Zealand (1.4) 78.3 United Kingdom (1.0) 15.9
United States 1.8 Japan (3.9) 32.7 Mexico (12.8) 9.4 37.2 Mexico (12.8) 82.9 Japan (3.9) 16.3
Note: Data taken from Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC) provided by the OECD. Eleven OECD-countries with highest number of natives residing in a foreign OECD country (in descending order) are determined using all
education categories and age groups. The minimum and maximum education shares are obtained from the sample of the 10 biggest OECD destination countries for each origin country. Figures in brackets behind destination country names
show the percentage share of the corresponding origin country's emigrant population to other OECD countries that lives in the given destination country. Low educational attainment means up to lower secondary education, medium
educational attainment means completed upper secondary education and high educational attainment means tertiary education. Observations with unknown education level and unknown place of birth were excluded from the calculation of
education shares. Education shares are calculated for the population aged 25-64-year-old and are reported in percentages. The standard deviation of educational shares within each home country is unweighted with respect to the OECD-
host  countries. 
Low Education High Education
Table 3: Variation in Educational Attainment of Emigrant Population from OECD-Origin Countries across Different OECD-Host Countries, around 2000Obtained in 
Home Country




Obtained in Host 
Country
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Australia 1.07 1.11 1.02 0.98 0.99 0.93 0.94 1.02
Canada 0.95 1.07 0.94 0.89 0.86 0.95 0.79 0.99
France 0.90 0.94 0.96 0.90 0.88 0.86 0.77 1.10
Germany 0.93 1.14 0.93 0.91 0.86 1.00 0.83 0.95
Netherlands 0.85 1.11 1.02 0.98 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Portugal 0.94 1.00 0.76 0.80 0.49 0.88 0.52 1.00
Sweden 0.93 0.91 0.94 0.92 0.81 0.88 0.89 0.95
Switzerland 0.89 1.05 0.93 0.96 n/a n/a n/a n/a
United States 0.79 1.07 0.83 0.93 0.80 1.04 0.79 1.13
Table 4: Median Wages of Foreign-Born Relative to Native-Born by Broad Educational Categories, 2005/2006
Note: Data taken from International Migration Outlook 2008 (OECD, 2008), Chart I.13, Chart I.15, Table I.14. Median hourly wages of the foreign-born are expressed
relative to median hourly wages of the native-born in the same group. Sample restricted to those aged 15 to 64 who are in dependent employment. Low educational
attainment means up to lower secondary education, medium educational attainment means completed upper secondary education and high educational attainment means
tertiary education.









Share Foreign Students 
in Tertiary Education
Share Foreign Students 
in Advanced Research 
Programmes
Number Foreign 
Students in Tertiary 
Education




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Australia 20.6 23.3 230,635 211
1) 30.0
3)
Canada 13.1 38.6 185,781 565 14.7-18.8
France 11.2 39.8 243,436 164 27.4
Germany 10.9 n/a 245,522 143 29.5
Italy 3.0 7.0 60,448 260 n/a
Netherlands 6.8 n/a 40,795 300
2) 15.0
Spain 3.6 24.0 64,906 224 n/a
Switzerland 20.3 45.9 45,583 187 n/a
United Kingdom 19.9 47.7 462,609 221 27.0
4)
United States 3.4 n/a 624,474 145
1) n/a
Note: Data taken from OECD iLibrary. Foreign students defined as non-citizen students except for Australia and the United States where they are defined
as non-resident students due to missing information on non-citizen status. Index of Change 1998-2008 in the number of foreign students is given for total
tertiary education and relative to 1998 (1998=100). Data on retention rates taken from Table I.8 of the International Migration Outlook 2010 (OECD,
2010). Retention rates are calculated as the number of international students who change their legal migration status, for example from "student" to
"work" or "family formation", divided by the number of international students who do not renew their student permit. 1) Base year figure in 1998 covers
non-citizen students whereas figure in 2008 covers non-resident students. 2) Index of change calculated relative to 1999. 3) Figure for Australia estimated
by Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship. 4) Figure for the UK refers to 2005/2006 and is taken from ICMPD (2006). 
Table 5: Number and Share of Foreign Students in Tertiary Education in OECD Countries, 2008Destination 
Country
Main Student Sending Countries    (Share 






Share Asia Share Africa
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Australia China (25.0), India (11.5), Malaysia (8.1) 4.4 3.5 0.9 79.3 3.2
Canada China (19.5), India (5.6), U.S. (5.4) 12.0 10.1 3.1 50.2 11.7
France Morocco (11.1), China (8.6), Algeria (7.7) 21.3 3.5 3.7 21.0 43.5
Germany China (10.4), Turkey (9.7), Poland (5.7) 47.5 2.5 2.7 37.5 9.0
Italy Albania (19.5), Greece (7.5), Romania (5.2) 56.5 1.9 7.6 15.0 10.8
Netherlands Germany (40.6), China (8.4), Belgium (5.4) 69.3 2.3 3.3 19.9 5.0
Spain Colombia (8.7), Morocco (8.4), Peru (6.8) 31.4 11.3 40.7 3.7 11.7
Switzerland Germany (24.0), Italy (10.8), France (10.3) 75.7 2.5 2.9 9.0 5.4
United Kingdom China (11.1), India (7.1), Ireland (5.8) 34.7 6.6 1.3 39.5 14.9
United States China (17.7), India (15.2), Korea (11.1) 11.2 10.1 5.0 67.2 5.7
Note: Data taken from OECD iLibrary. Foreign students are defined as non-citizen students except for Australia and the United States where they are defined as
non-resident students due to missing information on non-citizen status. Shares refer to students enrolled in tertiary education, both full-time and part-time.
Table 6: Origin of Foreign Students in Tertiary Education in OECD Countries, 2008Note: Data taken from OECD iLibrary. Graph shows total number of students in the 10 main OECD countries listed in Table 6 by continent of origin. Foreign students 
are defined as non-citizen students except for Australia and the United States where they are defined as non-citizen students from 1998 to 2003, and as non-
resident students from 2004 to 2008. Numbers refer to students enrolled in tertiary education, both full-time and part-time. Numbers for Australia in 1999 and Canada 
in 2001 to 2003 and 2005 are missing and were linearly interpolated using the numbers in adjacent years.























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Australia 13.6 77.5 55.0 9.8 n/a
Canada 14.8 70.0 50.2 n/a
1) 23.7
3)
Switzerland 23.1 62.4 31.1 51.3 n/a
Germany 3.6 79.7 n/a 86.0 n/a
Spain 40.4 49.0 34.6 14.3
2) n/a
France 8.1 82.7 65.9 n/a
1) n/a
United Kingdom 17.0 70.2 n/a 42.6 39.9
Italy 37.8 34.4 9.9 n/a
1) n/a
Netherlands 9.7 71.6 n/a 29.3 28.1
United States 20.1 63.7 35.7 n/a
1) 19.1
Table 7: Share of Immigrants by Duration of Stay, Outflow/Inflow Ratio, and 5 Year Re-Emigration Rate (around 2000)
Note: Data taken from Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC) provided by the OECD. Duration shares refer to the
foreign-born population. Observations with unknown length of duration were excluded from the calculation. The ratio of the aggregate
outflow to the aggregate inflow of the foreign population between 1998 and 2008 is calculated using data from the OECD's
International Migration Database. Ratios are based on data of foreign nationals from population registers for all countries except
Australia and the United Kingdom, for which data based on residence permits or other sources was used. Data on re-emigration rates
after 5 years are taken from Table III.1 (p. 171) of the International Migration Outlook 2008 (OECD, 2008). Relevant entry period for
the United Kingdom was 1992-1998, for the Netherlands 1994-1998, and for the United States 1999. 1) Data on outflows was missing
for these countries. 2) Ratio for Spain refers to period 2002-2008. 3) Figure taken from Aydemir and Robinson (2008).Reading Mathematics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Australia 8.8* 15.7** -4.4 -4.2
Canada -2.4 -2.7 -16.1** -1.1
France -25.4** -38.9** -31.7** -66.7**
Germany -57.1** -58.1** -81.6** -92.8**
Italy -60.7** -38.6** -79.4** -22.2
Netherlands -52.1** -53.8** -61.4** -86.9**
Spain -41.1** -47.8** -46.0** -26.1*
Switzerland -57.3** -69.5** -78.3** -81.7**
United Kingdom -11.5 -14.6* -36.5** -26.6**
United States -25.7** -22.9** -45.5** -39.4**
Table 8: Raw difference in PISA test scores between students with immigrant background and native students
Destination 
Country
Note: Source: PISA 2006; reading scores for the U.S.: PISA 2003. Native students are defined as those born in the
country of assessment with both parents also born in the country of assessment. Immigrant students are either those
born abroad with both parents also born abroad (first generation) or those born in the country of assessment but both
parents born abroad (second generation). Students with a mixed background are excluded. Values are computed
using the final weights provided by PISA. Stars indicate that the difference between the immigrant and the native
average score is statistically significant at the 1 percent level (**) and at the 5 percent level (*). 
Difference of Performance between Students 
with an Immigrant Background Who Speak a 
Language at Home that is Different from the 
Language of Instruction and Native Students Reading MathematicsSource: Algan et al. (2010). Data sources are the French Labour Force Survey 2005-2007, the German Microcensus 2005-2006, and the UK Labour Force Survey 1993-2007. Data points
reflect estimated gaps in age left education and log wages of different origin groups of first- and second-generation immigrant men relative to native men. Additional controls in the
regressions from which these estimates were obtained are a quadratic in year of birth, region dummies and time dummies in the age left education censored regression, and a quartic in
potential experience, region dummies and time dummies in the linear wage regression.
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Rate of Return to Schooling for Immigrants (RRI) 
vs. Rate of Return to Schooling for Natives (RRN)
Rate of Return to Experience for Immigrants (RREI) vs. Rate of 
Return to Experience for Natives (RREN) and Rate of Return to 
Spending an Additional Year in the Host Country (RRYSM)
Remarks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Baker and 
Benjamin (1994)
Canada Public Use Microdata
Files of the Canadian
Census for 1971,
1981, and 1986.
Equal time effects. Men aged 16-64 who report










1980s strong increase in
inflow from Asia,
Africa, Latin America.
Entry earnings are falling across successive immigrant cohorts, while their
rates of assimilation are uniformly small. The results confirm U.S. evidence
of "permanent" differences across arrival cohorts. The authors find small or
negative rates of assimilation for most cohorts over the sample period. The
results are robust to the choice of different base group. The authors find a
relative decline for returns to experience for immigrants educated outside
Canada. Using data from three censuses the authors fail to reject the usual
cohort fixed-effect specification.
RRI: 4.8% (1971), 4.4% (1981), 4.9% (1986).
RRN: 7.3% (1971), 6.6% (1981), 7.6% (1986).
Cross-sectional estimates: RREI: 3.3% (sq: -0.0006) (1971), 3.7%
(sq: -0.0006) (1981), 4.3% (sq: -0.0007) (1986). RREN: 4.6% (sq: -
0.0007) (1971), 5.2% (sq. -0.0009) (1981), 5.9% (sq. -0.0009)
(1986). RRYSM: n.a.
They assess the sensitivity of results with respect to
the choice of control group, either immigrants prior
to 1945 (fixed cohort), immigrants in Canada for




Norway Register data for
1980, 1990, 1992-
1996.











Nordic and OECD immigrant men catch up to the earnings of natives after 15-
18 years, for all other groups of men earnings do not converge. Non-OECD
men earn 30% less than natives after 25 years. Similar patterns for women.
Non-OECD women earn around 18% less than natives after 25 years, OECD
women 10% less. Standard methodology would understate assimilation
effects by 10-20 percent. Early cohorts have higher earnings than recent
cohorts. (all conditional on education, for an immigrant arriving at age 25).
n.a. n.a. The main contribution of the paper is to show that
the earnings of immigrants from outside the OECD
area are more sensitive to local unemployment than
the earnings of natives and OECD immigrants.
Controlling for this differential responsiveness
shows that there is actually no decline in
assimilation profiles of non-OECD immigrants




United States Current Population
Survey (CPS) from
1979 to 2003.




Individuals aged 21-64 (and





Asia, Africa, UK and
Commonwealth, Europe.
Wages of immigrants are found to be more sensitive to unemployment than
wages of natives. A 10% increase in the unemployment rate reduces wages of
immigrant men aged 31-39 by 1.7% and those of natives by 0.3%. The
traditional synthetic panel methodology assuming equal time effects
estimates significant assimilation effects in terms of wages. For males the
standard method predicts immigrant wage growth over 20 YSM to exceed
the one of natives by 15 to 17 pp. The proposed methodology reveals much
smaller assimilation effects. The positive bias in the standard method arises
from a negative trend in unemployment in the data, attributing wage effects
of improving labor market conditions during the 1990s to wage assimilation.
n.a. RREI: Low education: males 1.5% (sq: -0.0004), females 1.7% (sq: -
0.0012). High school: males 3.8% (sq: -0.0020), females 2.6% (sq: -
0.0014). College: males 5.2% (sq: -0.0028), females 5.7% (sq: -
0.0036). RREN: Low education: males 3.8% (sq: -0.0021), females
2.1% (sq: -0.0012). High school: males 5.0% (sq: -0.0024), females
3.7% (sq: -0.0020). College: males 6.5% (sq: -0.0026), females 6.5%
(sq: -0.0034). RRYSM: Low education: males 2.0% (sq: -0.0005),
females 0.7% (sq: -0.0002). High school: males 2.3% (sq: -0.0007),
females 1.4% (sq: -0.0004). College: males 2.5% (sq: -0.0006),
females 2.5% (sq: -0.0006).
The main contribution of the paper is to relax the
equal time-effects assumption and allow for
differential responsiveness of immigrant and native














The native-immigrant earnings gap at the time of arrival can be largely
explained by different regional sources of human capital. For immigrants as a
whole, foreign schooling and labour market experience is valued lower in the
German labour market than domestic schooling and experience. The authors
find evidence for heterogeneity in the returns to human capital across origin
countries. Immigrants from high income countries earn similar returns as
natives and earn the highest return to their foreign human capital among all
immigrant groups.
RRI education abroad: for men 4.5%, for women
6.2%. RRI education in Germany: for men 5.5%, for
women 6.2%. RRN: for men 7.2%, for women
6.8%. 
RREI experience abroad: for men 0.3%, for women 0.1%. RREI
experience in Germany: for men 1.3%, for women 0.9%. RREN: for
men 0.9%, for women 0.6%. RRYSM from restricted model: for men
0.8%, for women 0.5%. Only foreign labour market experience for
immigrants from high-income OECD countries has positive returns,
0.7% for men and 0.9% for women.
The authors also account for immigrants' indication
of staying temporarily or permanently and estimate



















Authors analyse assimilation profiles of immigrants both using single cross-
sectional data and using the time dimension of the data. Migrants from non-
English speaking countries entering Australia in 1965 perform significantly
better between 1973 and 1981 than predicted from the 1973 cross-section.
This finding is consistent with the view that the quality of non-English
speaking immigrants arriving in Australia has increased over the 1960s.
Migrants from English speaking countries perform similarly no matter
whether estimates are based on cross-sectional data or based on time-series
data.
RRI for schooling abroad: non-English speaking
immigrants 2.5% (1973), 4.9% (1981), English
speaking immigrants: 8.9% (1973), 8.4% (1981).
RRI for schooling in Australia: non-English
speaking immigrants 2.4% (1973), 0.8% (1981),
English speaking immigrants 0.9% (1973), -0.9%
(1981). RRN: 10.5% (1973), 9.0% (1981).
Cross-sectional estimates: RREI for experience abroad: non-English
speaking immigrants 0.6% (sq: -0.0002) (1973), 1.1% (sq: -0.0002)
(1981), English speaking immigrants 3.4% (sq: -0.0005) (1973),
0.9% (-0.0002) (1981). RREN: 2.6% (sq: -0.0004) (1973), 2.1% (-
0.0003) (1981). RRYSM: non-English speaking immigrants 0.5%
(sq: 0.0001) (1973), -0.3% (sq: 0.0001) (1981), English speaking
immigrants 0.1% (sq: -0.0000) (1973), 0.9% (sq: -0.0001) (1981).
Bell (1997) UK General Household
Surveys (GHS) 1973-
1992.
Equal time effects. Immigrant men aged 18-64
who are working more than






Large changes in the national-origin mix of immigrants in the UK in the post-
war period. Immigrants have on average more years of schooling than natives
and this gap has risen over successive cohorts. Most disadvantaged group are
immigrants from the Caribbean. However, that disadvantage diminishes
relatively fast with time spent in the UK. Immigrants that arrive without any
labour market experience typically experience only a small wage penalty.
White immigrants earn a wage premium upon arrival but quickly assimilate
to the earnings of natives.
RRI: Caribbeans 4.4%, Indians: 3.7%, Whites:
6.5%. RRN: 7.7%.   
RREI: Caribbeans 2.2% (sq: -0.0001 ), Indians 2.9% (sq: -0.0005),
Whites 3.5% (-0.0005). RREN: 5.8% (sq: -0.0010). RRYSM:
Caribbeans -0.6% (sq: 0.0002), Indians -1.0% (sq: 0.0002), Whites -
1.6% (sq: 0.0003).
Borjas (1985) United States 1970, 1980 U.S.
Census.
Equal time effects. Men aged 18-54 in 1970






Only white immigrants overtake the earnings of statistically comparable
white native workers after 10-15 years. All other groups have slower or even
negative rates of convergence to their specific native comparison groups.
Quality of immigrant cohorts declined over time.
RRI: between 2.8% (Mexicans) and 7.1% (Asians)
(1970), between 2.9% (Mexicans) and 5.9%
(Asians) (1980). RRN: between 4.9% (Cubans) and
6.9% (Whites) (1970), between 4.6% (Cubans) and
6.0% (Other Hispanics) (1980). Return to schooling
significantly lower for Mexicans, Cubans and other
Hispanics relative to native counterparts. For other
groups about the same.
Cross-sectional estimates. RREI: between 0.5% (Asians, sq: 0.0000)
and 4.0% (Whites, sq: -0.0007) (1970), between -0.2% (Cubans, sq: -
0.0000) and 3.9% (Whites, sq: -0.0006) (1980). RREN: between
2.6% (Blacks, sq: -0.0004) and 11.2% (Cubans, sq: -0.0026) (1970),
between 0.6% (Blacks, sq: -0.0000) and 3.5% (Asians, sq: -0.0005)
(1980). RRYSM: n.a.
Each immigrant group is compared to his native
counterpart, so, for example, first generation
Mexicans are compared to Mexican American
native men.
Table 10: Summary of the Literature on Immigrants' Earnings AssimilationBorjas (1995) United States 1970, 1980, 1990
U.S. Census.




Relative wages of immigrants grow by about 10pp during the first 2 decades
after arrival, very little thereafter. For 1970 and 1980 cohorts, eventual wage
gap is about 5-10pp. Immigrants who arrived in the late 1980s (1970, 1960)
earned about 19.3% (13.4%, 8%) less than natives at the time of entry (all
conditional on education, for an immigrant arriving at age 20)
RRI: 4.7%, RRN: 6% RREI: 8.8% (sq: -0.0016). RREN: 9.4% (sq: -0.0015). RRYSM:
1.9% (sq. -0.0004)
Also includes age at migration in specification.
Results show that a worker that migrates at age 30
has about 5% lower earnings than one who
migrates at age 20, all else equal. Also performs
analysis relative to native counterpart of each
ethnic group. Relative entry wage of Mexican,
Other Hispanic, and Asian immigrants has declined 
relative to their native comparison group. Only
White and Other Hispanic immigrants eventually
catch up with their native counterparts.
Bratsberg and 
Ragan (2002)




Equal cohort effects. Foreign-born men aged 25-
64 (worked positive hours
and earned at least $1000
wage or salary income in
1989 and not enrolled at








Asia and North Africa.
Immigrants with U.S. schooling earn higher wages than immigrants with non-
U.S. schooling. This wage advantage results from both greater educational
attainment and higher returns to education, and cannot be attributed to
greater English proficiency. Returns to years of non-U.S. schooling are higher
for immigrants who complete their schooling in the U.S. and can be
interpreted as U.S. schooling upgrading education received in the source
country. For immigrants without U.S. schooling, returns are higher for
immigrants from highly developed countries and countries in which English
is an official language.
RRI (linear spline function): for non-U.S. schooling:
less or equal 11 years of schooling 0.8%, more than
11 years of schooling 8.9%. For U.S. schooling: less
or equal 11 years of schooling 4.1%, more than 11
years of schooling 10.2%. RRN: n.a.
RREI: for those with non-U.S. schooling 1.8% (sq. -0.0003), for those
with U.S. schooling 4.2% (sq. -0.0007). RREN n.a. RRYSM: for
those with non-U.S. schooling 2.5% (sq. -0.0003), for those with U.S.
schooling 1.0% (-0.0001). 







Earnings of foreign-born 14.9% lower after 1 year in the country, 9.5% lower
after 5 years, equal after 13 years, and 6.4% higher after 20 years. 
RRI: overall 5.7%, to foreign schooling 5.8%, to
domestic schooling 5.0%. RRN: 7.2%. 
RREI: 2.0% (Experience squared: -0.0003). RREN: 3.2% (sq: -
0.0005). RRYSM: 1.5% (sq: -0.0009)
Foreign-born from English-speaking countries have
1.4pp higher return to education and better
transferability of home country labour market
experience in the U.S.
Clark and 
Lindley (2009)
UK UK Labour Force
Survey 1993-2004.
Equal time effects. Men aged 16-64. Employment rate
(excl. inactive)





Canada) and EU and the
rest of the world. Non-
whites from Britain's
former colonies in Asia,
the Carribean and
Africa and immigrants
from the rest of the
world.
Differentiate results by ethnicities (white/Non-white) and by whether the
Immigrant has completed his/her education (labour market entrant) or
whether he/she still has to complete their education in the UK systerm
(education entrants). Amongst whites, education entrants perform better in
comparison to white natives than labour market entrants. Amongst labour
market entrants, whites do better than non-whites, whilst among education
entrants, highly qualified prime-aged non-whites perform as well as both
white immigrants and natives. Patterns of labour market assimilation are
found to be diverse depending on ethnicity and immigrant type. Labour
market outcomes for all immigrant groups have a tendency to decline with
age relative to white natives.
Labour market entrants: RRI: 6.3% for white
immigrants, 5.6% for non-white immigrants. RRN:
7.9%. Education entrants: RRI for white
immigrants: 67.1% for university degree, 30.7% for
A-levels, 19.4% for O-levels. RRI for non-white
immigrants: 77.6% for university degree, 31.4% for
A-levels, 23.6. for O-levels. RRN for white natives:
69.8% for university degree, 27.8% for A-levels,
19.9% for O-levels.
n.a. The main contribution of the paper is to distinguish
immigrants who arrived to enter the labour market
from those who enter the education system.







Equal cohort effects. Men aged 16+ in 1984, who
were full-time employed at









The author shows within a human capital framework that in the case of
temporary migration the optimal investment into country-specific human
capital is lower than in the case of permanent migration. The empirical
results indicate that foreign workers in the German labour market receive
lower wages than their native counterparts throughout their working history
and that there is no earnings-crossover between these two groups. Using data
on expected length of stay in the country, the empirical results support the
hypothesis that total length of stay positively influences host country specific
human capital investment and thus earnings of immigrants. Earning profiles
are less concave the longer the total intended duration of stay in the host
country.
RRI: for schooling: 1.2%, for job-specific training:
1.0%. RRN: for schooling: 5.5%, for job-specific
training: 3.4%.
RREI: 1.9% (sq: -0.0005). RREN: 3.7% (sq: -0.0007). RRYSM:
1.4% (sq: -0.0002).
The main contribution of the paper is to show that
the migrant's length of stay in the host country has
an effect on his human capital investments and thus
on his relative earnings position. Exploits data on
intended total duration of stay in the host country.
Accounting for German language proficiency









Equal time effects. Individuals aged 18-55 at








Economic migrants are much more likely to emigrate than political ones,
with the least economically successful economic migrants most likely to
leave. Immigrant earnings grew on average by around 20 thousand SEK
relative to natives during their first ten years in Sweden. Controlling for
emigration the relative earnings growth during the first ten years reduces to
13.5 thousand SEK on average. For OECD migrants the authors estimate
negative assimilation. For non-OECD migrants there is still substantial
evidence for unconditional convergence, even after accounting for
emigration. A failure to adjust for emigration leads to an overestimation of
the rate of economic assimilation, especially for Nordic and OECD
immigrants.
RRYSM from cross-sectional estimates: apart from Nordic women no
positive returns to YSM for economic migrants, but positve RRYSM
for immigrants from non-OECD countries. From the longitudinal
analysis: growth for non-OECD migrants slows down after a few years
and cross-section results likely to be driven by changes in cohort
quality.
The main contribution of the paper is to explore the 
extent and patten of immigrant emigration and its
consequences for measures of assimilation.




Equal cohort effects, test
in Appendix using two
cross sections that one
cross section is sufficient
to identify assimilation
rates.
Men aged 25-65. Arabs











The gap in the residual earnings of immigrant and native workers is
eliminated once the national origin of individual's human capital is
accounted for. Human capital acquired abroad receives a lower return in the
host labour market than human capital acquired domestically. Return to
schooling obtained abroad is highest for immigrants from the West (7.1%)
and lowest for immigrants from Asia and Africa (5.7%). The returns to
experience acquired abroad are generally insignificant. The portability of
home country education varies significantly with its level (elementary school
education equally valued in home and host country). 
RRI : 8.0% for domestic schooling and 7.1% for
foreign schooling. RRN: 10.0% to domestic
schooling.
RREI: 1.1% for each year of domestic experience, 0.1% for each year 
of foreign experience. RREN: 1.7%, from estmation of restricted
model RRYSM: 0.8%. 
The main contribution of the paper is to
differentiate between host and home country
education and experience. Friedberg also estimates
a model interacting foreign and domestic human
capital to test whether the return to foreign human




United States Special supplements
to Current Population
Survey (CPS ) 1979,
1983, 1986, 1988
and 1989.
Equal time effects. Men aged between 18-61. Log average
hourly earnings.




Korea, China and the
Philippines).
Tracking the immigrants' skill levels through the 1980s, the authors find that
male immigrants who entered during the late 1980s are more skilled than
those who arrived earlier in the decade. This represents a break from the
steady decline in immigrant skill levels that took place between 1940 to
1980, but the average skill level of recent immigrants remains low by
historical standards.
RRI 5.1%. RRN: 8.2%. RREI: 3.4% (sq: -0.0005). RREN: 5.1% (sq: -0.0008). RRYSM:







(SCF) for natives, for
the years 1981, 1982,
1984-1997.
Equal time effects, with 
comparison group being 
native new entrants into 
the labour market.






Based on a life-cycle human capital framework, the authors argue for
defining cohort quality based on the present value of all future earnings
rather than the entry earnings of an immigrant cohort. Compare newly
arriving immigrants to the subgroup of natives that enters the Canadian
labour market at the same time as the immigrants, arguing that these should
be more likely to be affected by the same macro-shocks and subject to the
same human capital investment conditions. Findings show that changes
affecting all new entrants play an important role in understanding the large
cross-cohort earnings decline in Canada between the 1980s and 1990s.
Present value comparisons show that the 1990s cohorts were not dramatically
worse than the 1980s cohorts. Shifts in the source country composition and
the general new entrant effects account for over 90% of the 1980s decline.
Foreign experience of immigrants from non-English speaking, non-European
countries yields zero return.
n.a. Paper reports full set of estimates for immigrants' earnings profiles
over YSM relative to matched native entrants by education group
(high school and university education), age at entry (distinguishing
four groups), and entry cohort (distinguishing five groups). 
Hayfron (1998) Norway Population Census of
Norway Data Bank
for 1980 and 1990
(8.3% sample of the
central register).
Equal time effects. Men aged 17-55 in 1980
and 27-65 in 1990 who














n.a. The results show that the 1970-1979 cohort experiences a relative earnings
growth of about 11% between 1980 and 1990, which is substantially lower
than the cross-section estimate of 19%. There is rapid earnings divergence
across immigrant cohorts and between the 1960-1969 immigrant cohort and
natives.
Cross-sectional estimates: RRI: 2.4% (1980), 1.9%
(1990). RRN: 3.8% (1980), 6.9% (1990).
Cross-sectional estimates. RREI: 8.8% (sq: -0.0010) (1980), 9.0%
(sq: -0.0010) (1990). RREN: 10.7% (sq: -0.0012) (1980), 4.1% (sq: -






Denmark Registry data 1984-
1995.
Equal time effects. Men aged 20-59 (self-











Initial employment probability for refugees is much lower, but after 5-10
YSM approaches the level of non-refugees and natives. Refugees from Africa
and Palestine have lower initial employment chances than refugess from e.g.
Europe and Vietnam. Refugees start at a much lower wage rate than Danish
workers, and after 4 years their wage growth is just above the wage growth
for Danes. The slow assimilation is partly due to the immigrants' weak
attachment to the Danish labour market.
For hourly wages the paper reports estimates for
education indicators. For Danish-born workers,
hourly wage is 10.2% higher if they completed
secondary education (relative to primary education),
9.4% higher if they completed vocational training,
and 29.9% higher if they completed the highest
education level.
Classical model: RREI: refugees 0.5% (sq: -0.0000), non-refugees
1.6% (sq: 0.0001). RREN: 2.7% (sq: -0.0003). RRYSM (linear
spline function): first 5 years -5.5%, 5-10 years 0%, 10 years and
more, 2%. 
The authors estimate a random effects model of
employment probabilities and hourly wages to
correct for selectivity effects due to missing wage
information and cohort effects separately for
refugee immigrants and non-refugee immigrants.
As education prior to immigration not observed,
results not comparable with those of natives. In
addition to the return to experience (measured by
age and reported in column 10), the authors also
look at the returns to actual labour market
experience.









Focus of the paper is more on potential discrimination of immigrants in the
Dutch labour market. Taking account of sample selection, the authors
estimate that for Antilleans and Turks about 35% and 15% of their wage
gaps relative to natives are due to "discrimination". There is no indication of
discrimination against Surinamese and Moroccan immigrants. 
RRI for schooling abroad: Antilleans 5.1%,
Surinamese 3.6%, Turks -0.2%, Moroccans 0.2%.
RRI for schooling in the Netherlands: Antilleans
4.4%, Surinamese 3.2%, Turks 1.3%, Moroccans
3.0%. RRN: 4.0%.
Cross-sectional estiamtes: RREI for experience abroad: Antilleans
1.3% (sq: -0.0003), Surinamese 2.7% (sq: -0.0004), Turks 0.4% (sq: -
0.0002), Moroccans 0.4% (sq: -0.0001). RREI for experience in the
Netherlands: Antilleans 4.8% (-0.0015), Surinamese 5.5% (sq: -
0.0012), Turks 2.5% (sq: -0.0007), Moroccans 2.2% (sq: -0.0006).
RREN: 3.3% (sq: -0.0005). RRYSM: n.a.
Kossoudji 
(1989)





ethnic group to account











The author estimates a simultaneous equations mixed model of occupational
choice and earnings, distinguishing between immigrants who migrated as
adults and those who migrated as  children. 
For immigrants, except for higher levels of
occupations (professionals), the returns to education
are not significantly different from zero. For natives,
the returns to education are statistically significant
and positive for all occupation groups. No
significant difference in the returns to education by
the location of where education was obtained.
Education always significant in occupational choice
equations.
Results typically exhibit quadratic shape of experience profiles for
workers in all occupations. RREI: experience in the U.S. has a
significant positive effect on earnings for all groups except Hispanic
managers and craft workers and Asian sales/clerical and service
workers. No significant gain from experience accumulated in the
home country. RREN: positive returns for all occupations, returns
higher than for Hispanics, but lower than for Asians. RRYSM: n.a.
The econometric model is different than in most
papers, inhibiting a direct comparison of
coefficients. Dependent variable (earnings) in
levels rather than logs.
LaLonde and 
Topel (1991) 
United States 1970 and 1980 U.S.
Census.
Equal time effects. Men aged 16-64 who











Initial relative earnings between immigrants and natives declined between
1970 and 1980 with an initial earnings disadvantage of 20% in 1970 and
35% in 1980. Decline can be attributed to changes in the composition of
source countries towards Asian and Latin American countries. Assimilation
rates after 10 years since arrival in the U.S. are positive and large.
Assimilation is found to be more rapid for groups who start with lower wages,
such as Asians and Middle Easterners.
n.a. Cumulative effect of 10 YSM (relative to old immigrants of same
ethnicity): Europeans 8%, Asians 24%, Middle Easterners 42%,
Mexicans 21%, Other Latin Americans and Caribbeans 19%.
Assimilation rates are calculated relative to 1)
natives of same ethnicity and 2) older immigrants
of the same ethnicity who have been in the U.S. for
more than 30 years.
Longva and 
Raaum (2003)






Equal time effects. Men aged 17-55 in 1980
and 27-65 in 1990 who
work full-time, and earn
positive income (self-
employed and students


















The authors find that the earnings assimilation of immigrants in Norway from
1980 to 1990 differs considerably between cohorts and by country of origin.
They estimate the relative earnings growth for the 1970-1979 immigrant
cohort to be 6% over the decade (lower than the 11% estimated by Hayfron
(1998). They find earnings of OECD immigrants to be comparable to natives
as opposde to non-OECD immigrants, who earn considerably less than
natives at the time of entry, but improve gradually over time.
All immigrants: RRI: 3.9% (1980), 4.3% (1990).
Separate estimates for OECD and non-OECD
immigrants: RRI OECD: 4.4% (1980), 4.7%
(1990). RRI non-OECD: 2.4% (1980), 3.3%
(1990). RRN: 3.7% (1980), 5.2% (1990). 
Cross-sectional estimates. All immigrants: RREI: 6.0% (sq: -0.0007)
(1980), 5.3% (sq: -0.0006) (1990). Separate estimates for OECD and
non-OECD immigrants: RREI OECD: 8.0% (sq: -0.0009) (1980),
6.1% (sq: -0.0007) (1990). RREI non-OECD: 4.6% (sq: -0.0006)
(1980), 4.6% (sq: -0.0005) (1990). RREN: 11.9% (sq: -0.0014)
(1980), 4.5% (sq: -0.0005) (1990). RRYSM: n.a.
The authors replicate the study by Hafron (1998)
on the census immigrant population as opposed to a
random sample of immigrants. The authors observe
the exact year of immigration. In contrast to Hafron 
(1998) they define immigrants by country of origin
and perform separate analyses of immigrants
coming from OECD and non-OECD countries.

















which are adjusted in the
same way.






n.a. Actual earnings growth among immigrants who remained in the U.S. until the
1990s was considerably slower than implied by estimates based on repeated
cross-sectional data. Over their first 20 years immigrant earnings in the
longitudinal data grew by 10-15% relative to natives, while repeated cross-
sections suggest a growth about twice as fast, of about 26%. Selective
emigration by low-wage immigrants leads to overestimation of economic
assimilation when using census data. Back-and-forth migration, which leads
to misclassification of many low-wage immigrants as more recent arrivals,
has caused typical estimates to overstate the measured decline in the entry
level of earnings of immigrants between the 1960s and 1980s by one-third.
n.a. RRYSM: repeated cross-sectional data suggest immigrants relative
earnings gap to narrow by 13% in the first ten years and an earnings
growth of 10 to 20 pp in each successive decade; longitudinal data:
relative earnings grow by 12-15% in the first 15 years in the U.S. and
relatively little thereafter.
The main contribution of the paper is to use
longitudinal data to estimate immigrants'
assimilation profiles. Study focuses on measuring
the unconditional differences in earnings between
natives and immigrants and thus educational
attainment is not controlled for. Uses
semiparametric Censored Least absolute deviation







Equal cohort effects. Immigrants aged 15-65
(working at least 10 hours
per week and earning net








With the exception of immigrants from developed countries and immigrants
who have studied in Spain, the returns to host country human capital are
higher than returns to home country human capital. Having legal status is
associated with a wage premium.
RRI: for foreign schooling 1.8%, for schooling in
Spain 3.3%. RRN: 4 % (from Wage Structure
Survey 2006). Immigrants from developed countries
have higher return to home country education
(6.0%) than Latin Americans (1.8%) and Eastern
Europeans (1.1%).
RREI 0.7% (sq: -0.0002). RREN: n.a. RRYSM: 1.4% (sq: -0.0000). Aim to take possible bias in employment selection
into account by using a Heckman-correction.




Canada 1986, 1991 and 1996
Canadian Census.
Effect of age on earnings
t h es a m ef o ri m m i g r a n t s




Men aged 16-64 on the
survey date who worked





n.a. The authors observe a correlation between age at immigration and earnings,
which is driven by three main effects: absence of a return to source country
work experience, the return to education varying with age at immigration,
and an acculturation effect for immigrants who are visible minorities or
whose mother tongue is not English. Educational attainment and earnings
vary systematically across age at immigration. Immigrants who arrive around
age 15 to 18 complete fewer years of schooling than those who arrive either
earlier or later.
RRI for schooling abroad: 5.7% (1986), 5.9%
(1991), 6.3% (1996). RRI for schooling in Canada:
5.5% (1986), 6.3% (1991), 7.0% (1996). RRN:
7.3% (1986), 7.6% (1991), 7.7% (1996).
Cross-sectional estimates: RREI for experience abroad: 0.9% (sq: -
0.0002) (1986), 0.8% (sq: -0.0001) (1991), 0.9% (sq: 0.0001)
(1996). RREI for experience in Canada: 5.1% (sq: -0.0011) (1986),
4.6% (sq: -0.0009) (1991), 4.4% (sq: -0.0008) (1996). RREN: 6.2%
(sq: -0.0010) (1986), 6.0% (sq: -0.0009) (1991), 6.1% (sq. -0.0009)
(1996). RRYSM: n.a.
In a first section, the authors analyse in detail the
effect of age-at-immigration. 
Schoeni (1997) United States 1970, 1980 and 1990
U.S. Census.















Europeans have entered the the U.S. labour market with relatively high
wages and have earned wages comparable to natives over their life course.
Japanese, Koreans and Chinese had a lower initial wage, but have quickly
caught up with U.S.-born workers. Mexicans and Central Americans entered
with low wages and the wage gap between them and comparable U.S.-
workers has not shrunk. Wages are closely linked to education and returns to
education are higher if some schooling was obtained in the United States.
RRI: for immigrants without U.S. schooling: 4.5%
(1970), 5.1% (1980), 5.3% (1990). For immigrants
with some U.S. schooling: 6% (1970), 5.6% (1980),
and 5.7% (1990). RRN: 7.9% (1970), 7.1% (1980),
and 10.3% (1990). Returns vary substantially by
country of origin: in 1990 the RRI was 5.3% for
Mexicans, around 8% for most other groups, and
13.1% for Japanese, Koreans and Chinese.
The author accounts for 6 5-year categories for YSM. Detailed
results for each country of origin group reported with full interactions
of all variables with census year dummies.
The author imputes the time how long the
immigrants were educated at U.S. schools. They
depict wage profiles for immigrants who have and
have not received U.S. education; Mexican and
Central Americans who attended U.S. schools had
higher wage profiles than those who did not, but
there is no significant difference for immigrants

















Native-born non-whites and white (other) receive higher returns from
schooling obtained in the UK than native-born whites. All other immigrant
groups have lower returns to schooling than native-born whites. For non-white 
natives, UK labour market experience is more beneficial and for all
immigrant groups less beneficial than for white natives. For Irish and non-
white immigrants in England there is not statistically significant return to
experience abroad.
RRI for foreign education: white British 3.7%, Irish
4.2%, other white 7.4%, non-whites 3.3%. RRI for
UK education: white British 3.8%, Irish 4.4%, other
white 10%, non-whites 4.1%. RRN: whites 4.9%,
non-whites 6.6%.
Cross-sectional estimates. RREI UK experience: white British 3.3%
(sq: -0.0007), Irish 2.5% (sq: -0.0006), other white 2.4% (sq: -
0.0003), non-whites 3.0% (sq: -0.0006). RREI foreign experience:
white British 2.4% (sq: -0.0008), Irish 2.0% (sq: -0.0007), other
white 4.5% (sq: -0.0008), non-whites 0.2% (-0.0001). RREN: whites
3.8% (sq: -0.0006), non-whites 4.5% (sq: -0.0008). RRYSM: n.a.
The authors correct for the selectivity bias in the












Earnings differ greatly by race and country of origin. Immigrants from
Scandinavia and Western Europe earned higher incomes than migrants from
the U.K., whereas immigrants from the Orient, South America and the West
Indies earned significantly less. Black and Hispanic immigrants were found
to have depressed earnings profiles with the differential relative to non-black
immigrants increasing over time.
RRI: overall 3.5%, to home country schooling 3.2%,
to host country schooling 3.4%. Returns to having
attended vocational training: 3.1%.  RRN: n.a.
RREI: overall 2.8% (sq: -0.0006), to experience in home country
1.5% (sq: -0.0003), to experience in host country 3.4% (sq: -0.0007).
RRYSM: overall 1.9% (sq: -0.0003).
The main contribution of the paper is to augment
the human capital framework used by Chiswick
(1978) by distinguishing between home and host
country education and experience, and by adding
dummies for the country of origin and interacting
them with the YSM variable to allow for different













GNP in sending country
being valid instrument
for the probability of



















The results with and without the return intention controls that are observed in
the data are very similar. The return to experience on the job is almost the
same for natives and immigrants. The return to age is higher among natives
than among immigrants. Migrants initially start at similar earnings levels, but
their wage growth over time is smaller than for natives. Initial differences in
days worked per year between native and immigrant workers persist over
time. The relative wage differential over time is increasing faster for
Africans than for the other immigrant groups, whereas for Asians and Eastern
Europeans the widening of the employment differential stops after 5 years.
n.a. RREI: 3.1% (sq: -0.0001). RREN: 5.5% (sq: -0.0003). No information on educational attainment
available. Estimates separate models for
immigrants and natives with individual fixed
effects.




Equal cohort effects. Men aged 15-64, employed







The author accounts for age at migration and potentially different effects of
years since migration for different arrival ages. For a given stock of human
capital initial earnings are lower for younger arrivals, but their earnings
growth is faster with time in the destination country. The return to eduation
for immigrants with language difficulties is significantly lower. 
Without control for age at migration: RRI for
English speakers 4.6%, non-English speakers 5.1%.
With control for age at migration: RRI for English
speakers 4.5%, non-English speakers 4.4%. RRN:
n.a.
Without control for age at migration: RREI for English speakers 1.7%
(sq. -0.0003), for non-English speakers 1.9% (sq. -0.0003). With
control for age at migration: RREI for English speakers 0.3% (sq: -
0.0001), for non-English speakers 1.0% (sq: -0.0003), both main
effects not statistically signifcant. RREN: n.a. RRYSM greater for
child arrivals than later arrivals.
Note: Main immigrant groups in Column (7) refer to main groups focussed on in the analysis, not necessarily the main groups present in the country.Figure 5: Selection Scenarios
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Medium 2 2.5 1221 7 6 . 5 0 . 5
H i g h 321221 7 8 - 1
Table 11: Example Intermediate Selection







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Australia 60.7 21.2 0.3 33.9 11.0 9.3 15.7** 15.3** 11.1**
Canada 67.9 20.7 0.3 48.3 2.4 6.3 -2.7 -1.8 -3.2
France 76.8 19.7 0.3 34.8 10.9 38.9 -38.9** -32.5** -21.0*
Germany 83.8 11.2 0.4 55.0 11.7 24.8 -58.1** -31.7** -29.3**
Italy 91.0 6.4 0.1 66.9 27.3 22.1 -38.6** -28.0* -33.2
Netherlands 82.5 10.6 0.1 46.1 8.3 29.7 -53.8** -52.4** -46.3**
Spain 89.1 6.9 0.3 33.0 37.5 25.3 -47.8** -49.3** -55.4**
Switzerland 62.5 3.4 0.1 56.9 14.9 35.8 -69.5** -47.1** -44.0**
United Kingdom 84.3 9.1 0.1 38.0 4.2 10.5 -14.6* -6.7 -7.2
United States 80.1 13.7 0.4 62.3 2.4 25.0 -22.9** -2.2 4.8
PISA Test Score Gap (Mathematics)
Source: PISA 2006. Columns (1) and (2) report the share of native and immigrant students in the PISA student population. Native students are defined as those born in the country of
assessment with both parents as well born in the country of assessment. Immigrant students are those born either in the country of assessment or in another country with both parents
foreign-born. The missing category are students with mixed background. Columns (5) and (6) show the percent of families where both parents have low education. Values of summary
statistics are computed using the final weights provided by PISA.
Columns (7) to (9) report the proficiency gaps in mathematics of immigrant relative to native students. The values are the estimated coefficients of a regression of PISA scores on a
dummy for immigrants (the omitted category is natives). Column (7) reports unconditional regressions; column (8) adds a dummy for whether or not the language of assessment is
spoken at home, and column (9) adds dummies for the higher educational level of either parent ("low" - no schooling, primary education, lower secondary education; "medium" -
secondary education, post-secondary non-tertiary education; "high" - tertiary education, post-graduate education). The regressions are run separately for each country. All coefficients
and standard errors are estimated according to the "Unbiased Shortcut" procedure (OECD, 2009), using the replicate weights provided by PISA. Stars indicate that the difference
between the immigrant and the native average score is statistically significant at the 1 percent level (**) and at the 5 percent level (*). 
Table 12: PISA Outcomes - Summary Statistics and Regression Results
% of Student Population % Foreign Language at Home
Destination Country
% Low Education FamiliesAuthors Country Data Definition 1st Generation Definiton 2nd Generation Dependent Variable
Generational Income Elasticity - Immigrants (and 
Natives if available)
Remarks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Aydemir et al. (2009) Canada 1981, 2001 Canadian Census. Foreign-born men with a
foreign-born spouse who
have children aged 5-17 in
1981.
Canadian-born, both parents




Sons: 0.27*. Daughters: -0.048 (insignificant). For
annual earnings, Sons: 0.18*. Daughters -0.093. For
natives, 0.19 for annual earnings for the overall
population (reported from other study in Table 1).
Uses grouped averages for seventy countries of origin, separately for
sons and daughters. All earnings are adjusted for differences in
demographic characteristics (age and region) across country groups.
Outcomes measured at age 40 (first generation) and age 31 (second
generation). Transmission of earnings only slightly through the
impact of paternal earnings on the educational attainment of children.
Analysis includes study of the effect of social capital.
Borjas (1992) United States General Social Surveys (GSS) and
the National Longitudinal Surveys
of Youth (NLSY) 1977-1989.
Foreign-born men. U.S.-born, at least one foreign-
born parent, aged 18-64 in the





attainment and log wage in
NLSY.
GSS education: 0.27*; total effect of parental and
ethnic capital: 0.48. GSS occupations: 0.20*; total
effect of parental and ethnic capital: 0.64. NLSY
education: 0.27*; total effect of parental and ethnic
capital: 0.37. NLSY wage: 0.35*; total effect of
parental and ethnic capital: 0.61.
Individual level data, GSS uses 33 ethnicities, NLSY 20 ethnicities.
GSS does not report place of birth and therefore uses self-reported
ethnicities. NLSY has place of birth which is highly correlated with
ethnicity. Ethnic capital is measured as the average skill level of the
ethnic group in the father's generation. The father's wage is obtained
by matching the father's occupation code with average earnings for the 
occupation obtained from the 1970 Census.
Borjas (1993) United States 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970 U.S.
Census.
Foreign-born men aged 25-
64.
U.S.-born men, at least one
parent foreign-born.
Earnings relative to third
generation Americans.
0.27* (relating 1970 second-generation workers to their
presumed 1940 immigrant fathers). Reduces to 0.25*
with ethnic capital (the group average in 1970)
included.
Uses grouped averages for 23 countries of origin. All earnings are
adjusted for differences in demographic characteristics across country
groups. Analysis also includes source country characteristics who are
found to have an impact on second-generation earnings.
Borjas (2006b) United States 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970 U.S.
Census.
Foreign-born, aged 18-64. U.S.-born, at least one foreign-
born parent, aged 18-64.
Log weekly earnings relative
to third generation Americans.
Men: 0.511 for 1940-1970 and 0.560 for 1970-2000.
Women: 0.242 for 1940-1970 and 0.280 for 1970-2000.
Uses grouped averages. 1940-70 regressions use 30 national origin
groups, 1970-2000 uses 61 origin groups. Estimates are adjusted for
age. 
Card, DiNardo, and Estes
(2000)
United States 1940 and 1970 U.S. Census,
Pooled 1994-96 Current Population
Survey.
Foreign-born men, aged 16-
66.
U.S.-born men and women,
both parents foreign-born, aged
16-66.
Mean log weekly wages and
mean years of schooling.
Men: 0.44* for 1940-70 and 0.62* for 1970-1995.
Women: 0.21* for 1940-1970 and 0.50* for 1970-1995.  
Estimated on immigrant group level means. Use 34 countries (or
country groups) between 1940-70, and 33 countries (or country
groups) between 1970 and 1994-96. Estimates adjusted for age and
region. 
Carliner (1980) United States 1970 U.S. Census. Foreign-born ("earlier
immigrants"), aged 18-64,
distinguish those who
a r r i v e di nt h eU . S .b e t w e e n
1965 and 1970 ("recent
immigrants").
U.S.-born men, at least one
foreign-born parent, aged 18-
64. 3rd generation: U.S.-born,
both parents also U.S.-born.
Log hourly wages and log
annual earnings.
n.a. Considers 8 ethnicity groups from Latin America, Asia, Europe and
Canada. Regressions run on a pooled sample of nonstudent men who
had positive wages in 1969, with dummy variables for recent
immigrant, 2nd generation and 3rd generation. Results indicate that
recent immigrants have lower wages and lower earnings than earlier
immigrants for all ethnic groups but blacks. The 2nd generation had
higher wages than earlier immigrants among 7 of the 8 groups, but
difference only significant for 3 groups (Puerto Rican, Japanese,
Chinese). Controls include dummy for English in childhood home,
dummies for marital categories, years of schooling, and a quadratic in
age.
Deutsch (2006) Israel 1995 Census of Israel. Male Jews, older than 10
when they immigrated to
Israel between 1948 and
1952, from Asian-African
countries. 
F o r e i g n - b o r nm e n ,a g e d1 0o r
younger who came between
1948 and 1952, and Israelis,
aged between 33 and 53 in
1995, with foreign-born fathers.
3rd generation: Israelis younger
than 33 in 1995 with immigrant
fathers whose age at
immigration was 10 or younger.
Log monthly gross wages. n.a. Three-generation migrant analysis on two levels: (1) among three
generations of immigrants from Asian-African source countries; and
(2) between immigrants and native Israeli population. Wage equations
estimated for each generation, independent variables include a
quadratic in years of experience, schooling, B.A., M.A. and Ph.D.
Find poitive effect of the level of education on wage returns. Also
conduct wage decompositions. These show that for first- and third
generation immigrants, the wage differentials between the native
Israeli population and the immigrants are positive, whereas in the
second generation the opposite holds. 




Baseline estimate: 0.15*. If at least 5 wage observations
used for average wage: 0.37*. If at least 8 wage
observations used: 0.41*. Last estimate drops to 0.39*
if control for father's permanent migration propensity is
included. Baseline estimate natives: 0.18*. If at least 5
wage observations used: 0.25*. If at least 8 wage
observations used: 0.29*.
Uses individual level panel data which follow both fathers and their
actual sons over time. Several wage observations that help identifying
the permanent income component which turns out to play an
important role. Focus on impact of permanent migration intention of
father on son's wage. Found to be positive. Study also provides
estimates of intergenerational coefficient of father's years of
education on son's years of education, which is 0.06 for immigrants,
and 0.22* for natives.
Gang and Zimmermann
(2000)
Germany GSOEP 1984-2002. Foreign-born men. German-born to foreign parents
or who arrived before the age of
16, aged 17-38 in 1984.
Total years of education,
categorical schooling levels,
and receipt or absence of
vocational training.
Migrants' education has no effect on the educational
attainment of their children. Natives education has an
effect on the educational attainment of the next
generation; father's education has a larger impact than
mother's education.
Uses individual level panel data which follows both fathers and their
actual sons over time. Focus is on educational attainment relative to
native born. Consider Turks, Yugoslavs, Greeks, Italians, Spaniards.
Specifications include many RHS variables, including competition
from native Germans within cohort, parental capital, social support




Sweden 1975, 1980, Swedish Census,
foreign-born individuals who
immigrated to Sweden between
1916 and 1969, and were gainfully
employed in 1970. Data on all
biological children for the years
1997, 1998, and 1999.
Foreign-born men aged 20-
64 in 1975 and 1980.
Swedish-born, father foreign-
born, aged 20-64 in 1997, 1998
and 1999.
Annual earnings. OLS, average of 1975 and 1980 earnings: 0.207*. IV,
using parent's educational attainment: 0.39*. OLS
natives: 0.14*. IV natives: 0.22*. Regressions include
quadratic polynomial in age for 1st and 2nd generation
on RHS. 
For each 1st generation immigrant, a native Swede randomly selected
from a cell with the same age, gender, county and occupational satus.
Father's annual earnings from 1975 and 1980. Son's earnings from
1997, 1998 and 1999. 20 regions of origin. Large differences between
different groups of 2nd generation immigrants, depending on origin.
For some groups such as Nordic and some Eastern and Western




Denmark Entire population of immigrants
and 10% of Danish population for
1985-1997.  
Foreign-born men and
women from less developed
countries. 
Danish-born, both parents
foreign-born, aged 18-35, left
education.
Log hourly wages in the first
job after leaving education.
Sons: 0.001. Daughters: -0.003. Natives sons: -0.009*.
Native Daughters: 0.001*.
Ethnic group defined by country of origin (100 countries). Wage
equation control for several parental characteristics including
education. Also include ethnic capital variables, education,
experience, age, marital status, region. 
Osterberg (2000) Sweden Swedish income panel (SWIP) data
from 1978 to 1997. From 1978 a
1% sample of native-born and a
10% sample of foreign-born was
taken. Supplementary 10% samples
of people immigrating each year
from 1979 until 1997.
Foreign-born individuals
aged less than 65 in 1982.
Observed between 1978 and
1982.
Swedish-born, at least one
foreign-born parent ("2nd
generation"). Foreign-born who
immigrated to Sweden when not
older than 16 years of age
("young immigrants"). Foreign-
born with both parents Swedish-
born ("adopted immigrants").
All individuals aged 25 and
more and observed between
1993 and 1997.
Log of average of son's and
daughter's reported annual
earnings over the period 1993-
1997.
Sons (log of father's earnings): 2nd generation: 0.079*,
young immigrant: 0.107*, adopted: 0.007*. Sons (log of 
mother's earnings): 2nd generation: 0.079*, young:
0.076*, adopted: 0.076*. Daugthers (log of father's
earnings): 2nd generation: 0.037*, young: 0.068*,
adopted: -0.004*. Daughters (log of mother's earnings):
2nd generation: 0.041*, young: 0.045*, adopted: -
0.025*. Native sons (log of father's earnings): 0.068*.
Native sons (log of mother's earnings): 0.022. Native
daughters (log of father's earnings): 0.042*, Native
daugthers (log of mother's earnings): 0.080*.
Use OLS and a quantile regression approach. Use a five-year average
over 1978-82 for father's and mother's earnings adjusted for age
differences. For all earnings the average earnings of both generations
and sexes are regressed on age and age-squared. The residuals are
saved and the age-adjusted income is calculated as the expected
income, evaluated at age 40 for both generations, and the individual
specific residual is then added. Regressions include age, and age-
squared of child, dummies for second generation, young immigrant or
adopted immigrants interacted with the parents' earnings.
Riphahn (2003) Germany German Mikrocensuses for 1989,
1991, 1993, 1995, and 1996.
Foreign citizen with a valid






-0.285* (coeff. for father's lowest schooling degree),
0.267* (coeff. for father's advanced vocational training).
-0.442* (coeff. for mother's lowest schooling degree),
0.367* (coeff. for mother's advanced vocational
training). 
Analysis of pooled cross-sectional data using probit estimator. Socio-
demographic control variables include a person’s year of birth, sex,
whether living in East Germany (relevant after 1989), and the size of
the city of residence. Higer parental education is significantly
associated with a child's advanced school attendance. The average
second generation immigrant coefficient is -0.19* and the predicted
enrollment advantage of natives over immigrants is 5 percentage
points.
Smith (2003) United States Census (1940-1970) and Current
Population Survey (CPS) (special
supplements from1979, 1983, 1986
and 1988, and CPS from 1994-
1998). 
Foreign-born men. U.S.-born men, at least one
foreign-born parent. 3rd
generation or more: both
parents U.S.-born.
Years of schooling and log
wages.
Years of schooling: 0.50* (2nd generation regressed on
1st), 0.22* (3rd generation regressed on 2nd). Log
wages: 0.46* (2nd generation regressed on 1st), 0.27*
(3rd regressed on 2nd).
Focus is on Mexicans and Hispanics. Uses grouped data. Wages have
been normalised to place all generations at the same place in their life-
cycle earnings profiles, therefore estimates measure long-run
elasticities. 
Trejo (2003) United States Current Population Survey, 1979
and 1989.
Foreign-born, parents also
foreign-born, aged over 16.
U.S.-born men, at least one
foreign-born parent, aged 18-
61. 3rd generation: U.S.-born




n.a. Distinguishes two groups: Mexicans, and non-Hispanic whites.
Estimates separate cross-section wage regressions for every
ethnicity/generation group in each survey year. Predicted wage
differentials relative to 3rd generation whites at 3 different points in
the life cycle: Age 20: -0.551* (1st generation), -0.245* (2nd), -
0.235* (3rd). Age 40: -0.590* (1st), -0.199* (2nd), -0.262* (3rd).
Age 60: -0.525 (1st), -0.405* (2nd), -0.108 (3rd).
Table 13: Summary of the Literature on Immigrants' Intergenerational Mobility